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TOWARD A NONZERO-SUM APPROACH TO RESOLVING
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES:




All societies, communities, organizations, and interpersonal relation-
ships experience conflict at one time or another in the process of day-
to-day interaction. Conflict is not necessarily bad, abnormal, or
dysfunctional; it is a fact of life. Conflict and disputes exist when
people are engaged in competition to meet goals that are perceived to
be, or actually are, incompatible. However, conflict may go beyond
competitive behavior and acquire the additional purpose of inflicting
physical or psychological damage on an opponent, even to the point
of destruction. It is then that the negative and harmful dynamics of
conflict exact their full costs.'
INTRODUCTION
Countries differ in terms of their levels of wealth, economic structures,
technological capabilities, political systems, and cultural tradition.2 No
two countries have identical conditions, needs, and aspirations.3 As a
result, policymakers face different political pressures and make different
* Acting Assistant Professor of Law, Executive Director, Intellectual Property Law Program, and
Deputy Director, Howard M. Squadron Program in Law, Media and Society, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law, Yeshiva University; Research Associate, Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy,
Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. The author would like to thank the participants of
the First Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, including Ann Bartow, Graeme Dinwoodie,
Patty Gerstenblith, Wendy Gordon, Cynthia Ho, Timothy Holbrook, Jay Kesan, Roberta Kwall, Mark
Lemley, Malla Pollack, Susan Scafidi, and Jed Scully, for their helpful comments and suggestions on an
earlier draft of this Article.
1. CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT, at xiii (2d ed. 1996).
2. MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 191 (1998); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Propery in
China in the TwenOy-first Centugy, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 239 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners];
Peter K. Yu, Piracy, PrIudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S-China Intellectual
Proper!y Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 84 (2001) [hereinafter Yu, Piraq, Prudice, and Perspectives].
3. RYAN, supra note 2, at 201; see also Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of
Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 333 (1994) ("Fundamental
differences in concepts of ownership and legal regimes provide at least some explanation as to why it has
been so difficult to draft a multilateral intellectual property agreement. A favorable agreement for one
country could be unfavorable for another country.").
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value judgments as to what would best promote the creation and
dissemination of intellectual works in their own countries.4 These
uncoordinated judgments eventually result in a conflicting set of
intellectual property laws around the world.
As countries become increasingly interdependent in this globalized
economy, these conflicting laws create tension and sometimes result in
disputes. To minimize differences and prevent conflicts, countries use
a variety of dispute resolution techniques, including self-help, coercion,
mutual exchange of information, international agreements, and
multilateral regimes. Commentators generally analyze these techniques
by focusing on the number of parties involved in resolving an intellectual
property dispute.5 Usinga unilateral-bilateral-multilateral trichotomy,
commentators suggest that one can infer some general characteristics of
a dispute resolution arrangement by counting' the number of parties
involved in resolving a conflict.
Consider, for example, the differences between a bilateral agreement
and a multilateral regime. Commentators generally consider a bilateral
agreement more effective in addressing the individual concerns and
circumstances facing a particular country,6 for such an agreement "can
take into consideration the particular phases of development confronting
each country, and provide for the gradual inclusion of a developing
country into the global economy."7 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
that the bilateral agreements initiated by the United States after it had
threatened to impose trade sanctions "ha[d] generally encouraged
4. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 239.
5. See DORIS ESTELLE LONG & ANTHONY D'AMATO, A COURSEBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 284 (2000) ("Treaty regimes currently fall into two broad categories-bilateral
and multilateral."); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 95-141 (2001) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW]
(classifying trade principles and processes into multilateral, regional, and bilateral arrangements and
unilateral initiatives); INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 219 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris
Estelle Long eds., 1997) (discussing the differences between bilateral and multilateral treaties); Giunta &
Shang, supra note 3, at 339-40 (discussing the differences between bilateral agreements and multilateral
treaties).
6. GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONALINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 139 (noting that
the lengthy enforcement action plan annexed to the 1995 China-U.S. Agreement Regarding Intellectual
Property Rights "imposed more detailed procedural obligations than could be provided in a multilateral
agreement such as TRIPs"); Giunta & Shang, supra note 3, at 339 ("Bilateral agreements provide the most
workable vehicle for addressing the contentious issues surrounding intellectual property protection.").
. 7. Giunta & Shang, supra note 3, at 339; see also GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 139 (noting that the lengthy enforcement action plan annexed to the 1995
China-U.S. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights "specified particularized enforcement efforts
for motion pictures, literary works and software").
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speedier and more substantial changes in suspect nations, as failure to
comply might result in immediate trade sanctions."8
By contrast, a multilateral regime usually results in compromises,9
which often are shaped by the intergovernmental body responsible for
organizing the treaty conference, such as the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the World Trade
Organization (WTO). " Nonetheless, "multinational solutions present
the advantage of establishing a protection standard binding on a greater
number of countries than a bilateral solution."1  Even when the
interests of the signatory countries have changed, multilateral solutions
sometimes may be able to continue and persist in their own right. 2
Although the above comparison provides some helpful insights into
the general differences between a bilateral agreement and a multilateral
regime, it provides very limited information about the effectiveness and
future prospects of the dispute resolution arrangement. After all, a
multilateral regime can lead to an ineffective compromise that is
considered coercive by one or more signatory countries. 3 On the other
hand, despite the lack of reciprocity, a unilateral initiative can lead to
further cooperation that results in a longlasting dispute settlement. 4
8. Giunta & Shang, supra note 3, at 340; see also Ashoka Mody, New International Environment for
Intellectual Properqy Rikhts, in INTrELLECTUALPROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 203, 225 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole Ganz Brown
eds., 1990) ("In the short-run, bilateralism is proving more effective than multilateral efforts in furthering
U.S. interests. Bilateralism is quicker and allows more focused and tailored responses.").
9. GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONALINTELLECTUALPROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 223 (noting that
"the need to achieve concurrence among so many parties often leads to less stringent standards" and that
such standards "may be difficult (if not impossible) to raise through bilateral efforts").
10. Id. at 219.
II. Id. at 223.
12. See Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchi IVorld, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 115, 138 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) [hereinafter Stein, Coordination and Collaboration] ("Regimes
may be maintained-even after shifts in the interests that gave rise to them .... ). Professor Stein provided
four reasons for such persistence: (1) the delays in recalculation or reassessment of interests; (2) sunk costs
involved in international institutions; (3) tradition, legitimacy, and the reluctance to damage reputation by
breaking with customary behavior; and (4) the changing mindset from self-maximization to joint-
maximization. See id. at 138-39.
13. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement]; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the coercive nature and ineffectiveness of the TRIPs
Agreement).
14. Examples of such initiatives are available in the form of arms control proposals. See BARRY B.
HUGHES, CoN-I'NUITY AND CHANGE IN WORLD PourTics: THE CLASH OFPERSPECTIVES 141-43 (2d ed.
1994) (discussing unilateral initiatives); Charles E. Osgood, Recprocal Initiative, in THE LIBERAL PAPERS 155
(James Roosevelt ed., 1962) (proposing graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT)). The tit-for-tat
strategy proposed by Anatol Rapoport is instructive in understanding why unilateral initiatives can invite
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In light of the inadequacy of the unilateral-bilateral-multilateral
trichotomy, this Article proposes a new, but companion, 5 analytical
framework to examine intellectual property dispute resolution arrange-
ments. Instead of focusing on the number of parties involved, this
framework concentrates on the dispute resolution approach used to
resolve the conflict. Because countries sometimes use several ap-
proaches to resolve complex intellectual property disputes, 6 one may
need to focus on the various parts of the dispute resolution arrangement
to divine the particular approach used to resolve the conflict.
Part I of the Article outlines the three different approaches commonly
used to resolve intellectual property disputes, namely the coercive
approach, the adversary approach, and the cooperative approach. This
Part argues that the outcome of the cooperative approach will depend
on the mindset of the negotiators involved in resolving the dispute.' 7 If
negotiators have a zero-sum mindset, the approach usually results in
compromises in which losses are distributed among the parties. ' If they
have a nonzero-sum mindset, the approach usually results in a forward-
looking solution that provides mutual benefits to all the parties
involved. 19
Part II looks at recent developments in the fields of alternative dispute
resolution,2" business competition strategy,2' and international
relations.22 This Part argues that a nonzero-sum approach has been
increasingly embraced as the more preferable means to resolve disputes,
compete, and tackle global problems. Drawing on the experiences of
mediators, business strategists, and international relations theorists, Part
III argues that the nonzero-sum approach is the most preferable means
to resolve global intellectual property disputes. This Part further
reciprocation despite its one-sidedness. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54
(1984) (discussing tit-for-tat strategies). For an excellent overview of game theory written by Professor
Rapoport, see generally ANATOL RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAMES, AND DEBATES (1960).
15. The analytical framework proposed in this Article seeks to find out the effectiveness and future
prospects of a dispute resolution arrangement. However, it does not attempt to find out the general
characteristics of that arrangement. To do so, one may still need to use the unilateral-bilateral-multilateral
trichotomy.
16. Very often, more than one approach is used in a multilateral treaty involving a large number of
signatories, such as the TRIPs Agreement and the WIPO Internet Treaties. See TRIPs Agreement, supra
note 13; WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94 (Dec. 23, 1996);
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95 (Dec.
23, 1996).
17. See discussion infaa Part I.C.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 106-09.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
20. See discussion infia Part iI.A.
21. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
22. See discussion infrta Part II.C.
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discusses the prerequisites needed for the approach to succeed, situations
where the approach is inappropriate or will be ineffective, and the
implications of the approach for the rule of law. To illustrate the
nonzero-sum approach, Part IV examines recent disputes between the
European Union and the United States, 23 developed and less developed
countries,24 and China and the United States.25
I. COMMON APPROACHES USED TO RESOLVE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES
Traditionally, countries have used three different approaches, or a
combination of them, to resolve intellectual property disputes. These
approaches include (1) the coercive approach, (2) the adversary
approach, and (3) the cooperative approach. Sometimes, the nature of
the approach is apparent from the dispute resolution arrangement. For
example, who would mistake the coercive nature of unilateral trade
sanctions or protective tariffs? Likewise, who would second-guess the
cooperative nature of technical assistance or the exchange of informa-
tion between government authorities? Most of the time, however, the
nature of the approach is hidden from the dispute resolution arrange-
ment. To divine the approach used to resolve the conflict, one must
focus on the various parts of the dispute resolution arrangement. This
Part outlines the three different approaches commonly used to resolve
intellectual property disputes.
A. Coercive Approach
Under the coercive approach, a party uses its strength or bargaining
position to force the other party to do what it otherwise would refuse.
This approach has been widely practiced throughout history. During
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "Social Darwinism was the
order of the day,"26 justifying overseas expansion with the philosophy
that only the strongest nation was fit to survive in a process of natural
selection.2 7  Driven by nationalism, evangelism, capitalism, and
Darwinism,98 Western nations used their military and economic might
to coerce into submission their less powerful neighbors and "new
23. See discussion infia Part IV.A.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
25. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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discoveries." Such coercion led to expansive colonization in Africa,
Asia, the Middle East, and South America.29 To maximize their
economic interests, the Western powers demanded their colonies to
trade only with them. They also dictated what the colonies could trade
and at what price these colonies could do so."
As time passed, this violent approach had given way to a nonviolent
coercive approach. The textbook example of such an approach is
section 301 of the Trade Act of 197431 of the United States (section 301).
Section 301 was developed in response to Congress's dissatisfaction with
the outdated General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade"2 (GATT) and
the agreement's inability to protect U.S. economic interests.33 Aiming
to eliminate unfair trade practices and open foreign markets,34 section
301 permits the President of the United States to investigate and impose
sanctions on countries engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten
the United States's economic interests.
35
29. For excellent discussions of imperialism in the late nineteenth century, see generally CARLTON
J.H. HAYES, A GENERATION OFMATERIALISM, 187 1-1900(1941); WILLIAM L. LANGER, THE DIPLOMACY
OF IMPERIALISM, 1890-1902 (1950).
30. See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 306.
31. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (2000).
32. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
33. The legislative history of section 301 states:
[T] he President ought to be able to act or threaten to act under section 301, whether or not
such action would be entirely consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Many GATT articles. .. are either inappropriate in today's economic world or are being
observed more often in the breach, to the detriment of the United State&...
The Committee is not urging that the United States undertake wanton or reckless
retaliatory action under section 301 in total disdain of applicable international agreements.
However, the Committee felt it was necessary to make it clear that the President could act
to protect U.S. economic interests whether or not such action was consistent with the articles
of an outmoded international agreement initiated by the Executive 25 years ago and never
approved by the Congress.
S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 166 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7304; see also Kim Newby, The
Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSEJ.
INT'L L. & COM. 29, 33 (1995) ("The enacting of § 301 was seen as a direct result of Congressional
dissatisfaction with the manner in which U.S. trade was being protected under GATT."); Susan Tiefenbrun,
liray of Intellectual Poper y in China and the Former Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International Trade: A Comparison,
46 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 40 (1998) ("Section 301 for the Trade Act of 1974 arose from the need perceived by the
United States to strike back against unfair trade practices that were not enforced by GATT panel
condemnation.").
34. Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralis" An Overiew, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1, 4 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T.
Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM].
35. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420. Section 301 provides for both mandatory and discretionary actions:
Action must be taken when trade agreements are being violated. Action is not required in
five specific circumstances: if(1) a GATT panel concludes there is no unfair trade practice;
(2) the USTR believes the foreign government is taking steps to solve the problem; (3) the
foreign government agrees to provide compensation; (4) the action could adversely affect the
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In 1988, Congress introduced the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988,36 which amended section 301 by including two new
provisions-Super 301 and Special 301.37 Super 301,38 which has since
expired, 39 required the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to
review the United States's trade expansion priorities and identify
priority foreign country practices that posed major barriers to U.S.
exports.' Unlike the broad Super 301, Special 301 targets only unfair
trade practices concerning intellectual property rights and requires the
USTR to identify foreign countries that provide inadequate intellectual
property protection or that deny American intellectual property goods
fair or equitable market access."' Upon either identification, the USTR
will initiate within thirty days an investigation into the act, policy, or
practice of the identified country' and will request a consultation with
the country regarding its offending practices.43 If the issues remain
unresolved after six months,' which may be extended to nine months
American economy disproportionately to the benefit to be achieved; and (5) the national
security of the United States could be harmed through action.
The USTR has discretion to investigate foreign practices and impose sanctions on its
own initiative or at the behest of domestic industries that petition for redress. To impose
sanctions, the USTR must determine (1) that an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country
is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce; and (2)
that action by the United States is appropriate.
A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the
W"TO?, 90 AM.J. IN'L L. 675, 677-78 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
36. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495.
37. "The new Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 is probably the
most criticized piece of U.S. foreign trade legislation since the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930." Robert
E. Hudec, ThinkingAbout the New Section 301: Byond Good and Etil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note
34, at 113, 113. See generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 34, for an excellent collection of
essays discussing Super 301 and Special 301.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(l)(A)-(B).
39. Super 301 expired in 1990, and President Clinton reinstated the provision by an executive order
in March 1994. See Exec. Order No. 12,901,59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994). Despite the reinstatement, then-
USTR Mickey Kantor did not identify any Super 301 targets. Due to heavy criticism, the Clinton
administration did not request the legislative renewal of this controversial provision. See Puckett & Reynolds,
supra note 35, at 681.
40.. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(I)(A)-(B).
41. Id. § 2242(a)(l)(A).
42. Id. § 2412(b)(2)(A).
43. Id. § 2413(a)(1); see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANOTNIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVE-
REIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 107 (1995) ("Under Section
301, the 'defendant' has an opportunity to be heard, but as a matter of grace, not ofright.") (emphasis added).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(A); see also Theodore H. Davis,Jr., Combating Piracy ofIntellectual Proper@
in InternationalMarkets: A Proposed Modification of the Specia301 Action, 24 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 505,519-20
(1991) ("Unlike the more typical section 301 investigation, which has a twelve to eighteen month timetable,
a section 301 investigation stemming from a Special 301 priority designation is conducted under a six month
'fast-track' system.").
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under certain statutory conditions,4 5 the USTR may suspend or
withdraw trade benefits, impose duties or other restrictions, or enter into
binding agreements that require the offending country to eliminate or
phase out its offending practice or to compensate the United States.46
Since the introduction of Super 301 and Special 301, the U.S. govern-
ment has used these provisions repeatedly to pressure foreign countries
to reform their intellectual property regimes.47
However, not all countries can impose, or even threaten to impose,
unilateral trade sanctions, for the success of these sanctions largely
depends on the economic and military strengths of the imposing
country. Thus, less developed countries generally resort to more passive
types of protective measures, such as tariffs and subsidies. China is the
most notorious example in this respect. Its arsenal of protectionist trade
barriers includes quotas, import licensing, import substitution, local
content polices, certification and quarantine standards, and export
performance requirements.4" By instituting trade barriers, China has
successfully sheltered its domestic industries against foreign competition
and coerced its trading partners to grant concessions in exchange for
greater market access.
During the post-war period, some less developed countries took a
more radical approach. Frustrated by the international trading system,
which was biased toward industrialized countries, many less developed
countries, especially those in South America, adopted a self-reliant
development strategy, practicing import substitution49 and providing
large subsidies to local industries.5° China took an extreme approach by
45. The three statutory conditions are as follows:
(i) complex or complicated issues are involved in the investigation that require additional
time,
(ii) the foreign country involved in the investigation is making substantial progress in
drafting or implementing legislative or administrative measures that will provide
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, or
(iii) such foreign country is undertaking enforcement measures to provide adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights ....
19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(B).
46. Id. § 2411 (c)(l).
47. See Newby, supra note 33, at 39-46 (discussing Special 301 actions in Taiwan, China, and
Thailand); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 137-38 (discussing the United States's success in using
section 301 sanctions to pressure China to reform its intellectual property regime).
48. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 201-05 (discussing China's use of protectionist trade
barriers to protect its local industry); see also WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How
ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER 381 (1993) (discussing China's protectionist trade
barriers) ("China is trying to export like a capitalist and import like a communist.") (quoting statement of
former Ambassador Arthur Hummel).
49. "Import substitution is a policy of producing domestically as much as possible of that which a
country traditionally imported." HUGHES, supra note 14, at 374.
50. See id.
[Vol. 70
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launching the Great Leap Forward Movement,5 withdrawing com-
pletely from the global economy.52 By the late 1980s, however, "most
countries had concluded that import substitution was not working (or
that they had sheltered the nascent industries, long enough)."53  In
China's case, the self-reliant development strategy had led to high-cost
and ineffective domestic production, and the country remained
backward, possessing very limited foreign technology and capital.54
As Adam Smith pointed out more than two centuries ago, 5 the
biggest problem with the coercive approach is that coercion tends to
invite retaliation.56 Consider unilateral sanctions, for example.
Commentators repeatedly point out the lack of evidence that unilateral
sanctions can effectuate policy changes in other countries. 7 In fact,
51. See HSCj, supra note 26, at 655-58 for a discussion of the Great Leap Forward Movement in
China.
52. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 198 (discussing China's mistaken withdrawal from
the global economy).
53. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 374.
54. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 198; see also William T. Pendley, China as International
Actor, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE: STRATEGIES FOR U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA 19,
27 (Kim R. Holmes &JamesJ. Przystup eds., 1997) [hereinafter BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE]
(explaining why China needs to integrate with the global economy).
55. In The Wealth ofiVations, Adam Smith wrote the following:
The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far it is proper to
continue the free importation of certain foreign goods is, when some foreign nation restrains
by high duties or prohibitions the importation of some of our manufactures into their
country. Revenge in this case naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the
like duties and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into
ours. Nations, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner.
2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 40 (James E. Thorold Rogers ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1869)
(1776).
56. See Robert 0. Keohane, The Danomdfor International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra
note 12, at 182-83; Scott Fairley, Extratenitorial Assertions of intellectual Property Rights in International Trade, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM 14 1,
144 (George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994) ("Unilateralism begets unilateralism."). But see Alan 0. Sykes,
"Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U.
INT'L Lj. 301, 313 (1990) (questioning whether any nation sanctioned for a blatant act of cheating would
find counter-retaliations to be an optimal strategy).
57. SeeJulia Chang Bloch, Commercial Diplomacy, in LVING WITH CHINA: U.S./CHINA RELATIONS
INTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 185, 205 (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997) [hereinafter LIVING WITH CHINA];
see also CHAYES&CHAYES, supra note 43, at 22 ("If we are correct that the principal source of noncompliance
is not willful disobedience but the lack of capability or clarity or priority, then coercive enforcement is as
misguided as it is costly."); Mark A. Groombridge, China's Accession to the World Trade Organization: Costs and
Benefits, in CHINA'S FUTURE: CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT? 165, 178 (Ted Galen
Carpenter &James A. Dom eds., 2000) ("If one looks at the history ofusing economic sanctions as a weapon
..., there is a clear and consistent trend: multilateral sanctions sometimes work; unilateral sanctions almost
never do."); W. Bowman Cutter et al.,jVew Wrla New Deal A DenocraticApproach to Globalization, FOREIGN
AFF., Mar./Apr. 2000, at 80, 92 (arguing that unilateral economic sanctions not only failed to achieve their
goals but have cost the United States about $20 billion in lost exports, 200,000jobs, and the goodwill and
trust of its allies abroad). But see generally Richard W. Parker, The Problem with &orecards: How (and How Not)
to Measure the Cost-effectiveness ofEconomic Sanctions, 21 MICH.J. INT'L L. 235 (2000) (pointing out the difficulty
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most of the time, unilateral sanctions will hurt businesses of the imposing
country.58 Today, goods produced in one country are also produced in
another. Thus, unless the imposing country is able to secure coopera-
tion from its key trading partners,59 the sanctioned country could easily
turn to another country for trade. For example, China has repeatedly
played both the "Europe Card" and 'Japan Card" to ward off trade
threats from the U.S. government.6"
in measuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and the methodological challenges confronting
empirical studies regarding economic sanctions); see a/soJagdish Bhagwati, Trade Linkage and Human Rights,
in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL 241, 243 UJagdish
Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998) [hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND] (arguing that moral
absolutists are willing to suffer economic harm even though the sanctions may not result in any policy
changes).
58. For example, a confrontational policy has hurt American businesses in China. Due to the
constant use of trade threats by the U.S. government and the uncertain trade relations between the two
countries, many risk-aversive American businesses have limited their business in China to avoid risks. Yu,
From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 169. Unreliable as long-term suppliers, some of the American
businesses have been replaced by their foreign competitors. OV'ERHOLT, supra note 48, at 381. The trade
threats and constant bullying also have sparked a new resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia in China
that resulted in "day-to-day bureaucratic actions that hold back, divert, or delay action on U.S. companies'
permits, applications, and bids whenever U.S.-China relations sour." Bloch, supra note 57, at 209. For
discussion of the new resurgence of nationalism and xenophobia in China, see GEREMIE R. BARM9, IN THE
RED: ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CULTURE 255 (1999) (reflecting anti-American sentiments in his book
chapter entitled "To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic"); YONGNIAN ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE
NATIONALISM IN CHINA: MODERNIZATION, IDENTITYAND INTERNATIONALRELATIONS 2 (1999) (arguing
that China may face a new resurgence of nationalism "because a new ideology is necessary as faith in
Marxism or Maoism declines, and nationalism, if handled properly, canjustify the political legitimacy of the
leadership"); Ren Yue, China's Perceived Image of the United States." Its Sources and Impa4c in THE OUTLOOK FOR
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE 1997-1998SUMMITS: CHINESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
oN SECURITY, TRADEAND CULTURALEXCHANGE 247,251 (Peter Koehn &Joseph Y.S. Cheng eds., 1999)
[hereinafter OU'I'LOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS] (showing a poll that indicates anti-American
sentiment); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 169 (discussing evidence of the new resurgence of
nationalism and xenophobia in post-Deng China); Yu, Piracy, Ijudice, and Perspectives, supra note 2, at 28
(same).
59. See Robert P. O'Quinn, Integrating China into the World Economy, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND
DETERRENCE, supra note 54, at 45, 80 (explaining that imposing unilateral sanctions without cooperation
from the international community tends to isolate the country imposing the sanctions more than the target
country); WilliamJ. Dobson, China's Europe Card, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1996, at A21 ("To be effective,
America's China policy cannot simply be manufactured in Washington and delivered in Beijing; to some
degree, it must be sold in London, Paris and Bonn."); see also GREG MASTEL, THE RISE OF THE CHINESE
ECONOMY: THE MIDDLE KINGDOM EMERGES 187 (1997) ("With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.
allies feel more free than ever to set their own foreign policy independent of U.S. positions."); Bloch,supra
note 57, at 206 ("[W]here sanctions are concemed, the United States appears increasingly alone.").
60. See Bloch, supra note 57, at 206 ("[T]he Chinese government will react to sanctions by becoming
even more hostile to the United States and by switching from U.S. products to European and Japanese
ones."); Tony Walker et al., Li Peng Backs Trade with "More Lenient" Europeans, FIN. TIMES,June 11, 1996, at
1, 20 ("If the Europeans adopt more co-operation with China in all areas, notjust in economic areas but also
in political and other areas, then 1 believe the Europeans can get more orders from China.") (statement of
Chinese Premier Li Peng); see also Zhao Haiying, Sino-US. Economic Relations Across 7ime and Space, in
OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 58, at 207, 216 ("Given the current world economic
landscape, the United States has to compete with Europe andJapan in the emerging Chinese market, and
China has to compete with other developing countries in the U.S. market.").
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Even worse, a coercive approach tends to threaten the integrity of the
global trading system,6 including the international intellectual property
system that the developed countries have worked so hard to create.62 A
coercive approach may lead to trade wars or even the collapse of the
entire system.63 It also may lead to criticism from other countries, thus
alienating the imposing country from its trading partners.64 Further-
61. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 43, at 100 ("The central lesson the drafters [of GATI] took
from interwar history was that unilateral action on trade questions and disputes led ultimately to the collapse
of the international trading system."); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Propery Abroad:
Toward a .,ew Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 297 (1991) (arguing that the bilateral trade-based
approach "run[s] counter to U.S. long-term interests for a healthy, stable trade environment" and "tend[s]
to fragment the world trading system . . . [by creating] resentment, particularly among Third World
countries who view imposed bilateral agreements as a species of colonialism"); Helen Milner, The Political
Economy of US. Trade Policy: A Study of the Super 301 Provision, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 34,
at 163, 176-77 (arguing that unilateral action will undermine the international trading system and may lead
to its eventual breakdown); Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, supra note 12, at 124 ("When all nations
pursue their dominant strategies and erect trade barriers, ... they can engender the collapse of international
trade and depress all national incomes. That is what happened in the 1930s, and what nations wanted to
avoid after World War II."). But see William Safire, Smoot-Hawley Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1983, at A23
(arguing that protectionism may be the only solution to unfair competition from foreign countries).
62. See Assafa EndeshawA CriticalAssessment ofthe U.S.-China Conflicto n Intellectual Property , 6 ALiB. L.
Sc1. & TECH. 295, 337-38 (1996) (noting that the American coercive trade policy is attempting to destroy
what the United States has worked so hard to push intellectual property rights on the international trade
agenda); A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987
DUKE LJ. 831, 874 (arguing that the United States's unilateral actions and its existing approach toward the
protection of patents and mask works "ha[ve] raised a significant question of its continued commitment to
the principle of national treatment"); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,Intellectual Propert Rights in Data?,
50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 97 (1997) ("Universal intellectual property standards embodied in the TRIPs
Agreement had become enforceable within the framework of a World Trade Organization, largely as the
result of sustained pressures by a coalition of powerful manufacturing associations in Europe, the United
States, and Japan.").
63. As one commentator cautioned:
What if the EC was to assert that the U.S. patent system is discriminatory and should be
repealed since it takes... "first applying, first served" as its basis for dealing with foreigners?
What if Central and South American countries were to insist that U.S. restrictions on sugar
imports are clear impediments to trade and demand their removal? What ifJapan and
Taiwan were to claim that the U.S. requirement for voluntary restraints on machine tool
exports are harmful to domestic industry and demand compensation? Would the United
States enter into negotiations with these trading partners? If the United States decided not
to make the required concessions and these countries responded with countermeasures or
sanctions against U.S. imports without recourse to GATT procedures, what would become
of the world free-trading system?
Makoto Kuroda, Super 301 andjapan, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 34, at 219,220-21.
64. Julia Cheng, Note, China's Copyright System" Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an Internal Focus and
WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1941, 1979 (1998); see also David Hartridge & Arvind
Subramanian, Intellectual Propery Rights: The Issues in GA7C 22 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 893,909 (1989) ("It
is indeed hard to see why many states should accept new multilateral commitments in [the intellectual
property] area if they remain vulnerable to unilateral actions."); GA TT Bill Brings Major Reforms to Domestic
Intellectual Property Law, II Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1966, at 1966-67 (Dec. 21, 1994) [hereinafter GATTBill
Brings Major Reforms] (noting the dissatisfaction of less developed countries over the United States's ability to
impose Special 301 sanctions despite their compliance with TRIPs).
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more, if practiced by a leading economic power such as the United
States, such an approach might lead to emulation by emerging
democracies, which are constantly looking for models and guidance for
their transition from a centrally planned to a market economy.
Moreover, a coercive approach is self-deluding in nature and rarely
succeeds in the long run,66 especially in situations requiring a change of
domestic beliefs or socio-economic conditions. 67  For example, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs Agreement)6 -which many regard as coercive69 and "imperial-
istic" 7 -succeeds in ."achiev[ing] treaties in diplomatically and
politically difficult areas in which agreement would otherwise be
65. See ROBERT W. MCGEE, A TRADE POLICY FOR FREE SOCIETIES: THE CASE AGAINST
PROTECTIONISM 160 (1994) (arguing that the United States's coercive trade policy may lead to unrevised
adoption by emerging democracies); see also Whitmore Gray, The Challenge ofAsian Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L
Lj. 1, 5-6 (1995) ("After the Second World War, however, a new era of global interaction of legal systems
developed. U.S. economic dominance reinforced the idea that U.S. legal institutions and, particularly,
recent U.S. substantive law, should be considered as normal models for modernization.").
66. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 172.
67. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 118 (1995) (noting that a coercive policy fails to generate the
type of domestic rationale and conditions needed to produce enduring change); see also CHAYES & CHAYES,
supra note 43, at 32 ("[T]he experience in the international arena is that unilateral sanctions in the more
coercive form of military or economic penalties are but infrequently and sporadically deployed to redress
violations of treaty obligations, and are not very effective when they are."); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND
IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 13 (1998) (illustrating
the difference between overt coercion and persuasion by comparing the development of antitrust and
intellectual property laws in less developed countries); Leaffer,supra note 61, at 278 ("A durable agreement
must be based on mutual gain and cannot be imposed by the information-producing countries on the
developing world.").
68. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13.
69. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
70. See Robert Burrell, A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of Copyright on China by the West,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 195 (Lionel Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998); Marci A.
Hamilton, The TRIPSAgreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614
(1996) [hereinafter Hamilton, TRIPSAgreement[ ("If TRIPS is successful across the breathtaking sweep of
signatory countries, it will be one of the most effective vehicles of Western imperialism in history."); id. at
617 ("TRIPS is nothing less than freedom imperialism."); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a
"Polite Form of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996); J.H. Reichman, Intellectual
Propero in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GA TT Connection, 22 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 747, 813
(1989) ("Imposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling states in the name of 'harmonization' remains
today what Ladas deemed it in 1975, namely, a polite form of economic imperialism.") (citing I STEVEN P.
LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALPROTECTION
14-15 (1975)); see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 184 (1996) ("What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest."); Susan Strange,
Cave! hie dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 12, at 337, 340
(arguing that the American policy is a form of"nonterritorial imperialism"); Yu,From Pirates to Partners, supra
note 2, at 172 (noting the imperialistic nature of the TRIPs Agreement). Interestingly, as Professor Strange
pointed out, one French author titled his book on American foreign policy The Imperial Republic. Id.
(referencing RAYMOND ARON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: THE U.S. AND THE WORL.D, 1945-1973(1974)).
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elusive."'" However, by linking tariffs on textiles and agriculture with
intellectual property rights and restrictions in foreign direct investment,
72
the TRIPs Agreement fails to attack the crux of the piracy and counter-
feiting problem. 73 Rather, it masks the significant cultural and ideologi-
cal differences between developed and less developed countries74 and
postpones these difficult issues for resolution in a later forum.
Finally, a coercive approach creates serious ramifications in the
context of human rights and the rule of law. 5 A coercive approach
would demonstrate that a country should rely heavily on pressure and
ultimata to protect its economic interests, thus discrediting the very
important message that governments should respect legal rights and
processes.76 Indeed, the coercive approach would provide the coerced
country with "a convenient legitimization" for its repressive measures
while simultaneously insulating it from criticism by the coercing country
for its lack of rule of law and human rights protection.77
Despite these shortcomings, a coercive approach is sometimes
effective in facilitating immediate compliance and inducing short-term
concessions, especially in situations where the coerced country has failed
to fulfill its treaty obligations.78 After all, a Country will ruin its own
71. RYAN, supranote 2, at 12.
72. For background on the history of the TRIPs Agreement, see generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1998); RYAN, supra note 2; A. Jane Bradley,
Intellectual Property Rights, Incestment, and Trade in Serices in the Unruguy Round Laying the Foundation, 23 STAN.J.
INT'L L. 57 (1987). For an excellent collection of essays discussing the Uruguay Round, see URUGUAY
ROUND AND BEYOND, supra note 57.
73. Yu, From Irates to Partners, supra note 2, at 173.
74. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 12; Yu, From pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 173.
75. Yu, From Airates to Partners, supra note 2, at 174.
76. See William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Propery Rights, Human Rights and
Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &POL. 135, 143 (1997)
[hereinafter Alford, Making the World Safe for What?]; Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Propery Rights in the
P.R.C.: Impediments to Protection and theNeedfor the Rule ofLauw 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN Lj. 1, 42 (1996) ("If the
system requires action by the powerful elite within the government, the Party, or both to ensure enforcement,
rule of law is replaced by rule of men."); Burrell, supra note 70, at 198 ("[The Western approach toward
China] suggests that western governments are more concerned with property rights than with the more
fundamental rights of China's population."); see a/soJ.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the
TRIPSAgreement: The Casefor Ongoing Pblic-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Proper y Transactions,
9 DUKEJ. COMP. &INT'LL. 11,48 (1998) ("Coercion is... a delicate, risky, and possibly counterproductive
strategy, one that could easily backfire on those governments that succumb to this temptation.").
77. See Alford, MAking the World Safefor What?, supra note 76, at i44-45 (noting that the U.S. coercive
trade policy provides China with "a convenient legitimization for repressive measures [the Chinese
authorities] intended to take in any event while simultaneously constraining America's capacity to complain
about such actions").
78. See ALFORD, supra note 67, at 118; CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 43, at 89 ("On the record, it
cannot be said that unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States have been uniformly
ineffective in inducing other countries to fulfill treaty obligations. In some issue areas they have worked at
least moderately well in a fair proportion of cases."); Sykes, supra note 56, at 313 ("Section 301 is fairly
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reputation in the trading community if it retaliates upon being found
cheating on its treaty obligations. 79  Given the lack of a supergovern-
ment in the international system and the limitation of the enforcement
and dispute resolution mechanisms,' ° a coercive approach is sometimes
necessary to induce compliance with international norms and treaty
obligations. Nonetheless, such an approach cannot be used very often
and should be primarily employed as a last resort.
B. Adversar, Approach
Under the adversary approach, parties confront each other in an
adjudicatory proceeding to resolve disputes and differences. The
common adjudicatory process in international law is through the
International Court ofJustice (ICJ), which was included as an optional
dispute settlement mechanism in both the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works8 and the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property.82 However, because countries are
reluctant to use this optional forum,8 3 the ICJ offers very limited
successful at inducing foreign governments to modify their practices when they are accused of violating U.S.
legal rights; ... success is more likely with a GSP beneficiary.").
79. Sykes, supra note 56, at 313.
80. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the limitation of the dispute settlement mechanism of the
WsTO).
81. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,revised at Paris
July 24,1971, art. 33(l), 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 22 1. Article 33(I)of the Berne Convention provides:
Any dispute between two or more countries of the Union concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one of the countries
concerned, be brought before the International Court ofJustice by application in conformity
with the Statute of the Court, unless the countries concerned agree on some other method
of settlement. The country bringing the dispute before the Court shall inform the
International Bureau; the International Bureau shall bring the matter to the attention ofthe
other countries of the Union.
Id.
82. Paris Convention for the Protection ofIndustrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at StockholmJuly
14, 1967, art. 28(l), 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. Article 28(l) of the Paris Convention provides:
Any dispute between two or more countries of the Union concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one of the countries
concerned, be brought before the International Court ofJustice by application in conformity
with the Statute of the Court, unless the countries concerned agree on some other method
of settlement. The country bringing the dispute before the Court shall inform the
International Bureau; the International Bureau shall bring the matter to the attention ofthe
other countries of the Union.
Id.
83. Professor Schachter explained why countries are reluctant to have their disputes adjudicated in
the ICJ:
Litigation is uncertain, time consuming, troublesome. Political'officials do not want to lose
control of a case that they might resolve by negotiation or political pressures. Diplomats
naturally prefer diplomacy; political leaders value persuasion, manoeuvre and flexibility.
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assistance in resolving international intellectual property disputes,84 thus
making the Berne and Paris Conventions virtually unenforceable except
by coercion or diplomacy.
The situation improved when the Uruguay Round included in the
TRIPs Agreement the dispute settlement procedure of the WTO
Under this mandatory procedure, a member state of the WTO can
initiate consultations with another member state that allegedly has
breached the treaty obligations.8 6 If consultations fail, the parties may
pursue good offices, conciliation, or mediation within the WTO.8 7
Alternatively, the parties can request the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB), which administers the WTO dispute settlement procedure, to
establish a panel to hear the complaint.8 Following hearings and
deliberations, the panel will submit a report to the DSB, 89 which the
DSB will automatically adopt unless it makes a consensus decision
against adoption or unless a party appeals for review by the Appellate
Body.°0 When a party appeals the panel decision, the seven-member
Appellate Body will issue a report. Unless the DSB makes a consensus
decision to reject that report, the DSB will automatically adopt it, and
They often prefer to "play it by ear", making their rules fit the circumstances rather than
submit to pre-existing rules. Political forums, such as the United Nations, are often more
attractive, especially to those likely to get wide support for political reasons. We need only
compare the large number of disputes brought to the United Nations with the few submitted
to adjudication. One could go on with other reasons. States do not want to risk losing a case
when the stakes are high or be troubled with litigation in minor matters. An international
tribunal may not inspire confidence, especially when some judges are seen as "political" or
as hostile. There is apprehension that the law is too malleable or fragmentary to sustain
"true"judicial decisions. In some situations, the legal issues are viewed as but one element
in a complex political situation and consequently it is considered unwise or futile to deal with
them separately. Finally we note the underlying perception of many governments that law
essentially supports the status quo and that courts are responsive to demands for justice or
change.
Oscar Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theor and Practice, 178 RIcUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 9, 208 (1982).
84. GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONALINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at Ill (noting that
no member country ever pursued litigation before the ICJ despite the optional dispute resolution provisions
in the Beme and Paris Conventions).
85. Article 64 of the TRIPs Agreement requires that all intellectual property disputes arising under
the Agreement be settled by the dispute settlement procedure provided in the General Agreement of Trade
and Tariffs. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, art. 64, 33 I.L.M. at 1221. See generally DAVID PALIETER &
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (1999), for a comprehensive discussion of the dispute settlement procedure of the WTO.
86. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993,
art. 4, 33 I.L.M. 112, 116 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
87. Id. art. 5.
88. Id. art. 6.
89. Id. art. 12(7).
90. Id. art. 16(4).
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the disputing parties have to adopt the report unconditionally." If the
member is found to be in breach of its treaty obligations and fails to
implement the DSB's recommendations or rulings within a "reasonable
period of time,"92 the complaining party may request negotiations for
compensation.93 If such negotiations fail, the complaining party may
request the DSB to authorize the suspension of concessions and other
obligations covered by the treaty.94
The WTO dispute settlement procedure provides various benefits.
By replacing a coercion-based environment with a rule-based system,
9 5
91. Id. art. 17(14).
92. Id. art. 21(3).
93. Id. art. 22(2).
94. Id. Article 22(3) delineates in detail the principles and procedures a complaining party must apply
in considering what concessions or treaty obligations to suspend. Id. art. 22(3).
95. As Professors Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld described:
[One of the major breakthroughs in the Uruguay Round] was agreement on a strict and
binding system of dispute settlement and enforcement. Under the earlier GATT dispute
settlement mechanisms, parties to disputes could frustrate the system both at the beginning
and at the end. In contrast, the new Understanding on Dispute Settlement, to which all
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are required to belong, precludes
objection by a potential defendant to initiation of a case beyond a short delay, and precludes
veto of a decision made by a panel, or, if that decision is appealed, by the Appellate Body.
There is also a complex system of enforcement, complete with fairly short deadlines and
provision for retaliation, in case a member state does not comply with a decision.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achieements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and
Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 275, 276-77 (1997); see also WilliamJ. Davey, Dispute Settlement
in GA TT, II FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 51, 76-78 (discussing how an adjudicative system would better promote
compliance with GATT rules than would a negotiation/consensus system). ProfessorJohn Jackson argued
that the rule-based system is particularly important for the governance of international economic affairs:
Economic affairs tend (at least in peace time) to affect more citizens directly than may
political and military affairs. Particularly as the world becomes more economically inter-
dependent, more and more private citizens find theirjobs, their businesses, and their quality
of life affected if not controlled by forces from outside their country's boundaries. Thus they
are more affected by the economic policy pursued by their own country on their behalf. In
addition, the relationships become increasingly complex-to the point of being
incomprehensible to even the brilliant human mind. As a result, citizens assert themselves,
at least within a democracy, and require their representatives and government officials to
respond to their needs and their perceived complaints. The result of this is increasing citizen
participation, and more parliamentary or congressional participation in the processes of
international economic policy, thus restricting the degree of power and discretion which the
executive possesses.
This makes international negotiations and bargaining increasingly difficult. However,
if citizens are going to make their demands heard and influential, a "power-oriented"
negotiation process (often requiring secrecy, and executive discretion so as to be able to
formulate and implement the necessary compromises) becomes more difficult, if not
impossible. Consequently, the only appropriate way to turn seems to be toward a rule-
oriented system, whereby the. various citizens, parliaments, executives and international
organizations will all have their inputs, arriving tortuously to a rule-which, however when
established will enable business and other decentralized decision makers to rely upon the
stability and predictability ofgovernmental activity in relation to the rule.
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the procedure provides certainty and stability in the international
trading system.96 The procedure also provides a mechanism through
which countries can resolve international trade disputes before seeking
retaliation. Nonetheless, as with all adversary processes, the dispute
settlement procedure creates hostility between the disputing parties.97
Furthermore, due to the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism in
the international trading system, the best redress a country can seek if
the offending country refuses to compensate is the suspension of
concessions and other treaty obligations 9 8-in other words, retaliation.9
Since the creation of the WTO, commentators have cited a number
of weaknesses of the dispute settlement mechanism,' including the lack
of transparency of the dispute settlement proceedings,10 ' limited access
JOHN H.JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS Ill (2d ed. 1997).
96. But see ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 364 (1993) ("[1] f the major GATT countries are not ready to change
their behavior, these stronger demands will only produce more visible and dramatic legal failures. And if
that were to happen, the credibility of GATT legal obligations would almost certainly plunge.").
97. Davey, supra note 95, at 70 (arguing that a legalistic approach may be counterproductive "because
it poisons the atmosphere in which [diplomatic] contacts take place ... [and because] economic relations
between the contending parties may deteriorate generally as positions in the dispute harden and bad feelings
spill over into other areas").
98. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 86, at art. 22; see also Davey, supra note 95, at
70 ("The need to promote negotiated solutions is said to exist because even if a panel report vindicates the
complaining party, there is no guarantee that the other party will correct its violation.").
99. Writing in 1987, Professor Davey provided four reasons why the GATT should authorize
retaliation more regularly:
First, the novelty of retaliation will decrease with use and it will eventually be accepted as the
normal consequence of an inability to resolve a dispute. This will lessen the poisonous effects
that retaliation entails. Second, retaliation would improve the efficiency of the GATT
dispute settlement system by encouraging speedy conflict resolution. Third, retaliation is fair
because it reestablishes the balance of concessions between the two parties, a balance that is
thrown into disequilibrium when one party has violated GATT's rules. Fourth, and most
important, retaliation will often occur anyway if disputes are not resolved. Given that this
is the case, it would be desirable for GATT to exercise greater control over retaliation when
it occurs. Indeed, it is possible that retaliation will become more common, in the future,
because of its proven effectiveness in recent U.S.-EC trade disputes. With GATT supervision
some control can be exercised, particularly as to the amount of retaliation, which reduces the
likelihood that a massive trade war would erupt.
Davey, supra note 95, at 10 1-02.
100. See generally IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SE-TLEMENT PROCEDURES: ISSUES AND LESSONS
FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000) for
a comprehensive discussion on how to improve the dispute settlement process of the WTO.
101. GAIL E. EVANS, LAWMAKING UNDER THE TRADE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN LEGISLATING
BY THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 194 (2000) (noting that "the substantive goals of classical
constitutionalism, in particular, adequate lawmaking procedures and transparency of law, are yet to be
achieved"); JOHN H.JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 316 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the transparency problem); see also John
Jackson, The Institutional and jurisdictional Architecture: Reflections on Constitutional Changes to the Global Trading
System, 72 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 511, 517 (1996) (noting that transparency "has been an enormous weakness
586 UNIVERSITY OF CINCNNATI IA WREVIEW [Vol. 70
by non-members to the dispute settlement panels and the Appellate
Body, 1"2 technical and financial difficulties confronting less developed
countries in implementing their treaty obligations, 10 3 and the insensitiv-
ity and undemocratic nature of the decisionmaking processes. 4 These
criticisms were further intensified by the anti-globalization protests in
Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec) and Genoa and the growing
dissatisfaction among less developed countries with the international
trading system. 105
C. Cooperative Approach
Under the cooperative approach, parties work together to resolve
disputes and differences. Depending on the mindsets of the negotiators,
the cooperative approach can result in two distinctive outcomes.
If negotiators have a zero-sum mindset, i.e., they believe they are
playing a zero-sum game in which one country's gain necessarily results
in another country's loss, the cooperative approach will result in
compromises.'0 6 For example, the TRIPs Agreement represents a
of international organizations and structures, partly from several centuries' history of diplomatic discourse,
which has strongly stressed negotiation in a context of secrecy, and, in some cases, secrecy in order to prevent
their home constituencies from learning what they are doing").
102. EVANS, supra note 101, at 209 (noting that "one of the deficiencies with circumscribing the scope
of private rights at the transnational level is that individuals have no direct recourse to international dispute
settlement"); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 101, at 316-17 (discussing the limited participation of non-
members).
103. JACKSON ETAL., supra note 101, at 335-36 (discussing the difficulties confronting less developed
countries).
.104. See EVANS, supra note 101, at 201 (arguing that states signing the Uruguay Round Agreement
"have little choice but compliance"); Robert F. Housman,Democratizing International Trade Decision-making 27
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 699 (1994) (criticizing the lack of democratic processes in international trade decision-
making); Michael H. Shuman, GA TTzillav. Communities, 27 CORNELLINT'LLJ. 527,530 (1994) (noting that
"the most insidious feature of the GATT is that it systematically strips communities of powers they might
otherwise use to protect themselves against the adverse effects of the global economy"). But seeJohn 0.
McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000) (discussing the
democratic potential of the 'A'TO).
105. See Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The.Aot-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the TRIPS
Agenda, 18 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 165 (2000) (discussing the implications of the failed Seattle Ministerial
Conference for the future of the TRIPs Agreement); David A. Gantz,.Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millennium
Round" in Seattle.- Lessons for Future Global Trade.Negotiations, 17 ARIZ.J. INT'L& COmP. L. 349 (2000) (discussing
the implications of the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference for future global trade negotiations); Clyde
Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 61 (2001)
(arguing that the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference was the eruption of long suppressed issues); Susan
Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257 (2000)
(oflering a proposal for reconciling the concerns of the protestors in Seattle with the purposes and procedures
of the V%7ro).
106. See discussion infa Part 11.A (discussing the difference between a compromise and a nonzero-sum
solution).
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compromise between the developed and less developed countries on
their different positions regarding the availability, scope, and use of
intellectual property rights."07 The various harmonization directives of
the European Union represent compromises among the fifteen member
states of the Union on how to protect intellectual property rights." 8
Likewise, the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties represent compromises of
more than 100 WIPO members on the protection of intellectual
property in the Internet and concerning new communications technolo-
gies. 1
09
By contrast, if negotiators have a nonzero-sum mindset, i.e., they
believe they are playing a nonzero-sum game in which a country's gain
does not necessarily result in another country's loss, the cooperative
approach may result in a forward-looking solution that provides mutual
benefits to all the parties involved." 0 Such a solution not only resolves
the intellectual property dispute, it also preserves hard-earned relation-
ships between the disputing countries. For example, the development
of a "constructive strategic partnership" between China and the United
107. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13; see also RYAN, supa note 2, at 12 (discussing the linkage
bargaining involved in the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement); Frederick M. Abbott, The IVTO TRIPS
Agreement and Global Economic Dealopment, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
39,46 (Frederick M. Abbott & DavidJ. Gerber eds., 1997) [hereinafter Abbott, The IVTO TRIPSAgreement]
(describing the bargain between the developed and less developed countries in the TRIPs Agreement);
Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Properry and International Mergers andAcquisitians, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1289
(1998) (arguing that the whole purpose of the TRIPs Agreement "was to induce the developing world to
incur these liabilities in return for other agreements contained in the WTO Treaty, promising reductions
in agricultural export subsidies, concessions on the import of tropical products, and a gradual phasing out
of textile import quotas in the industrialized world").
108. See, e.g., Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the Legal Protection of
Topographies of Semiconductor Products, 1987 Oj. (L 24) 36; Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May
1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 Oj. (L 122) 42; Council Directive 92/100/EEC
of 19 November 1992 on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in
the Field of Intellectual Property, 1992 Oj. (L 346) 61; Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September
1993 on the Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright
Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, 1993 OJ. (L 248) 15; Council Directive
93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related
Rights, 1993 OJ. (L 290) 9 [hereinafter EC Copyright Term Directive]; Directive 96/9/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of I I March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 OJ.
(L77) 20 [hereinafter EU Database Directive]; Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, 2001 Oj. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter EU Information Society Directive]. The European Union is not
the only entity that seeks to harmonize its intellectual property laws. There are many regional intellectual
property arrangements. For a discussion of these arrangements, see WIPO, INTRODUCTION TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY AND PRACTICE 505-14 (1997).
109. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 16; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra
note 16. For discussion of the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference in Geneva and the formation of the
WI1PO Internet Treaties, see generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA.J. INT'L
L. 369 (1997).
110. See discussion infia Part III.A (discussing the benefits of the nonzero-sum approach).
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States could help resolve the century-old intellectual property dispute
between the two countries while preserving their often troubled relation-
ship.111 Likewise, provisions that facilitate financial and technical
assistance and the exchange of information between government
authorities will allow countries to tackle a common problem by sharing
expertise and information."12
Today, increased globalization and the proliferation of new commu-
nications technologies have made it difficult for countries to protect
intellectual property rights by focusing on their own national borders. "3
Infringing activities in one country can easily inflict losses in another
country. Therefore, cooperation is badly needed. Because the
cooperative approach can result in two distinctive outcomes, whether
countries will compromise or create forward-looking solutions that are
mutually beneficial to each other will depend on the mindsets of the
negotiators.
II. FROM ZERO-SUM TO NONZERO-SUM APPROACHES
In recent years, people have increasingly applied the nonzero-sum
approach" 4 to resolve disputes, compete, and tackle global problems.
In the legal field, lawyers, clients, jurists, and scholars continue to extol
the benefits of using mediation and other nonadjudicatory procedures
to resolve disputes. 5 In the business world, corporations and nonprofit
organizations aggressively establish corporate alliances and strategic
partnerships." 6 Similarly, in the international arena, diplomats and
I 1l. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2.
112. See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, art. 67, 33 I.L.M. at 1222 (requiring developed
countries to provide technical and financial cooperation to less and least developed countries); id. art. 69,
33 l.L.M. at 1223 (providing for cooperation among signatory countries regarding the elimination of
international trade in pirated and counterfeited goods); Letter from Wu Yi, Minster of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation, People's Republic of China, to Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative
(Feb. 26, 1995), in Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M.
881, 885-86 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Agreement] (delineating the mutual responsibilities of the Chinese and
U.S. government in training customs officers and bureaucrats, exchanging information and statistics, and
undertaking future consultations).
113. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: W4,hy National Courts Should Create Global Norns,
149 U. PA. L. RIv. 469 (2000) (discussing the use of extraterritorial adjudication as a means of developing
international copyright norms).
114. In game theory terms, a zero-sum game is a game where a player's gain will result in another
player's loss. By contrast, in a nonzero-sum game, a player's gain will not necessarily result in another
player's loss. Under a nonzero-sum approach, the decisionmaker assumes that he or she is playing a
nonzero-sum game from which mutual benefits can be created, i.e., either both parties will be better off or
one party will be better off without making the other party worse off.
115. See discussion infra Part II.A.
116. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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policymakers are shifting from the balance-of-power approach to the
balance-of-interests approach, thus making it possible for the establish-
ment of a large number of international organizations and multilateral
regimes."' Borrowing from the experience of mediators, business
strategists, and international relations theorists, this Part seeks to
improve intellectual property dispute resolution by applying what we
can learn from these other fields.
A. Mediation
Discourage litigation .... Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often
the real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker
the lawyer has a superior opportunity of becoming a good [person].
-- Abraham Lincoln" 18
Mediation is "the process by which the participants, together with the
assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed
issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a
consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs."' 9 Despite
its recent popularity, mediation is not a new conflict resolution tech-
nique. Indeed, mediation has very deep historical and cultural roots.
"Forms of conflict resolution in which a third party helps disputants
resolve their conflicts and come to their own decisions have probably
been practiced since the existence of three or more people on earth." 2 °
For millennia, mediation has been widely practiced in East Asia and
Africa by religious organizations and among ethnic and religious
minorities. 2'
Commentators generally trace the origin of institutionalized media-
tion in the United States to early dispute resolution procedures in labor-
management relations. '22 Unlike isolated disputes where parties usually
117. See discussion infra Part II.C.
118. Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture, July 1, 1850, quoted in FREDERICK TREVOR HILL,
LINCOLN THE LAWYER 102 (The Century Co. 1906).
119. JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING
CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 7 (1984); see also MOORE, supra note 1, at 8 (defining mediation as "an
extension or elaboration of the negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable third party
who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power ... [and who] assists the principal parties in
voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute").
120. FOLBERG &TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 1.
121. See id. at 1-4 (tracing the historical and cultural roots of mediation); MOORE, supra note I, at 20-
22 (tracing the history of mediation).
122. FOLBERG &TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 4 ("The most familiar model for mediation in the United
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have no further dealings with one another, "[l]abor relationships are
long-term and depend on future cooperation of the parties."' 23 Thus,
mediation was needed to solve the disputes while preserving delicate
relationships.
1 24
Mediation was given a further push in the late 1960s, a period
characterized by Vietnam War protests, civil rights struggles, student
unrest, growing consumer awareness, reexamination of gender roles,
and the statutory creation of many new causes of action.'25 During that
period, American society experienceda litigation explosion, 12 6 and the
general public became increasingly disillusioned with the formality,
expense, and slowness ofjudicial proceedings, as well as the denial of
access to justice.' 2' As a result, the government, public interest
organizations, and the general public began to experiment with new,
alternative forms of dispute resolution.'28
In 1980, Congress responded to the growing interest in alternative
dispute resolution by enacting the Dispute Resolution Act,'29 which
"called for the establishment of alternative dispute resolution programs
nationwide to be administered by the Justice Department."' 3 ° Despite
the statute, Congress failed to allocate the money needed for the
States comes from the dispute resolution procedures in labor/management relations.") (citation omitted);
MOORE, supra note 1, at 23 ("The first arena in which mediation was formally institutionalized in the United
States was that of labor-management relations.").
123. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 4.
124. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation--ts Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309-25 (1971) (using a
collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor union as an illustration of the function
of mediation); see also LINDA R. SINGER, SETrLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,
FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 16 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that "collaborative" negotiation is particularly
appropriate "where the parties will continue to deal with one another in the future"); Leonard L. Riskin,
Mediation and Lauyers, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 29, 33 (1982) (noting that mediation can help in "contexts in which
the parties have a complex, interdependent relationship").
125. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 4.
126. See generallyJETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981) (tracing the growth of
litigation in American Society). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTALJUSTICE (1995) (arguing that the
expansion of legal rights and protection have created greater expectation of justice and recompense).
127. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 4; see also Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice
and Training, 33J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 580 (1983) (criticizing the American legal system as "strewn with the
disappointed hopes of those who find [it] too complicated to understand, too quixotic to command respect,
and too expensive to be of much practical use"); Maurice Rosenberg, Let's Eveybody Litigate?, 50 TEX. L.
REV. 1349 (1972) (noting the need forjudicial reforms in light of the heightened sense of legal entitlements
and the changing-expectations of courts among the American public).
128. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 4-5; see also SINGER, supra note 124, at 1-14 (discussing
the origins and growth of the dispute settlement movement in the United States); STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6-9 (3d ed. 1999)
(recounting the history of the alternative dispute resolution movement); Christine B. Harrington,
Delegalization Refonn Movements: A Historical Anasi, in I THE POLITICS OF INFORMATONALJUSTICE 35
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (providing a historical overview of the delegalization reform movements).
129. 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-10 (2000). Appropriations for the Act expired in 1985.
130. FOLBERG &TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 5.
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implementation of the Act. 3' Fortunately, the congressional initiative
was picked up by local and state governments, nonprofit organizations,
and the private sector. 3 2  Those efforts were further supported by
scholars, theoreticians, and practitioners who studied alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms.133
Since then, mediation has become one of the predominant methods
of alternative dispute resolution.'34 Indeed, mediation sometimes is con-
sidered preferable to formal adjudicatory procedures.'3 5 In the early
1990s, the American Arbitration Association had faced significant com-
petition from mediation firms before it expanded its mediation depart-
ment. 13' Today, mediation has been widely used in resolving labor,
family, neighborhood, ethnic, business, and environmental disputes.
To see the differences between mediation and adjudicatory processes
(such as arbitration and litigation), one must understand the different
philosophies behind the two dispute resolution processes. 137 In adjudica-
tory procedures, all of the disputants are adversaries, competing against
each other in a zero-sum game. If one wins, the other must lose. 138 By
contrast, in mediation, the disputants do not compete against each other
nor do they play a zero-sum game. Instead, all of them benefit
139
131. Id. at 5-6.
132. Id. at 6.
133. Id.
134. ROBERTA. BARUCH BUSH &JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING
TO CONFLICT TH ROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION, at xi (1994) (considering mediation practice
"as the single most powerful tool in the. alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement").
135. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at xiv ("Mediation is preferable to the alternatives of
resolving disputes by coercion or adversarial proceedings."); id. at 12-13 (providing statistics in support of
the argument that mediation provides a greater sense ofsatisfaction about the process the participants have
undergone than do other dispute settlement techniques). But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
LJ. 1073 (1984) (criticizing the weaknesses of alternative dispute resolution). As Professor Fiss explained:
[The courts'] job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the
peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as
the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with
them. This duty is not discharged when the parties settle.
Id. at 1085.
136. EllenJoan Pollock, Arbitrator Finds Role Dwindling as Rivals Grow, WALL ST.J., Apr. 28, 1993, at B I
(noting that the number ofconstruction disputes handled by the American Arbitration Association dropped
from 5189 in 1991 to 4387 in 1992 whereas a competing mediation firm enjoyed a fifteen- to twenty-percent
increase in construction cases in the same year).
137. Riskin,supra note 124, at 43-48 (noting that lawyers and mediators employ different philosophical
maps).
138. Id. at 44.
139. MOORE, supra note 1, at xv (noting that mediation aims at cooperative, rather than competitive,
problem-solving). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother New ofLegalNegotiatian: The Structure
of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984), for an excellent article discussing cooperative problem-
solving.
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through a unique, creative, and forward-looking solution. 40  "IT]he
emphasis [of mediation] is not on who is right or wrong or who wins
and who loses, but rather upon establishing a workable solution that
meets the participant's unique needs. Mediation is [therefore] a
win/win process.','
4'
Mediation has several advantages over adjudicatory procedures.
First, adjudicatory procedures are bound by the rules of procedure and
substantive law. They assume that. "each conflict can be reduced to
findings of fact and cognizable causes of action."' 42 By forcing parties
into adversary positions, these procedures sometimes ignore more
optimal solutions. Unlike adjudicatory processes, mediation "assumes
that each conflict is unique and will not necessarily be governed by any
rule of general applicability. The process assumes that the participants
can discover a mutually advantageous, 'win-win' solution to their
conflict."'4 The process therefore encourages the participants to craft
solutions based on their interests, values, norms, and principles.'44 It
also allows the participants to make decisions without being constrained
by precedents set in other disputes nor concerned with the precedent
they set for others, or even themselves. 4 5
140. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 8-9 ("[M]ediation is cognitive and behavioral in
perspective rather than existential. It is more concerned with the present and the future than with the
past."); id. at 9 (noting that the primary focus of mediation is "on the solution of the task and the
development of a plan of action for the future").
14 1. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 10; see also MOORE, supra note 1, at xv ("Mediation
can teach negotiators... how to achieve win-win rather than win-lose outcomes.").
142. Lela Porter Love, Mediation: The Romantic Days Continue, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 738 (1997)
[hereinafter Love, The Romantic Days Continue]; see BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 134, at 16 ("Because of its
flexibility informality, and consensuality, mediation can open up the full dimensions of the problem facing
the parties. Not limited by legal categories or rules, it can help reframe a contentious dispute as a mutual
problem.").
143. Love, Mediation: The Romantic Days Continue, supra note 142, at 738; see BUSH & FOLGER, supra note
134, at 16 (arguing that "mediation can facilitate collaborative, integrative problem solving rather than
adversarial, distributive bargaining").
144. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 8; Fuller, supra note 124, at 308 ("[M]ediation is
commonly directed, not toward achieving conformity to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant
norms themselves."); Riskin, supra note 124, at 34 (noting that mediation is "potentially more hospitable to
unique solutions that take more fully into account nonmaterial interests of the disputants"); see BUSH &
FOI.GER, supra note 134, at 16 (arguing that mediation can "produce creative, 'win-win' outcomes that reach
beyond formal rights to solve problems and satisfy parties' genuine needs in a particular situation").
145. FOLBERG &TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 10; see also Fuller, supra note 124, at 325-26 (noting that
the proper function of mediation is "that of helping them to free themselves from the encumbrance of rules
and of accepting, instead, a relationship of mutual respect, trust and understanding that will enable them to
meet shared contingencies without the aid of formal prescriptions laid down in advance"). As Professor
Riskin explained:
[A]ll sorts of facts, needs, and interests that would be excluded from consideration in an
adversary, rule-oriented proceeding could become relevant in a mediation. Indeed, whatever
aparqy deems relevant is relevant. In a divorce mediation, for instance, a spouse's continuing need
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Second, mediation does not rely heavily on lawyers or outside
authority.'46 Instead, it is a self-empowering process'47 that allows the
participants to make their own decisions and craft their own solutions. '48
By doing so, it becomes "a dialogue process designed to capture the
parties' insights, imagination, and ideas that help them to participate in
identifying and shaping their preferred outcomes."' 49 Thus, mediation
usually results in a consensual agreement that "will be more acceptable
in the long run than one imposed by a court [or an arbitrator]."' ° After
all, participants are more likely to support the terms they help create
than those of an agreement negotiated or imposed by others.' 5' Should
for emotional support could become important, as could the other party's willingness and
ability to give it.
Riskin, supra note 124, at 34 (emphasis added).
146. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 10-11.
147. Standards of Conduct for Mediators ("Self-determination is the fundamental principle of
mediation."), reprinted inJohn D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 38 S, TEX. L. REV.
455, 478 (1997); BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 134, at 2 (arguing that mediation "restor[es] to individuals of
a sense of their own value and strength and their own capacity to handle life's problems"); Robert A. Baruch
Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediatorfor?": Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST.J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 1, 27 (1996) (arguing that mediation improves the negotiation by facilitating "an increased level of
party participation in and control over decisions made in the process"); see also Riskin, supra note 124, at 34
(noting that "the ultimate authority [in mediation] resides with the disputants"); ROGER FISHER ET AL.,
GETrING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 27 (2d ed. 1991) (emphasizing the
need to "give [the other parties] a stake in the outcome by making sure they participate in the process").
In recent years, there has been a great debate between whether mediators should assume an evaluative
role. For symposia addressing this debate, see Symposium,How Will Lauyering and Mediation Practices Transform
Each Other, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839 (1997); Symposium,AltenativeDispute Resolution, 33 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 497 (1997); Symposium, The Lawyer's Duties and Responsibilities in Dispute Resolution, 38 S. TEXAS L. REV.
375 (1997). For criticism of evaluative mediation, see generally Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love,
Mapping Mediation; The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten
Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997) [hereinafter Love, Top Ten
Reasons]; Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather Than One Eclectic Process,
2000J. DISP. RESOL. 295.
148. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 7-8; see also Riskin, supra note 124, at 33 (noting that
mediation can help in contexts in which the parties have "strong incentives to work out their own
relationship with minimal reliance upon others").
149. Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid"Lock, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1001 (1997).
150. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 10; Kovach & Love, supra note 147, at 98 (noting that
mediation results in "a high level of party satisfaction with the process"); see also David A. Lax &James K.
Sebenius, Interests: The Measure ofNegotiation, 2 NEGOT.J. 76, 79 (1986) [hereinafter Lax & Sebenius, Interests]
("[A]n unpleasant process can dramatically affect future dealings; the supplier who is berated and threatened
may be unresponsive when cooperation at a later point would help.").
151. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 10; SINGER, supra note 124, at 13 (citing the finding of
a national survey that active participation in solving problems and the opportunity to reach a fair conclusion
were more important to disputants than savings in time and cost); Kovach & Love, supra note 147, at 98
(noting that mediation results in "impressive levels of party compliance with self-created outcomes"); cf.
FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 10 ("The lack of self-determination in adversary proceedings helps
account for the neverending litigation surrounding some conflicts.").
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circumstances change, these participants also may be more willing to
renegotiate their agreement.1
5 2
Third, mediation "push[es] disputing parties to question their
assumptions, reconsider their positions, and listen to each other's
perspectives, stories, and arguments. They urge the parties to consider
relevant law, weigh their own values, principles, and priorities, and
develop an optimal outcome," 135  By reducing strategic" and cognitive
barriers,15 5 mediation "enriches the information base upon which parties
make their decisions and thereby ensures greater understanding
between the parties and better resolutions."' 56 Even when mediation
152. SINGER, sopra note 124, at 14.
153. Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 147, at 939; see also BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 134, at 2
(arguing that mediation "evo[kes] in individuals of acknowledgement and empathy for the situation and
problems of others").
154. "Strategic barriers include the familiar tactics ofcompetitive bargainers: hiding information that
might be disadvantageous to claiming value; asserting extreme positions and being inflexible with respect
to meaningful concessions; and attempting to distract one's opponent." Kovach & Love,supra note 147, at
102; BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 134, at 16 ("[B]ecause of mediators' skills in dealing with power
imbalances, mediation can reduce strategic maneuvering and overreaching.").
155. Psychological research showed that, "in the cognitive processes by which people assimilate
information, there are regular and identifiable 'departures from rationality' that lead to distortion and
misinterpretation of the information received." Bush,supra note 147, at 9-10. Negotiation scholars generally
refer to these "departures" as cognitive barers. Examples of these barriers include loss aversion and reactive
devaluation. Loss aversion refers to the tendency "to give prospective losses more significance than prospective
gains of actually equivalent value." Id. at 10; see id. at 9-12 (discussing cognitive barriers). Reactive Devaluation
refers to the tendency to "devalue a proposal received from someone perceived as an adversary, even if the
identical offer would have been acceptable when suggested by a neutral or an ally." ROBERT H. MNOOKIN
IETF AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 165 (2000); id. at
165-66 (discussing reactive devaluation).
156. Kovach & Love, supra note 147, at 101. As Professors Kovach and Love explained:
In the isolation and polarization created by the adversarial dynamic, parties frequently do
not learn about the perceptions, actions, attitudes, interests, and values of the other side.
Mediators enhance the informational environment-both in terms of the quantity and the
reliability of the information-by using as inducements for openness their own neutrality and
the benefits of a mutually advantageous or "win-win" outcome.
Id. at 101-02; see Bush, supra note 147, at 13 (arguing that "mediators can help parties put more information
on the table and ensure that it is more reliable and less suspect than would be the case if the parties
negotiated alone"); see also MNOOKIN ET AL, supra note 155, at 44-68 (discussing the tension between'
empathy and assertiveness).
Professors Bush and Folger described the social benefits of the transformative function of mediation:
[Transformation] involves changing not just situations but people themselves, and thus the
society as a whole. It aims at creating "a better world," not just in the sense of a more
smoothly or fairly working version of what now exists but in the sense of a different kind of
world altogether. The goal is a world in which people are notjust better off but better: more
human and more humane. Achieving this goal means transforming people from dependent
beings concerned only with themselves (weak and selfish people) into secure and self-reliant
beings willing to be concerned with and responsive to others (strong and caring people). The
occurrence of this transformation brings out the intrinsic good, the highest level, within
human beings. And with changed, better human beings, society as a whole becomes a
changed, better place.
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fails to resolve all elements of the dispute, mediation "can educate the
participants about each other's needs and provide a personalized model
for settling future disputes between them. It can thus help them learn
to work together, isolate the issues to be decided, and see that through
cooperation all can make positive gains."' 57 Thus, some commentators
consider the principal goal of mediation as conflict management rather
than dispute resolution.'58 Indeed, statistics have demonstrated that
participants who are unable to resolve their conflicts during formal
mediation are likely to resolve their conflict later on in the post-
mediation stage.'59
Finally, mediation "reduce [s] both the economic and emotional costs
of dispute settlement."'6 It also seeks to establish a degree of harmony
and is based on assumptions about mutuality, cooperation, and
fairness.' 6' By encouraging direct communication between the
participants,. mediation reduces hostility between the disputants,'62 thus
facilitating the permanence of a settlement.6 3 Moreover, mediation
BUSH &FOLGER, supra note 134, at 29; see a~so id. ("[Tlhough satisfying needs and reducing unfairness can
make people temporarily better off, only a changed world of changed people can ever really hope to achieve
this. In a world in which people remain the same, solved problems are quickly replaced by new ones;justice
done is quickly undone.").
157. FOLBERG &TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 10; Riskin, supra note 124, at 34; see also Fuller, supra
note 124, at 325 ("I[lhe central quality of mediation [is] ... its capacity to reorient the parties toward each
other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their
relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another."); Bush,supra
note 147, at 13 (arguing that "mediators can help parties perceive each other-including past and present
actions, attitudes, motivations and positions-more fully and accurately than they would if left to
themselves").
158. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 8 (citingJOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THERAPISTS AND COUNSELORS (1981)).
159. For example, in the Denver Custody Mediation Project, sixty-five percent of those couples who
did not reach agreement during formal mediation reached agreement prior to their court hearings.
FOLBERG &TAYLOR, supra note 119, at It.
160. BUSH &FOLGER, supra note 134, at 16. As Professors Bush and Folger explained:
The use of mediation has... produced greatpmate savings for disputants, in economic and
psychic terms. Also, by providing mediation in many cases that would otherwise have gone
to court, the .mediation movement has also savedpublic expense. It has freed up the courts
for other disputants who need them, easing the problem of delayed access tojustice. In sum,
the movement has led to more efficient use of limited private and public dispute resolution
resources, which in turn means greater overall satisfaction for individual "consumers" of the
justice system.
Id. at 16-17.
161. Riskin, supra note 124, at 34.
162. Fuller, supra note 124, at 308 (noting that mediation is "directed toward bringing about a more
harmonious relationship between the parties, whether this be achieved through explicit agreement, through
a reciprocal acceptance of the 'social norms' relevant to their relationship, or simply because the parties have
been helped to a new and more perceptive understanding of one another's problems.").
163. FOLBERG &TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 10. Unlike mediation, an adversarial process "tends to
focus hostilities and harden the disputants' anger into rigidly polarized positions." Id.
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may be conducive to creating new relationships, "turn [ing] protagonists
into partners."'164 By contrast, adjudicatory procedures "tend to
exacerbate dislike and distrust and may tarnish, if not destroy, old
relationships and throw up at least apparent, if not solid and substantial,
road blocks to the creations of new relationships." 6 5
Despite its benefits, mediation is not recommended when "a party's
interests can be served only by a complete victory, either in court or by
capitulation of the other disputant."' 66  Likewise, mediation is not
helpful when a party is interested in creating a precedent.'67 For
example, in a patent dispute, a company may need to demonstrate the
validity of its core intellectual property by wining a judgment in court.
Mediation therefore would not serve the purpose.'68 Furthermore,
disputants should avoid mediation when they "wantf to establish a
reputation that will deter future litigation " "' or when they seek to use
the lawsuit for larger strategic or corporate ends. 1
70
164. DAVID W. PlANT, RESOLVING INTERNATIONAI.INrELLECTUAL PROPERTY DIsPUTEs 22 (1999).
Indeed, "[m]ediation offers an effective means of organizing individuals around common interests and
thereby building stronger community ties and structures." BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 134, at 18. As
Professors Bush and Folger explained:
This is important because unaffiliated individuals are especially subject to exploitation in this
society and because more effective community organization can limit such exploitation and
create more social justice. Mediation can support community organization in several ways.
Because of its capacity for reframing issues and focusing on common interests, mediation can
help individuals who think they are adversaries perceive a larger context in which they face
a common enemy. As a result, mediation can strengthen the weak by helping establish
alliances among them.
Id.
165. PLANT, supra note 164, at 22.
166. MNOOKIN ETAL., supra note 155, at 107.
167. Id.
168. Id. Professor Mnookin and others illustrated this point with actions of the Ford Motor Company:
[F]'or several years Ford Motor Company has made one take-it-or-leave it offer to plaintiffs,
correlated to Ford's valuation of the plaintiff's claim. If the offer is rejected, Ford litigates.
The company would rather defend those lawsuits and establish a reputation for being willing
to fight than overpay for frivolous claims. Over time, the company believes its strategy will
pay off with lower total legal expenses and payments.
Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. As Professor Mnookin and others explained:
In some corporate takeover situations,.., the target company will file a lawsuit in an attempt
to deflect or defend against a hostile takeover bid. The goal is not so much to win the battle
as to win the larger war for control of the company. The suit itself may be over some
relatively insignificant thing, but the target company uses the suit to drop the share price and
block the takeover.
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B. Corporate Alliances and Strategic Partnerships
Alliances are a big part of this game [of global competition] ....
They are critical to win on a global basis .... The least attractive way
to try to win on a global basis is to think you can take on the world all
by yourself.
-Jack Welch, Former CEO, General Electric.'
"The twenty-first century will be the age of alliances."' So declared
the opening of a recent book by a professor at Harvard Business School.
To a great extent, corporate alliances and strategic partnerships are
designed to deal with the continuous challenge of globalization and to
take advantage of the efficiency created by new communications tech-
nologies.'73 As Akio Morita, the former chairman of Sony Corporation,
has observed: "No company is an island. In an interdependent world,
every company has to think in terms of working with others if it wants
to compete in the global marketplace."' 74 Today, one can easily find
strategic partnerships'7 5 in the airline industry, '76 between multinational
corporations, 177 and between nonprofit organizations.' 
78
171. MICHAEL Y. YOSHINO & U. SRINIVASA RANGAN, STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: AN
ENTREPRENEURIAL APPROACH TO G LOBALIZATION 3(1995) (quotingJack Welch, Former CEO, General
Electric, Address at Harvard Business School (Oct. 28, 1997)).
172. JAMES E. AUSTIN, THE COLLABORATION CHALLENGE: HOW NONPROFITS AND BUSINESSES
SUCCEED THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1 (2000); see also ED RIGSBEE, DEVELOPING STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES, at v (2000) (declaring partnering as "the modus operandi of the third millennium"); The Science of
Alliance, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1998, at 69 (describing the web of alliances among McDonald's, Coca-Cola,
and Disney and noting that "[allliances now account for 18 % of the revenues of America's biggest
companies").
173. YVES L. Doz & GARY HAMEL, ALLIANCE ADVANI'AGE: THE ART OF CREATING VALUE
THROUGH PARTNERING, at xiii (1998); see also YOSHINO & RANGAN, supra note 171, at ix ("The primary
driver of strategic alliances is the emergence of intense global competition, which has rendered simple but
time-tested strategies, a staple of major corporations, less effective.").
174. YOSHINO & RANGAN, supra note 171, at 3.
175. Although corporate alliances and strategic partnerships are different, the term "strategic
partnership" will be used throughout this section to denote the various types of cooperative alliances.
176. STEPHEN M. DENT, PARTNERING INTELLIGENCE: CREATING VALUE FOR YOUR BUSINESS BY
BUILDING STRONG ALLIANCES 12-13 (1999).
177. Examples of cooperative alliances between multinational corporations include:
IBM, Siemens, and Toshiba's cooperating to develop a new generation of memory
chips
DuPont and Sony's workingjointly to develop optical memory storage products (which
they will market separately)
Leading semiconductor manufacturers Motorola and Toshiba's allying to exchange
vital technologies and information on manufacturing processes and planning a joint
venture to produce memory chips and microprocessors (which both will sell)
General Motors (GM) and Hitachi's working together to develop electronic
components and automobiles.
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Under a strategic partnership, corporations seek "to realize their
objectives through cooperation with other organizations, rather than in
competition with them."'7 9 By doing so, corporations can share unique
resources 180 and overcome market barriers, especially those in less
developed countries.'' They also can realize their synergistic
potential 8 2 by taking advantage of economies of scale, 8 building better
relationships,'84 and learning from each other. 1
85
YOSHINO & RANGAN, supra note 171, at 4.
178. See generally AUSTIN, supra note 172 (discussing how to create and sustain successful strategic
partnerships between nonprofit organizations and businesses).
179. JOHN CHILD & DAVID FAULKNER, STRATEGIES OF COOPERATION: MANAGING ALLIANCES,
NETWORKS, ANDJOINT VENTURES I (1998). Professors Child and Faulkner distinguished cooperative
strategy from competitive strategy:
Competitive strategy is concerned with the question of how a firm can gain advantage over
its competitors. There are two broad traditions within thinking about competitive strategy.
The first emphasizes how superior profits can derive from the structure of the industry in
which a firm is located, and from the pursuit of generic strategies-cost leadership,
differentiation, or focus-in ways which suit the conditions of that industry. The second
tradition draws attention to the competitive advantage that can be gained from a firm's
unique competences and resources, which combine to deliver valued products and are
difficult to imitate or acquire. A strategy of cooperation with one or more other firms can
be a counterpart to the pursuit ofcompetitive advantage in the ways identified by both these
traditions of thinking about competitive strategy.
Id. (citations omitted); see also DENT, supra note 176, at 6 (arguing that "[t]he future prosperity of a business
depends on its ability to initiate, sustain, and profit from interdependent relationships").
180. CHILD &FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 2 ("Valued competences and resources are often available
only from a partner, or from sharing their development with a partner. Alliances may enable firms to gain
access to partners' advanced technology or share the high cost of developing new capabilities through
research and development.").
181. Id. ("Sometimes, entry into an industry or regional sector is only feasible in the first place via a
partner. The ability to enter some markets, especially in developing countries or those with invisible entry
barriers like Japan, may be possible only through cooperation with a local firm."); see also Yu, From Pirates
to Partners, supra note 2, at 221 (discussing the benefits of establishing joint ventures in China).
182. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 2 ("Cooperation between firms can also permit the
pooling of their complementary strengths so as to secure creative synergies."). DENT, Apra note 176, at 178
(defining synergy as "two (or more) people or organizations working together to do more than one of them
can do alone-even after summing up their individual achievements"); RIGSBEE, supra note 172, at 13
(defining synergy as "when the joined alliance equals more than the sum of its separate parts (I + I = 3)");
YOSHINO & RANGAN, supra note 17 1, at 4 (describing a strategic partnership as "a trading partnership that
enhances the effectiveness of the competitive strategies of the participating firms by providing for the
mutually beneficial trade of technologies, skills, or products based upon them").
183. The Science ofAlliance, supra note 172 (describing how firms need to create strategic partnerships
and let outsiders help them if they want to concentrate on what they do best).
184. DENT, supra note 176, at 11.
185. YOSHINO & RANGAN, supra note 171, at 18 (noting that one of the goals ofa strategic partnership
is "to augment its strategic competencies through learning from its opposite"); see also id. ("Learning is an
implicit, if not explicit, strategic objective of every firm that strives to maintain its competitive position.
Willingness to learn leads to product and process innovation."); CILD& FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 6
(arguing that strategic partnerships should be established in a structure that promotes organizational
learning); DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 173, at 80 (emphasizing the importance of creating an interface so that
partners can learn from each other).
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Despite these advantages, not every organization can form a strategic
partnership. To do so, the organization must identify its needs,
186
understand its strengths, 8 7 and assess its "readiness, willingness, and
ability to engage in the [partnership] process."'I8 It also must determine
the type of partner it needs, evaluate what each partner is likely to bring
to the relationship, 89 and assess the potential partner "in terms of the
complementarity of [its] assets and skills and the possible synergies"
arising from the partnership.'90
Each organization should "devote sufficient attention to the cultural
compatibility between the partners,"'' for the lack of such attention
sometimes may result in the breakdown of the partnership.'92 It also
needs to work with the other to decide how their respective contribu-
tions "can be valued in a fashion that is fair to both partners, taking note
of the downside risks and the upside .potential."'93 To bring the
partnership to life, the partners must further decide the structure of the
alliance and the decisionmaking processes.'94
Forming the partnership is only the beginning. After the partnership
is created, "[c] onscious attempts must be made to cause the alliance to
develop if it is to attract the best people, and contribute most to the
partner companies." 5 Because each partner is dependent on the other,
mutual trust'96 is vital to the success of a strategic partnership.' 7 When
186. DENT, supra note 176, at 22 (noting that "[t]he genesis of every partnership is a need that has to
be fulfilled").
187. id. at 92 (acknowledging the need for firms to understand what they could offer to their potential
partners).
188. Id. at 52. Such assessment is important because the partnership process will result in changes and
therefore potential stress within the firm. See id. at 166.
189. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 85.
190. Id.
191. Id.; DENT, supra note 176, at 79 ("Cultural forces influence how well partnerships develop. Each
company's management style, whether autocratic or consensus based, may be a factor.").
192. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 85.
193. Id.; JORDAN D. LEWIS, TRUSTED PARTNERS: How COMPANIES BUILD MUTUAL TRUST AND
WIN TOGETHER 109- 1(10999) (discussing how to monitor progress of a strategic partnership).
194. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 85.
195. Id. at 7.
196. Professors Child and Faulkner defined trust as "the willingness of one party to relate with another
in the belief that the other's actions will be beneficial rather than detrimental to the first party, even though
this cannot be guaranteed." Id. at 45. Translated in business terms, trust means "having sufficient
confidence in a partner to commit valuable know-how or other resources to transactions with it despite the
fact that, in so doing, there is a risk the partner will take advantage of this commitment." Id.
197. Id. ("Cooperation between organizations creates mutual dependence between them and requires
trust to succeed."); id. at 46 ("Increased trust between alliance partners promises an economic pay-off for
each."); DENT, supra note 176, at 96 (noting that a strategic partnership "will never attain the peak of
synergy envisioned when the alliance was formed" if the partners do not trust each other); id. at 199
(considering trust as the "single most important" dynamic involved in partnering); RIGSBEE, supra note 172,
at 39 (emphasizing the importance of"a relationship of trust" in a strategic alliance); YOSHINO & RANGAN,
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the partners trust each other, they will be "more willing to share
information and so better inform their actions and decisions." 198 They
also will be willing "to invest assets in their alliance which cannot readily
be used elsewhere." '199 In addition, due to the goodwill established
between them, the partners will have less temptation to take advantage
of each other.2"0 In sum, trust will "render the cooperation more
genuine, reduce the need to spend time and effort checking up on the
other partner, and help to direct the partners' attention and energies
towards longer-term goals of mutual benefit.",
20 1
As commentators have pointed out, trust is by nature socially
constituted and "tends to be strengthened by cultural affinity between
people and can be supported by institutional norms and sanctions.,
20 2
Thus, different types of trust are required at different stages of the
development of the partnership.0 3 In general, trust can be classified
into three categories.20 4 Calculative trust refers to the trust needed to set
up the partnership when the partners notice each other's synergistic
potential.2 °5 As the partners proceed and fulfill their promises, predictive
trust will be developed 20 6 partly as a result of cooperative reactions and
partly due to "the deepening of trust based on an evolution of its
foundations., 2 7  Finally, bonding trust materializes when the partners
come to enjoy their collaborative relationship.20 8
In addition to developing trust, partners must constantly exchange
information, especially in the early stages of the partnership. "The
initial context of an alliance seldom encourages cooperation: the
partners generally lack mutual familiarity, understanding, and trust, and
supra note 171, at 123 (emphasizing the need for "trust within a firm and trust between a firm and its
partner"). See generally LEWIS, supra note '193, for a detailed discussion of how to build trust between
partners in a strategic partnership.
198. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 46.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 46-47.
202. Id. at 47; see also id. at 51-53 (discussing the social constitution of trust); DENT, supra note 176,
at 53 (acknowledging the need to develop trust and to build the partnership one step at a time).
203. One commentator described the various stages of relationship development as forming, storming,
norming, performing. DENT, supra note 176, at 47; see also id. at 48 (noting that "[r]elationships move
between stages in response to outside forces and influences").
204. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 48-50 (discussing the various bases of trust).
205. Id. at 15.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 47; id. at 50-51 (discussing the development of trust-based relations).
208. Id. at 15; see also LEWIS, supra note 193, at xiii ("Rather than being a matter ofblind faith, trust
must be constructed, one step at a time.").
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the absence of these can easily lead to an adversarial relationship.
20 9
Thus, partners must communicate with each other extensively to
understand the other better and to avoid misperception. 2" They also
must be sensitive to the other's national and corporate cultural differ-
ences 2  and be willing to view and align their preferences in relation to
the other partner. 12 Indeed, "[w]here both... partners have the prime
objective of learning from each other, the prognosis for the future is
much brighter. '213 Moreover, through the realization of the partners'
synergistic potential, the partnership may evolve into something that is
not foreseen at the outset. 214  Thus, commentators highlight the
continuous need for communication by emphasizing that a strategic
partnership is a continuing process, rather than an ultimate goal.215
209. Doz & HANIEL, supra note 173, at 146. One alliance manager described the initial suspicion
within a strategic partner:
Let's face it; every alliance is plagued by strong suspicions right from the start. Senior
managers in both firms wonder what the true motives of the other firm are. Functional
managers wonder what the alliance will do to theirjobs. Engineers are wary of what the
other guys want. We step into this charged environment. It is our job to make sure that
suspicions do not get so out of hand as to impede the alliance and to develop working
relationships to ensure to the extent possible that the people in each firm trust those in the
other. Believe me, it is not easy.
YOSHINO & RANGAN, supra note 171, at 124.
210. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 6 ("Strategic alliances, including joint ventures,
collaborations, and consortia, are at base all about:organizational learning, and should be structured towards
that end."); DENT, supra note 176, at 108 (noting that "[t]he time [partners] spend getting to know [their]
partners will pay offin terms ofmore trust, less friction, and more productivity in the end"); DOZ & HAMEL,
supra note 173, at 80 (emphasizing the importance of creating an interface so that partners can learn from
each other); LEWIS, supra note 193, at 117 (emphasizing the importance ofgood communication in strategic
partnerships).
211. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 173; see also id. at 7 ("The interface between two
(sometimes more) company cultures is the crucible of potential achievement. Sensitivity to each other's
cultures is vital to effectivejoint operation. Its absence leads to a failed alliance, however great the potential
economic synergies between the partners."); DoZ & HAMEL, supra note 173, at 145 ("The process and norms
of interaction between partners also determine alliance success. Intentions are converted into real
cooperation through interactions."); LEWIs, supra note 193, at 116 (discussing the need to respect the
partner's thinkingand respond to its interests).
212. See CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 173.
213. Id. at 172.
214. Id. at 7 ("A successful alliance is one that evolves into something more than was perhaps foreseen
at the outset."); DENT, supra note 176, at 48 (noting that strategic partnerships "achieveo goals that often
exceed expectations at the outset"); id. at 53 (noting that "[t]he success of a partnership depends on what
is actually accomplished-not on what was intended or possible"); DOz & HAMEL, supra note 173, at 169
("[Flew alliances can succeed by holding fast to their initial plans. Indeed, what separates alliances that last
long enough to fulfill their aspirations from those that break apart at the first difficulty is their capacity for
learning and adjustment.").
215. Doz & HAMEL, supra note 173, at 32 ("Alliances cannot be crafted and set on 'autopilot.' They
require ongoing management of the relationship within a clear strategic framework."); id. at 118 ("[A] n
alliance cannot be fully designed at the start; we must expect that it will evolve over time."). As Professors
Doz and Hamel explained:
[l]nitial interface should be seen as something to be perfected with time and experience.
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Finally, in order to form an effective strategic partnership, the two
partners must possess the political will and commitment to make the
relationship succeed.216 They also must treat the other with equality and
respect, thus avoiding a relationship in which one partner dominates the
other. 217 By doing so, they will produce psychological contracts and will
"accept unwritten and largely non-verbalized expectations and
assumptions about each other's prerogatives and obligations. '' 218  This
mutual commitment also will help maintain a healthy relationship
between the partners should a conflict arise in the future. After all, a
partnership will "remain vulnerable to all sorts of destabilizing factors,
no matter how well conceived they are strategically., 219 Indeed, because
cooperation does not require a partner to pass all proprietary informa-
tion unchecked to the other partner, 2  partners may "harbor private
expectations that they do not share with their allies."
221
One can sometimes view the cooperation between WIPO and the
WTO as a form of strategic partnership. In the Agreement Between the
World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade
Organization,222 the two organizations agreed to cooperation in the
Partners need to continually ask: Does the interface facilitate mutual understanding and
trust? Does it allow us to share enough information to make the alliance work? Will it
become broader and more open as collaboration develops?
Id. at 138.
216. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 6 ("Commitment and trust are the key attitudes most
strongly associated with success in alliances. No amount of energy and clear direction will compensate for
their absence."); id. at 173 (arguing that the success of strategic partnerships requires "strong commitment
by top- and lower-level management in the partner companies"); Doz & HAMEL, supra note 173, at 142
("The strategic context of the alliance allows.., the partners' wholehearted, fully committed cooperation
by shaping the strategic significance and scope each partner assigns to the alliance, by setting the tone of the
relationship, and by setting each partner's expectations about the outcome."); id. at 33 (emphasizing that
"a strong shared commitment to playing as a team is critical" to the success of a strategic partnership);
RIGSBEE, supra note 172, at 39 ('A strategic alliance must be an institution where individuals, organizations
and companies come together to develop a relationship of trust, tolerance, cooperation, commitment, and
mutuality.").
217. DENT, supra note 176, at 93 (noting the need for equality for partnerships to succeed); Yu, From
Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 161 (noting that the word partnership "indicates that neither side assumes or
intends to assume a dominant position, thus implying equality and mutual respect"); see also LEWIS, supra
note 193, at 88 (discussing the three possible governance arrangements in a strategic partnership).
218. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 173.
219. DoZ&HAMEL, supmrnote 173,at 118.
220. CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 7 ("To cooperate does not mean to allow all proprietary
information to pass unchecked to the partner."); see also LEWIS, supra note 193, at 47 ('Just as friends do not
share everything in their personal lives, trusting relationships can be close and constructive without disclosing
company secrets.").
22 1. DOZ & HAMEL, supra note 173, at 143.
222. The Agreement entered into force on January I, 1996. Agreement Between the World
Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754 (1996)
[hereinafter Cooperation Agreement]; see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, art. 68, 33 I.L.M. at 1223
("In carrying out its functions, the Council for TRIPS may consult with and seek information from any
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notification of, access to, and translation of national legislation; 223 the
communication of national emblems and transmittal of objections
pursuant to Article 6ter of the Paris Convention;224 and legal-technical
assistance and technical cooperation. 5  As with other strategic
partnerships, commentators noted "the importance of the synergies that
arise between the two organizations as a result of the autonomous
activities of WIPO in the full range of its work, whether it is norm-
setting or studying, its registration unions or technical cooperation.
226
However, not every partnership comes from organizations that are
nonrival in nature. Some are indeed adversaries; as most people would
perceive. Consider for example a strategic partnership between an
employer and a labor union. Instead of trying to keep the union weak,
one employer provides strategic planning to help the company's union
get organized.2 7 To many, the employer's action is counterintuitive.
Why would an employer be interested in building up a strong labor
union that has the potential to challenge the employer later on?
Fortunately, the employer does not see the relationship this way.
Instead, it creatively believes it is more advantageous to deal with an
organized union than with :an unorganized union. Because an orga-
nized union will know the preferences of its members better, helping the
union get organized eventually will speed up the negotiation process and
result in an outcome that is more satisfactory to both sides.
228
C. International Cooperation
"Bacon speaks ofwars ... as being the 'true exercise to a kingdom or
sovereignty'; Hobbes sees nations 'in the position of gladiators one
against the others'; to Bolingbroke, self-love is the determining principle
source it deems appropriate. In consultation with WIPO, the Council shall seek to establish, within one year
of its first meeting, appropriate arrangements for cooperation with bodies ofthat Organization."); Frederick
M. Abbott, The Future of the Muilateral Trading System in the Conteit of 7IPS; 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 661, 680-82 (1997) (discussing the possibilities for cooperation between WIPO and WTO).
223. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 222, art. 2, 35 i.L.M. at 756-57.
224. Id. art. 3, 35 l.L.M. at 758.
225. Id. art. 4, 35 I.L.M. at 758-59.
226. Adrian Otten, Implementation of the TRIPs Agreement and Pospectsfor Its Further Development, IJ. INT'L
ECON. L. 523, 530 (1998).
227. See DENT, supra note 176, at 132.
228. When asked why she helped the union get organized, the CEO of the company responded:
In the next round of negotiations with the union, I want them to know what their members
want so we can get down to the critical issues that are facing our industry. Neither side wants
to drag out these talks. It's an investment in our management's time to have the union be
strategically prepared for these negotiations.
Id.; see also id. at 16 ("Management understood that the best way to get to the root causes ofemployee unrest
in the workplace was to get the employee unions to help them make improvements.").
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in international relations; and Hamilton declares harmony to be
impossible 'among unconnected sovereignties." 22  Traditionally,
political philosophers, diplomats, policymakers, political scientists, and
international relations scholars have embraced the balance-of-power
theory. Premised on the anarchic nature of the international system, the
theory holds that countries have to balance power with power, through
unilateral initiatives or collective means, to protect themselves against
foreign aggression and possible extinction.
2 3°
In recent years, however, scholars and policymakers have increasingly
emphasized the need to replace the balance-of-power theory with a
balance-of-interests theory for three main reasons.23l First, the balance-
of-power approach to international relations is confrontational by
nature; its underlying rationale is "mutual checking, not mutual coope-
ration. '2 32 In contrast, the balance-of-interests approach is conciliatory
by nature; its underlying rationale is "reciprocal accommodation of the
interests of the other."2 33  Second, the balance-of-power approach "is
precarious, as each side constantly seeks to gain an upper hand vis-4-vis
the other."2" 4 The balance-of-interests approach, however, nurtures
cooperation rather than stirs up competition among nations.23 Such an
229. ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONALPOLITICS
246(1962).
230. See generally HANSJ. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (6th ed. 1985), for the leading text articulating the Realist
worldview ofinternational politics.
231. E.g., Wu Xinbo, China and the United States: Toward an Understandig on East Asian Secuwi#, in
OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 58, at 69,83 ("[Approaches to major-power relations
should replace the practice of balance-of-power with one of balance-of-interests."); Nabil Fahmy, Peace Is
Still Possible in the Middl East, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000,,§ 4, at 15 ("Building a sustainable peace [in the
Middle East] means finding a balance of interest, rather than reaching an agreement reflecting the balance
of power."); Paul Gillespie, Bosna4 Somalia Pose New Problernfor Peacekeeping, IRISH TIMES,June 19, 1993, at
II (quoting that an under-secretary general of the United Nations acknowledged the need to search for
mutually acceptable compromises to disputes in the Middle East "on the basis of the balance of interests.
rather than the balance of power"), available at Lexis, News library, ALLNWS File; C. Raja Mohan Jzapan
Comes to the Fore, HINDU, Sept.. 20, 1997, at 13 (reporting that China, in opposing the U.S.-Japan pact,
"argued that Asia should move away from alliances and look for some form of collective security, and that
the notion of 'balance of interests' must replace 'balance of power."'), available at Lexis, News library,
ALLNWS File; Michael Parks, The Malta Swnmit, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1989, at A12 (reporting that the
West welcomed Gorbachev's substitution of a "balance of interests" for the old balance of power in the
Soviet Union's foreign policy). See also ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE 197 (3d ed. 2001) ("For international regimes to govern situations of complex
interdependence successfully they must be congruent with the interests ofpowerfully placed domestic groups
within major states, as well as with the structure of power among states.").
232. Wu, supra note 231, at 83.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.; see also WOLFERS, supra note 229, at 205 (noting the need to replace the traditional policy of
"going it alone" with a policy of "going it with others").
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approach therefore contributes to the stability of the international
system.236 Third, the concept of "spheres of influence" may be outdated
in this world of growing interdependence and reduced sovereignty.
237
Instead of creating or expanding their own "turfs" that divide the
community and generate conflict, countries should aim at building an
international community that benefits all member countries.
23 8
To illustrate the shift offocus from the balance-of-power theory to the
balance-of-interests theory, it is instructive to look at the growing
popularity of international regimes,239 which are determined primarily
by interests rather than the distribution of power.2' Although the
American hegemony is considered a crucial factor in the creation of
international regimes,24 commentators generally attributed the rise of
these institutions to market failure in world politics.
242
"[S] tates are autonomous sovereign entities that 'develop their own
strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions.' 2 3  As
self-interested actors, states would be reluctant to cooperate with others
unless other countries did the same 2 4 or unless they would be worse off
if they did not cooperate.2 45 In fact, most countries would tend to free
ride on the others' effort, 246 thus resulting in an underproduction of
collective goods.
2 47
236. Wu, supra note 231, at 83.
237. Id.
238. Cf id.
239. See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supba note 12, for an excellent collection of essays
discussing international regimes.
240. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, supra note 12, at 135 (noting that "interests determine regimes,
and that the distribution of power should be viewed as one determinant of interests"); see ROBERT 0.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DiscORD IN THIE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 7
(1984) ("Alliance cooperation would be easy to explain as a result of the operation of a balance of power, but
system-wide patterns of cooperation that benefit many countries without b iing tied to an alliance system
directed against an adversary would not."); see also INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra
note 5, at 219 (noting that a multilateral treaty would likely focus on a single issue, as compared to the larger
number ofissues covered by a bilateral agreement); Keohane,supra note 56 (discussing the difficulty linking
regime issues that are clustered separately).
241. See generally KEOHANE, supra note 240, for a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of
international regimes as American hegemony eroded.
242. Keohane, supra note 56, at 151; Stein, Coordination nad Collaboration, supra note 12, at 123.
243. Stein, Coordination and Colaboration, supra note 12, at 116 (quoting KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 96 (1976)).
244. See id. at 123 (noting that actors would go along as long as others would be similarly coerced).
245. Id. at 117 (noting that there is no need for a regime when each state obtains its most preferred
outcome by making independent decisions).
246. Id. at 123 (discussing the free riding problem).
247. Id. at 124 ("[1]ntemational collective goods whose optimal provision can only be assured if states
eschew the independent decision making that would otherwise lead them to be free riders and would
ultimately result in either the suboptimal provision or the nonprovision of the collective good.").
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There are two central attributes to this market failure: imperfect
information and high transaction costs. In world politics, "information
is extremely costly and often impossible* to obtain."2 ' Thus, countries
would be reluctant to reveal to others their preferences unless others did
the same. To illustrate this problem, one can turn to the classic example
of the prisoner's dilemma, which is usually described as follows:
Two criminals are arrested, but the district attorney does not have
enough evidence to convict either of them for serious charges unless
one or both confess to the crime. The district attorney separates the
two and makes the following offer to each: "If you confess and your
partner does not, I will grant you immunity, and you will walk out
free. However, if your partner squeals, andyou don't, I'm going to
throw the book at you. If neither of you confesses, then I'll have to
settle for misdemeanor charges, which will get you each a brief prison
term. If you both confess, I'll get you both on felony charges, but I'll
argue for shorter sentences than if you do not confess and your partner
does. Think about it and tell me what you want to do. 49
Because the two prisoners-or countries in the context of this
discussion-cannot communicate to each other about their choices and
have no way to ascertain what choice the other would make, the
dominant strategy is to cheat on the other, thus resulting in a Pareto-
deficient outcome. 5° As a result, international regimes are needed to
correct this market failure.
By facilitating communication between the participants, international
regimes improve the quantity and quality of information available to
each participant.25'- For example, through the creation of international
regimes, countries obtain information that is essential for effective action
on cross-border issues, such as the spread of communicable diseases,
telecommunications frequencies, pollution of the atmosphere and the
oceans.52  Sometimes, this information might even reveal other
substantial shared interests, thus encouraging cooperation on issues that
governments might otherwise act unilaterally. Moreover, by making
government policies "appear more predictable, and therefore more
reliable," '253 international regimes reduce uncertainty and risk in the
248. Keohane, supra note 56, at 154.
249. JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENI-STS 78 (1994). For a detailed
discussion of the prisoner's dilemma, see ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S
DILEMMA (1965).
250. Stein, Coordinaiwn and Coilaboratian, supra note 12, at 120.21.
251. Keohane, supra note 56, at 161-62.
252. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 23 , at 291.
253. Id.; see KEOHANE; supra note 240, at 97, (stating that the function of international regimes is "to
make human actions conform to predictable patterns so that contemplated actions can go forward with some
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international system.254 They also make it harder for states to evade
their obligations when other states could point to clear rules and
211procedures.
25
Even if countries can obtain information, "transactions costs,
including costs of organization and side-payments, are often very high"
in the international system. 256 International regimes are therefore
needed to encourage cooperation and to lower the transaction costs.
Indeed, "a major function of international regimes is to facilitate the
making of specific agreements on matters of substantive significance
within the issue area covered by the regime," 25 7 especially in situations
where "ad hoc attempts to construct particular agreements, without a
regime framework, will yield inferior results compared to negotiations
within the framework of regimes., 258  Furthermore, international
regimes can benefit major powers by helping them "keep [their]
multiple and varied interests from getting in each other's diplomatic
ways, 259 thus reducing unnecessary tension or even confrontation.
Despite these benefits, international regimes do not dispose of all the
risks and uncertainty in the international system.26 Although interna-
tional regimes help reduce the uncertainty created by the rapid and
often unpredictable changes in world politics, "they create another kind
of uncertainty, uncertainty about whether other governments will keep
their commitments. ' 261 Given the fact that countries seek to maximize
their self-interests, they will tend to cheat on the others whenever
conditions reward such action. Nonetheless, "[flor reasons of reputa-
tion, as well as fear of retaliation and concerns about the effects of
precedents, egoistic governments may follow the rules and principles of
international regimes even when myopic self-interest counsels them not
hope of achieving a rational relationship between means and ends"). Indeed, "international regimes
introduce into U.S. foreign policy greater discipline, a quality most critics believe it needs in greater measure.
Thus, international rules help reinforce continuity when administrations change. And they set limits on
constituency pressures in Congress." KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 231, at 292.
254. Keohane, supra note 56, at 162; see also Arthur A. Stein, 14hen Mispercepion Matters, 34 WORLD
POL. 505 (1982) (discussing the conditions and ways in which misperception matters in international politics).
255. Keohane, supra note 56, at 162.
256. Id
257. Id. at 150; see also id. ("Regimes are developed in part because actors in world politics believe that
with such arrangements they will be able to make mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be
difficult or impossible to attain.").
258. KEOHANE, supra note 240, at 88.
259. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 231, at 201.
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to. 262 To deter cheating, many international regimes also include
rigorous enforcement and review mechanisms.
263
III. THE NONZERO-SUM APPROACH
Due to the divergent social, political, economic, and cultural
conditions that affect the configuration of a country's intellectual
property system, conflicts in the intellectual property field are bound to
arise. However, conflicts are "not necessarily bad, abnormal, or
dysfunctional. 264 In fact, they can be constructive and beneficial,265 for
they enable countries to understand their differences. Such differences
may further allow policymakers to understand their national goals and
priorities, thus facilitating trade and diplomatic exchange.266
262. KEOHANE, supra note 240, at 106. As Professor Axelrod explained:
What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the players might meet
again. This possibility means that the choices made today not only determine the outcome
of this move, but can also influence the later choices of the players. The future can therefore
cast a shadow back upon the present and thereby affect the current strategic situation.
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION; supra note 14, at 12; see also id. at 151 (noting that "the
stakes of the current situation expand from those immediately at hand to encompass the influence of the
current choice on the reputations of the players" when third parties are watching); ROBERT AXELROD,
Promoting Norms: An Evoluionay Approach to Norms, in THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGFNT-BASED
MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 44, 62 (1997) (noting that "a violation of a norm is not
only a bit of behavior having a payoff for the defector and for others; it is also a signal that contains
information about the future behavior of the defector in a wide variety of situations").
263. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, JR., THE STRATEGY OF CONFLIcT 143 (1980) (noting that
"[a]greements are unenforcible if no outside authority exists to enforce them or if noncompliance would be
inherently undetectable"); Keohane, supra note 56, at 167 ("Through a set of more or less institutionalized
arrangements, members maintain some degree of control over each other's behavior, thus decreasing
harmful externalities arising from independent action as well as reducing uncertainty stemming from
uncoordinated activity."); Otten, supra note 226, at 525 (arguing that the underlying belief of the detailed
monitoring and review procedures of the TRIPs Agreement "is that unless there is detailed monitoring of
compliance with international commitments, those commitments will be worth much less"); Stein,
Coordination and Collaboration, supra note 12, at 128 (arguing that a regime "must specify what constitutes
cooperation and what constitutes cheating" because each actor would require assurances from the other
members that they would also eschew their rational choice and would not cheat).
264. MOORE, supra note 1, at xiii; see also FISHER ET AL, supra note 147, at 43 (noting that
"[aigreement is often made possible precisely because interests differ"); LEWIs, supra note 193, at 42-43
("Conflict is a natural consequence ofhaving distinct views on important matters. It is healthy ifyou respond
by looking for creative solutions; it can be damaging otherwise,").
265. FOLBERG &TAYLOR, supra note 119, atix (noting that conflict and dispute "provide the impetus
for social change and individual psychological development"); FRED E.JANDT, CONFLICT RESOLUTION
THROUGH COMMUNICATION 3 (1973) ("[C]onflict is desirable from at least two standpoints. It has been
demonstrated that through conflict man is creative. Further, a relationship in conflict is a relationship-not
the absence of one. Such a relationship may result in creativity because of its intensity."); MOORE, supra
note I, at xiii ("[C]onflict can lead to growth and be productive for all parties.").
266. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 14 (''Differences set the stage for possible gains from
trade, and it is through trades that value is most commonly created"); id. at 14-15 (discussing how values can
be created from differences in resources, relative valuations, risk preferences, and time preferences); Vilhelm
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Nevertheless, mismanaged conflicts usually follow a negative course,
inflicting physical and psychological damage on the parties.267 In some
scenarios, such conflicts may even lead to large-scale destruction that
affects innocent bystanders.26 Thus, to manage and resolve conflicts,
people are constantly looking for solutions that are efficient-that allow
parties to satisfy their interests, minimize suffering, and control
unnecessary expenditures of resources. 69 This Part argues that the
nonzero-sum approach is the most preferable means. to resolve global
intellectual property disputes. This Part further discusses the prerequi-
sites for the approach to succeed, situations where the approach is
inappropriate or will be ineffective, and the implications of this
approach for the rule of law..
A. Nonzero-sum Approach
In Christopher Moore's classic text on mediation, The Mediation
Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict,27° the author provides an
excellent diagram about the possible outcomes of a dispute as viewed by
a particular party.27 This diagram, slightly modified, is below:
Aubert, Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflia and ofConflict Resohdion, 7J. CONFuCT RESOL 26,30
(1963) (noting that opposition of interests may develop into a bargain). As one commentator explained:
If a vegetarian with some meat bargains with.a carnivore who owns some vegetables, it is
precisely the difference in their known preferences that can facilitate reaching an agreement.
No one would counsel the vegetarian to persuade the carnivore of the zucchini's succulent
taste. More complicated negotiations may concern several items. Although the parties may
have opposing preferences on the settlement ofeach issue, they may feel most strongly about
different issues. An overall agreement can reflect these different preferences by resolving the
issues of relatively greater importance to one side more in favor of that side. A package or
"horse trade" can be constructed this way so that, as a whole, all prefer it to no agreement.
DAVID A. LAX &JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 92 (1986); see also MORTON
DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLIcT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES (1973)
(discussing the differences between constructive and destructive processes).
267. MOORE, supra note I, at xiii.
268. Notorious examples of these conflicts include the two world wars and various regional ethnic
conflicts.
269. See MOORE, supra note I, at 3.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 102.
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Fig. 1. Possible Outcomes of Intellectual Property Dispute Resolution
In the lower left-hand comer of the diagram is the lose-lose scenario.
This scenario occurs when neither party is concerned about the conflict,
when both parties try to avoid the conflict for some reasons, or when the
interests of the parties are not related.272 It also occurs when neither
party has enough power to force the issue, when one or more of the
parties are uncooperative, or when "[t]here is lack of trust, poor
communication, expressive emotion or an inadequate resolution
process." '73 Typically, a stalemate will occur when two powerful trading
partners collide (such as in many EU-U.S. disputes), when two weak
countries confront each other (such as in disputes between less or least
developed countries), or when countries engage in a trade war (such as
in situations when one country uses the coercive approach while the
other country retaliates). Under the lose-lose scenario, neither party
maximizes its self-interests, and resources are used at a suboptimal level.
In the middle of the diagram is the win-lose curve as seen from the
viewpoint of one disputant. 4  Outcomes from both the adversary
approach and the zero-sum cooperative approach fall on this curve.
When the parties use the adversary approach, which by definition
results in a winner and a loser, the outcome usually falls at either end of
the curve. If Party A wins, the outcome falls at the upper end of the
272. id. at 103.
273. Id.
274. Due to different interests, preferences, values, forecasts, and aversions to risks, each party might
come up with a different win-lose curve.
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curve. However, if Party B wins, the outcome falls at the lower end of
the curve.
Unlike an adversary process, a zero-sum cooperative process usually
results in compromises, 275 which split the difference by requiring each
party to give up something276 and share the pain.2 7  Thus, the outcomes
of the zero-sum cooperative process fall between the two extreme ends
of the curve. If the bargaining power is relatively equal, the compromise
usually falls in the middle of the curve.
In the upper right-hand comer of the diagram is the win-win
scenario, in which all parties benefit or in which one party benefits
without making the other party worse off. This scenario only occurs
when the parties use the nonzero-sum approach. Under this scenario,
resources tend to be used more efficiently than under other approaches.
In fact, as the diagram demonstrates, both parties enjoy a very high
degree of satisfaction.
Despite the more efficient outcome, not all parties increase their
satisfaction to the same degree. For example, Party A might have a
greater degree of satisfaction in one scenario, while Party B might have
a greater degree of satisfaction in another. Nonetheless, because the
party's satisfaction does not come at the expense of the other, both
parties will be able to maintain a cordial relationship. In light of the
various benefits under this approach, this Article considers the nonzero-
sum approach the most preferable approach to resolve global intellec-
tual property disputes.
B. Prerequisites
To succeed under the nonzero-sum approach, the parties must satisfy
several prerequisites. Obviously, each party must understand its own
275. One commentator argued that "[clompromise sets up a lose-lose dynamic." DENT, supra note
176, at 38. As he explained:
If you're willing to give up something of value, ultimately it will come back to haunt you.
This is because it's important to you. I call compromise lose-lose because both parties lose
the energy to resolve the conflict in a collaborative way that will end it. Rather than giving
in to the compromise, partners should try to figure out how to use the energy to create a new
solution in which both parties win.
Id.; see id. at 181 (arguing that "[clompromise is useful [only] as a temporary gesture, but it seldom makes
either party happy"); see also id. at 182 ("Unless a conflict is resolved using a win-win strategy, the aftermath
only sets up the conditions for the next conflict.").
276. SINGER, supra note 124, at 17.
277. Id. (noting that compromise "distributes the pain of losing--and often rewards the more
unreasonable bargainer to boot").
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needs and interests." 8 However, doing so is not as easy as people would
imagine, especially when the parties are in dispute. 9  Indeed,
"[n] egotiating parties often misperceive what their interests really are.
Misperception may result from external factors, such as law, tradition,
or advice from friends, that describes how the negotiation game is to be
played and completed, or from confusion in the negotiators
themselves."28 Thus, one of the mediator's roles is to help the partici-
pants identify their interests28' and to reduce strategic and cognitive
barriers that might prevent the participants from making a rational
decision.
In addition, the parties must understand each other's needs and
interests.282  To facilitate. this understanding, the parties must
communicate with each other.28 They also need to empathize with the
278. PLANT, supra note 164, at 81; see also LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 266, at 58 (noting that a
negotiation would reach an impasse if each party had "an inflated expectation of its alternative").
279. "Parties in dispute rarely identify their interests in a clear or direct fashion." MOORE, supra note
1, at 231. Christopher Moore attributed the disputants' lack of clarity to four reasons:
1. [Parties o]ften do not know what their genuine interests are
2. [Parties a]re pursuing a strategy of hiding their interests on the assumption that they
will gain more from a settlement if their genuine goals are obscured from the scrutiny
of other parties
3. [Parties h]ave adhered so stiongly to a particular position that meets their interest that
the interest itself becomes obscured and equated with the position and can no longer
be seen as a separate entity, or
4. [Parties a] re unaware of procedures for exploring interests
Id.
280. Id. at 231-32.
281. See id. at 231-43 (discussing how to uncover hidden interests of disputant parties).
282. MNOOKIN ET AL, supra note 155, at 48 (noting that the better one can understand the other's
thinking, the better one "will be able to anticipate the strategic problems and opportunities that may crop
up in the negotiation-and to prepare for them"); PLANT, supra note 164, at 81 (noting that each party must
understand its adversary's real interests and needs); Lax & Sebenius, Interests, supra note 150, at 88 (noting
that "it goes almost without saying that negotiators should constantly assess their counterparts' interests and
preferences").
283. Professor Schelling explained the need for interaction between the parties:
[In a nonzero-sum game, s]omething has to be communicated; at least some spark of
recognition must pass between the players. There is generally a necessity for some social
activity, however rudimentary or tacit it may be; and both players are dependent to some
degree on the success oftheir social perception and interaction. Even two completely isolated
individuals, who play with each other, in absolute silence and without even knowing each
other's identity, must tacitly reach some meeting of minds.
SCHELLING, supra note 263, at 163; see also HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS AND
INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20 (1997) (noting that "the
uncertainty created by incomplete or asymmetric information leads to outcomes that prevent optimal levels
of exchange or that foster conflict. In other words, incomplete information leads to inefficient outcomes");
ARTHUR STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 58 (1990) ("[lIt is universally suggested that the result of misconception is conflict that would
otherwise have been avoidable. Although international conflicts are often attributed to misperception,
international cooperation never is.").
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other by understanding the other's needs, interests, and perspectives28 4
or by "see ing] the world through the other [party]'s eyes. 28 5  One
should, however, not confuse empathy with sympathy, which is "an
emotional response to the other person's predicament., 28 6 "Empathy
does not require people to have sympathy for another's plight."2 7
Rather, it is a "'value-neutral mode of observation,' ajourney in which
[a party] explore [s] and describe [s] another's perceptual world without
commitment. Empathizing with someone, therefore, does not mean
agreeing with or even necessarily liking the other side."
288
Moreover, the parties must understand the dispute resolution process
and the context in which they negotiate. Mediators have repeatedly
emphasized the need to discuss the mediation process explicitly at the
start of a negotiation.289 Indeed, the more the parties understand the
process, the more efficient the negotiation process will become. 9 °
Likewise, business strategists. have emphasized the importance for
managers of strategic partnerships to understand the logic of these
alliances"' and to evaluate the readiness, willingness, and ability of the
initiating partner to engage in the partnership process.292
The above prerequisites emphasize the parties' need for
information-about themselves, about the other, and about the process.
However, information sometimes creates tension in the negotiation
process. Indeed, some commentators consider this tension a
negotiator's dilemma: "[W]ithout sharing information it is difficult to
create value, but when disclosure is one-sided the disclosing party risks
being taken advantage of.
293
284. MNOOKIN ET AL, supia note 155, at 46 (defining empathy as "the process of demonstrating an
accurate, nonjudgmental understanding of the other side's needs, interests, and perspective").
285. Id. at 47. To deepen perspectives and to provide insights into the other party's positions, many
negotiation programs require participants to play the other party's role. For example, "[i]n various
management programs at Harvard,. . .senior industrialists have been assigned the parts ofenvironmentalists
and vice versa." Lax & Sebenius, Interests, supra note 150, at 88.
286. MNOOKIN ETtAL, supra note 155, at 47.
287. Id.
288. Id.; FISHER Er AL, supra note 147, at 35 (noting that "[o]ne can at the same time understand
perfectly and disagree completely with what the other side is saying").
289. MNOOKIN El AL, supra note 155, at 62 (noting that "it often helps to discuss process explicitly
at the start of a negotiation).
290. See id. at 25 (discussing how negotiators can reduce transaction costs).
291. YOSHINO & RANGAN, supra note 171, at 51 (emphasizing the need for managers to understand
the logic of strategic alliances to make these relationships succeed).
292. DENT, supra note 176, at 52.
293. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 17. Professor Mnookin and others described the negotiator's
dilemma:
Without sharing information, it is difficult to find trades that might create value and
potentially make both negotiators better off. But if unreciprocated, openness can be
exploited. Disclosing one's preferences, resources, interests, and alternatives can help to
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To avoid this dilemma, the participants must trust each other. Trust
is very important in the mediation process.294 Indeed, one of the biggest
assets of a mediator is that he or she can cultivate the trust of the
disputants. 295 Once the mediator has the trust of the participants, the
information environment will be transformed from adversarial to
collaborative.296 Instead of being reluctant to divulge information, the
parties will be willing to share information. They also will "confide in
the mediator about their priorities, possible options for settlement, and
their alternatives to agreement-critical information that they often do
not wish to share.,
297
Trust is equally important in the international arena, 298 in particular
create value but may pose a grave risk with respect to distributive issues. Negotiators are
constantly caught between these competing strategic demands. Ultimately, an individual
negotiator is typically concerned with the size of her slice, and only secondarily concerned
with the size of the pie as a whole. Indeed, a negotiator who can easily claim a large share
of a small pie may wind up with more to eat than one who helps bake a much bigger pie but
winds up with only a silver. A skillful negotiator moves nimbly between imaginative strategies
to enlarge the pie and conservative strategies to secure an ample slice no matter what size the
final pie turns out to be.
Id. at 9.
294. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 119, at 9 ("Trust and confidence by the parties involved, as in
any helping relationship, are necessary for an effective mediation process.").
295. Fuller, supra note 124, at 326 (noting that the primary function of the mediator is "to induce the
mutual trust and understanding that will enable the parties to work out their own rules"); Kovach & Love,
supra note 147, at 101 ("Mediators cultivate the trust of parties."); see aLso MOORE, supra note 1, at 161
(acknowledging the need to "create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation that promotes positive
relationships and is conducive to negotiations").
296. As one commentator explained:
Only after trust in the mediator and in the process begins to mature, will the mediator be able
to probe beneath what a party is initially willing to volunteer to the mediator. Only when
the parties trust the mediator, will parties and counsel feel comfortable in discussing with the
mediator the real interests and needs behind the positions they are urging.
PLANT, supra note 164, at 86.
297. SINGER, supra note 124, at 20.
298. L.N. RANGARAJAN, THE LIMITATION OF CONFLICT: A THEORY OF BARGAINING AND
NEGOTIATION 281 (1985) ("The tightness ofcoalitions also depends on trust. Even the credibility ofthreats
depends on how the threatener has behaved on past occasions."); BRIGID STARKEY ET AL., NEGOTIATING
A COMPLF.X WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 114 (1999) (noting that
negotiation that results in mutually acceptable outcomes "involves the enhancement of communication
between the parties and the construction of trusting relationships"); see also SCHELLING, supra note 263, at
36 ("[M]he threat's efficacy depends on the credulity of the otherparty, and the threat is ineffectual unless
the threatener can rearrange or display his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would,expost, have
an incentive to carry out.").
As the Soviet-U.S. Cold-war relationship demonstrated, even parties with diametrically opposed
interests can develop trust. As commentators explained:
One of the lessons learned from the forty-five.year cold war between the United States and
the Soviet Union is that even states with seemingly opposed values can successfully negotiate
with one another. The explanation for this apparent inconsistency lies in the dynamic nature
of culture and identity as forces in the international system. Cultural differences are not
always invoked as reasons to avoid negotiation. Trust can be built regardless of these many
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in international regimes. "Co-operation means sacrificing some degree
of national independence with a view to co-ordinating, synchronizing,
and rendering mutually profitable some of the political, military, or
economic policies the co-operating nations intend to pursue., 299 Unless
a country can trust other countries, it will be unwilling to give up its
national independence for the betterment of the entire community.
3 00
Furthermore, "[r] eduction in uncertainty and increase in predictability
depend crucially on trust, which is built up as a perception of past
actions." 3°' Due to the lack ofjudicial enforceability in the international
system, each member of an agreement has "to take on trust the word of
the others.30 2
Finally, to increase mutual trust, the two parties must be able to stand
on an equal footing. "Cooperative strategy... means what it suggests,
namely the achievement of an agreement and a plan to work together;
not the giving of orders down hierarchies." 3 3 Indeed, in order to have
satisfactory results, the process must allow all the participants to get
involved. Mediation emphasizes the importance that the participants
are making their own decisions.0 4 Likewise, literature on strategic
partnerships focuses on the tension between corporate managers and the
control they exert over the operation of the partnerships.30 ' Because a
country "will be more likely to adhere to international norms that it has
differences when objectives are shared. The Americans and the Soviets shared a belief in the
strategic doctrine of deterrence-the principle that their mutual willingness to destroy each
other was a basis for cooperation. This mutual fear led to a shared value: the need for
survival in the face of possible annihilation. This fear is what guided their behavior in such
negotiations as SALT and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).
STARKEY ET AL, -supra, at 68.69.
299. WOLFERS, supra note 229, at 27; Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, supra note 12, at 120 (noting
that regimes will arise because the actors "eschew independent decisionmaking").
300. WoLFERS, supra note 229, at 29 ("[Ihe most dangerous to the amity between peacetime allies
are suspicions concerning the reliability of allied pledges of future assistance; most disruptive in wartime
alliances are suspicions that one ally may be contemplating a separate peace with the enemy.").
30 1. RANGARAJAN, supra note 298, at 28 1.
302. Id. As Professor Schelling explained:
Trust is often achieved simply by the continuity of the relation between parties and the
recognition by each that what he might gain by cheating in a given instance is outweighed
by the value of the tradition of trust that makes possible a long sequence of future agreement.
By the same token, "trust" may be achieved for a single discontinuous instance, if it can be
divided into a succession of increments.
SCHELLING, supra note 263, at 134-35.
303. Id.
304. See discussion supra Part II.A.
305. See CHILD & FAULKNER, supra note 179, at 184 (regarding control "as a critical issue for the
successful management and performance of strategic alliances"); see id. at 184-209 (discussing control within
a strategic partnership); see also LEWIS, supra note 193, at 83-107 (discussing the need for partners to select
an appropriate structure that reinforces trust).
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helped to shape," 3° international relations theorists underscore the need
to involve a large number ofcountries in developing international norms
and multilateral regimes.
C. Limitations
As with most approaches, the nonzero-sum approach has its
limitations. First, the approach does not work well when a party's
interests can be served only by a complete victory." 7 "Sometimes a
party's interest in public vindication is so strong that it cannot be met
without adjudication, and that interest may outweigh whatever tangible
settlement options the other party can offer."308 Likewise, a nonzero-
sum approach does not work well if the party has an interest in creating
a longlasting precedent and is using the adversary process as a means to
that end.30 9 After all, the nonzero-sum approach assumes that there will
be no eventual winner or loser, and the dispute resolution process does
not seek to establish right or wrong. In fact, by assuming that each case
is unique, the approach acknowledges that the settlement will be of very
limited precedential value.
Second, the approach would be inadequate if the goal of a party were
to punish the other party, because the nonzero-sum approach is
cooperative by nature and tends to preserve the relationship between
the parties. If punishment is what a party is seeking, the adversary
approach or the coercive approach may be more appropriate. Due to
the lack of constraints as to what a country can do, the coercive
approach may be the most effective at punishing the other party.
Nevertheless, due to its unilateral nature, such an approach would
create costs that would affect the country's international reputation and
its relationship with other trading partners, who may be concerned
about being similarly coerced in the future.3"0
Third, the nonzero-sum approach creates very limited propaganda
value. For example, if a party wants to announce to all its trading
partners that it has adopted a new and tougher policy on pirated
software or counterfeit audiovisual products, the nonzero-sum approach
may not be effective in disseminating this message. Likewise, this
306. Sam Nunn, Address to the Ameican Assembl,, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 57, at 277, 285.
307. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 107.
308. Id.
309. Id.




approach would not create a reputation that deters similar disputes in
the future.3 '
Fourth, the nonzero-sum approach may have limited effectiveness if
one is using the confrontation for political or strategic ends.312 For
example, the U.S. government had sometimes used its dealings with
China to divert domestic attention and gain "political mileage." '13 By
trying to avoid confrontation, a nonzero-sum approach would unlikely
serve these types of purposes, for a dispute negotiation or settlement
might draw less attention from the mass media and the general public
than a full-fledged confrontation.
Fifth, the nonzero-sum approach would be unnecessary for a party
having overwhelming power in the negotiation process unless it wants
to maintain future relationships with the other party. A party should not
use the nonzero-sum approach unless it will make the party better off.
If a party can obtain through other approaches, such as unilateral action
or adversary processes, an outcome that is superior than the one
obtained through the nonzero-sum approach, the party would be much
better off using these other approaches."' Thus, a party should always
keep in mind the no-agreement alternatives and consider these options
as what Professors Roger Fisher and William Ury called its BATNA, the
"Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement." 5 The party should use
these options to set its reservation value and establish its bargaining
range.
Finally, in a dispute resolution, there is always an essential tension
between cooperative moves to create value and competitive moves to
claim it.3 7 Indeed, most disputes require both zero-sum and nonzero-
311. See MNOOKIN ET AL, supra note 155, at 107 ("Sometimes a party may refuse to settle a case
because it wants to establish a reputation that will deter future litigation."); see also AXELROD, THE
EVOLuTION OF COOPERATION, supra note 14, at 154 (noting that "[mlaintaining deterrence through
achieving a reputation for toughness is important... in international politics").
312. See id. (arguing that settlement may not be appropriate for cases that are used "for larger strategic
or corporate ends").
313. Editorial, Surprise! A Deal with China, WALL ST.J.,June 18, 1996, at A22 (noting that the last-
minute compromise surrounding the 1996 intellectual property agreement between China and the United
States had helped the Clinton administration gain "domestic political mileage"); Seth Faison, China Turns
Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1998, at D I (noting that copyright piracy was "an obvious
lever" for the Clinton administration to pull when it wanted to appear tough on China).
314. See David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Altenatikv or the Limits to Negotiation, I
NEGOTIATIONSJ. 163, 169 (1985) (noting that "[ilf negotiation is seen as a means of doing better by joint
action than would be otherwise, it should not be surprising that nonnegotiauion courses of action will
sometimes prove to be the superior means").
315. FISHER ET AL, supra note 147, at 100.
316. LAX&SEBENIUS, supra note 266, at 61.
317. Id. at 33.
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sum dispute resolution approaches."' 8 As commentators have explained,
"[v]alue creating and value claiming are linked parts of negotiation.
Both processes are present. No matter how much creative problem
solving enlarge the pie, it must still be divided; value that has been
created must be claimed." '319 Even worse, the tension between the
cooperative and competitive moves is further exacerbated by the
interaction of the tactics used to create or claim value.
2 °
D. Implications of the Nonzero-sum Approach for the Rule of Law
One might wonder whether the nonzero-sum approach would pose
any challenge to the rule of law. Commentators generally do not
consider cooperative dispute resolution techniques antithetical to civil
society.32" ' Rather, they consider these techniques consistent with, or
complementary to, the values embodied in the rule of law. While some
considered cooperative techniques as "an additional pre-trial step,"
322
others considered it "bargaining in the shadow of the law." '323 Indeed,
as one commentator has noted, "[b]eing cooperative now means
318. In Getting to res, Professors Roger Fisher and William Ury discussed how we could divide an
orange without splitting it into half. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 147, at 73. However, imagine a parent
trying to divide ten oranges among his or her two children. How often would a child want only the fruit to
eat, while the other want only the peel for baking?
319. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 266, at 33; see also SCHELLING, supra note 263, at 4 (noting the
simultaneous presence of both common and conflicting interests in international affairs).
320. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 266, at 34. As David Lax and James Sebenius explained:
First, tactics for claiming value ... can impede its creation .... Second, approaches to
creating value are vulnerable to tactics for claiming value.. . . In tactical choices, each
negotiator thus has reasons not to be open and cooperative. Each also has apparent
incentives to try to claim value. Moves to claim value thus tend to drive out moves to create
it. Yet, if both choose to claim value, by being dishonest or less than forthcoming about
preferences, beliefs, or minimum requirements, they may miss mutually beneficial terms for
agreement.
Id. at 34-35.
321. For criticisms ofaltemative dispute resolution, see, for example, Fiss,supra note 135 (arguing that
alternative dispute resolution takes away the courts' ability to give force to, and interpret, the values
embodied in authoritative legal texts); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formalily: Minimizing the Risk of
Preudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 1359 (cautioning that alternative dispute resolution
may disadvantage minority disputants); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100
YALE Lj. 1545 (1991) (cautioning that alternative dispute resolution may disadvantage women); Kevin C.
McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement" The Impact of Scarci ofAdjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV.
833 (1990) (cautioning that alternative dispute resolution may threaten the effective functioning of the legal
system by lowering the quality of the practicing bar); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of
Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631 (cautioning that alternative dispute resolution may undermine
the legal system by decentralizing the making of public law).
322. Jonnette Watson Hamilton, The Significance of Mediation for Legal Education, 17 WINDSOR Y.B.
ACCESSJUST. 280 (1999).
323. MOORE, supra note 1, at 279.
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adhering to authoritative substantive norms-legal, moral, and
political-which form the backdrop of dispute settlement and make its
outcomes legitimate and fair. It is no longer enough that bargainers be
cordial, predictable, and nice; they must do justice as well."324
Indeed, the nonzero-sum approach may help improve the quality of
justice by allocating limited dispute resolution resources more efficiently.
Consider mediation for example. Commentators have repeatedly
described its ability to "free[] up the courts for other disputants who
need them, easing the problem of delayed access to justice."325 Thus,
one can easily find the increasing use of alternative dispute resolution in
the adversarial court system. 2 Likewise, although commentators and
policymakers emphasized the important function of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, one should not ignore the fact that the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism includes other approaches such as consultation,327
good offices, conciliation, and mediation. 28
To see why the nonzero-sum approach is complementary to the rule
of law, one must understand the interdependence between cooperative
dispute resolution techniques and adjudicatory procedures. One also
must understand that the success of these techniques always depends on
the existence of adjudicatoIry procedures. As Professor Herbert Kritzer
has noted, "without the threat of adjudication, it is unlikely that most of
what we think of as civil disputes would lead to any agreements.
3 29
Likewise, in world politics, coercion is' needed "to guarantee that no
individual would take advantage of another's cooperation by defecting
from the pact and refusing to cooperate." 330 .Unless countries could
resort to coercion or an adversary process, other countries would not
have any incentive to cooperate in the first place. In fact, a recent
survey of the WTO panel decisions showed that "the vast majority of
324. RobertJ. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark The.Aomatwe Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role,
51 MD. L. REV. 1, 26 (1992); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is I Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. LJ. 2663, 2664 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is ItAnyway?] ("To charge that settlement is ungoverned by'precedent is to be grossly insensitive
to the contexts in which settlements occur.").
325. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 134, at 17.
326. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Admersary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted
or "the Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (199 1) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in
an Adversary Culture] (describing the various uses of alternative dispute resolution in the court system).
327. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 86, art. 4.
328. Id. art. 5.
329. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS
IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 130 (199 1) (citations omitted); see also id. at 137 ("The settlement of many (if not
most) cases relies upon the adjudication of others; to separate those that settle from those that are adjudicated
misses the fundamental reality underlying the working of the system."); Marc Galanter, The Qualiy of
Settlements, 55J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 61-62 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
330. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, supra note 12, at 122.
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potential [international trade] disputes are settled informally on a
bilateral basis without any formal invocation of the [WTO] dispute
settlement mechanism, but against the background of the knowledge that recourse
to the mechanism is possible." ''
Because of this interdependence, an overuse of the nonzero-sum
approach will limit the available public information that is needed for
the disputants to assess their probable outcomes, while scanty use of the
nonzero-sum approach will underutilize this highly preferable approach.
Thus, although parties should aim at using a nonzero-sum approach,
they should be conscious of the limitations of the approach and avoid
using it regardless of their needs and situations. After all, parties using
a nonadjudicatory procedure need precedents and legal standards to
calculate their BATNA and to assess the acceptability or fairness of the
outcomes under the nonzero-sum approach. 32 If everybody used the
cooperative approaches, there would not be enough norms and
precedents for disputants to make their assessments. 333  By reducing
bargaining-shadows and adjudicatory authority (and thus the legitimacy
of the cooperative solutions), the overuse of the nonzero-sum approach
therefore would reduce the effectiveness of the nonzero-sum
approach.334
In sum, the question should not be whether the nonzero-sum
approach would pose challenges to the rule of law, but when, how, and
under what circumstances should we use the nonzero-sum approach so that
it will strike the right balance between our needs for public information
and for efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction.3 5
IV. ILLUSTRATIONS
To illustrate the nonzero-sum approach, this Part discusses various
examples from three different categories of disputes The first Section
331. Otten, supra note 226, at 527 (emphasis added).
332. MOORE, supra note 1, at 279; see also Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Setlmnt in an Adversa, Culture,
supra note 326, at I I ("The parties may not accurately be able to predict what might happen in court.
However, there is some notion that what they are contracting out of-the adjudicated result.").
333. See id. at 10 (arguing that "Ct]oo much'settlement might result in fewer clear-cut rules, thereby
clouding probability assessments").
334. Cf David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. LJ. 2619, 2642 (1995)
(noting that "[p]roponents of the problem-solving conception desire the minimum amount of adjudication
necessary to create bargaining-shadows and adjudicatory authority").
335. Cf., e.g., id. at 2642 (suggesting that "the locus of disagreement [on the expediency of settlement]
changes from the questionfor or against settlement? to the question how much settlement?'); Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 324, at 2664 (arguing that "the question is not 'for or against'
settlement (since settlement has become the 'norm' for our system), but when, how, and under what circumstances
should cases be settled?").
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focuses on recent intellectual property disputes between the European
Union and the United States. It argues that the nonzero-sum approach
used to resolve the recent EU-U.S. privacy dispute may provide some
insight into how one can resolve intellectual property disputes between
the two trading partners. 36 The next Section focuses on the continuous
disputes between developed and less developed countries. To
demonstrate how one should examine the various parts of a complex
agreement in order to divine the conflict resolution approaches used to
resolve the dispute, this Section focuses on selected provisions of the
TRIPs Agreement.337 The last Section focuses on the perennial
intellectual property dispute between China and the United States.
Unlike the first two Sections, which analyze disputes occurring at the
macro level, this Section discusses disputes occurring at the micro level.
In particular, it discusses how U.S. companies can use the nonzero-sum
approach to resolve private intellectual property disputes in China.33
A. Disputes Between the European Union and the United States
Since its establishment, the European Union has been very aggressive
in shaping the global intellectual property debate and in establishing
international norms that protect the economic interests of its nationals.
In 1993, the European Community enacted the Council Directive
Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related
Rights (EC Copyright Term Directive).3 9 This directive requires all
member states to implement legislation that extends the term of
copyright protection to the life of the author plus seventy years.
3 40
Article 7 of the Directive specifically requires that the term of copyright
protection for a work originated from a non-EU country be determined
by the term of protection granted under the law of the country from
which the work originates.341 Thus, unless the United States extends the
copyright term from life of the author plus fifty years to life of the author
plus seventy years, U.S. works will fall into the public domain twenty
years earlier than their European counterparts. To create parity
between European and U.S. authors, 342 Congress emulated the EC
336. See discussion infia P rt [V.A.
337. See discussion infia Part IV.B.
338. See discussion infia P rt IV.C.
339. EC Copyright Term Directive, supra note 108.
340. Id. art. I(l).
341. Id. art. 7(!).
342. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on lnternational Fcononic Polity and Trade of the House Comm. on
InternationalRelations, 105th Cong. 44 (1998) (statement of Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks) ("[Copyright extension] will not only bring us into parity
with the European Union and a number of other countries which have recently extended the term of
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Copyright Term Directive by enacting the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act,343 which extended the copyright term for twenty
additional years.3 44 Commentators have heavily criticized this exten-
sion,345 and the U.S. Supreme Court will examine its constitutionality in
the upcoming term.3 6
A few years after the enactment of the EC Copyright Term Directive,
the European Union promulgated the European Parliament and
Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases (EU Database
Directive). 347  This directive requires all member states to implement
legislation that grants sui generis protection to databases created as a
protection for copyright, but will protect some ofour most important copyrighted exports.").
343. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000)).
344. 17 U.S.C. § 304.
345. For discussions of copyright term extension, see generally Michael H. Davis, Evtending Copyright
and the Constitution. "Hae I Stayed Too Long?" 52 U. FLA. L. REV. 989 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyiht
Lgislationfor the "DigitalMillennium,"23 COLUM.-VLAJ.L.&ARTs 137, 170-75 (1999); Marci A. Hamilton,
Copyright Duramtion Evtension and the Dark Heart of Copyng 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. Lj. 655 (1996); Peter
A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All 7hat-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionalty-Grouted Discourse of
Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND.J. TRANSNATL L. 595 (1996); Dennis S. Karjala, The Term of
Copyright, in GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR EDUCATION AND SOCIETY (Laura N. Gasaway
ed., 1997); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the FrstAmendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 70-74 (200 I); William F. Patry,
77Te Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread fiom Author 14 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. LJ. 661 (1996); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno, An Esample of the Low of Unintended
Consequences, 8J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223 (200 1); J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Coryright and the Limits of Cultural
Polity, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 625 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman, Duratio ofCopjyght]; Symposium,
The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Evtensio; How Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. Lj. 651
(2000); Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyighl Tem: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property
Clause, 7j. INTELL. PROP. L. 315 (2000).
346. On February 19, 2002, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari inEldred v. Ashcrofi,
which was formerly known as Eldred v. Reno. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2002) (No. 01-618). For legal documents concerningEldred, see
OPENLAW: Eldred v. Ashcroft, at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/. See also Marci
Hamilton, Bringing the People into the Copygld Arena. How the New Awareness of Copyright Law Issues Can Help in
Guarding the Public's Domain, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
hamilton/20010329.html (Mar. 29, 200 1) [hereinafter Hamilton, B~nging the People nto the Copyright Arena]
(discussing the difficulties of the Eldred litigation).
347. EU Database Directive,supra note 108. Fordiscussions ofthe EU Database Directive and recent
development concerning U.S. database legislation, see Yochai Benkler, Constilutional Bounds of Database
Protection: 77h Role of .udicial Rev ew in the Creation and DefAiion of Private Rhts in Infomation, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. LJ. 535 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyrht, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the
UnitedStates andAbroad, 66.U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law]; Marci
A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Benker, 1 BERKELEY TECH. Lj. 605 (2000); Malla Pollack, 7he Right to
Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Propery Clause, and the First
Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 47 (1999); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 62; J.H.
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and
Technolobgy, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 793 (1999); Peter K. Yu, Evolvig Legal Protection for Databases,
GIGALAW.COM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articIes/2000/yu-200012.html (Dec. 2000). See also McManis,
supra note 107, at 1294-96 (discussing the tension between the EU Database Directive and the TRIPs
Agreement).
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result of "substantial investment" by database producers. 48 Under the
Directive, databases are protected against unauthorized extraction and
reutilization for a renewable term of fifteen years regardless of their
eligibility for copyright protection.349 To the detriment ofU.S. database
producers, the Directive includes a reciprocity provision that denies
protection to databases produced in non-EU countries that do not offer
comparable protection to databases."0 As a result of this provision,
databases produced by U.S. companies become vulnerable to foreign
competition and piracy in European markets.
Despite the Directive's adverse economic impact, the United States
has been reluctant to introduce laws offering comparable protection to
databases. To understand why databases receive very limited protection
in the United States, one must look at Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.35' In Feist, the United States Supreme Court held
that the white pages of a telephone directory did not constitute a
sufficiently original work of authorship to qualify for copyright protec-
tion. 52 As the Court reasoned, a compilation does not warrant
copyright protection unless information is selected, coordinated, or
arranged in an original manner. 53 Pointing out that "[o]riginality is a
constitutional requirement," 5 4 the Court firmly rejected the "sweat of
the brow" theory of copyright protection."' Thus, nonoriginal,
noncreative databases do not qualify for copyright protection, no matter
how much labor and capital have been expended to create them.
Shortly after the passage of the EU Database Directive, the United
States submitted a draft treaty proposal to WIPO,356 which has yet to
348. EU Database Directive, supra note 108, art. 7(l).
349. Id. art. 10.
350. Id. art. 11.
351. 499U.S. 340(1991).
352. Id. at 364.
353. Id. at 362.
354. Id. at 346.
355. Id. at 352-54. "Sweat of the brow" theory is the notion that industrious collection of facts is
rewarded with copyright protection. For discussions of Feist and the constitutional originality requirement,
see generally Dennis S. Karala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885 (1992); LeoJ.
Raskind, Assessing the Impact o]Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331 (1992); Russ VerSteeg, Rethking Or giity,
34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1993); Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, "Creativity," and the
Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. P'mr. L. REV. 549 (1995).
356. Modeled after the EU Directive, the United States's draft treaty proposal to WIPO called for the
protection of databases created as a result of substantial investment by database producers in the collection,
assembly, verification, organization, or presentation ofinformation. The term of protection was twenty-five
years and could be renewed indefinitely upon showing of substantial changes in the database. Instead of
reciprocity, the treaty proposal mandated national treatment. For a discussion of the U.S. draft treaty
proposal to WIPO, see Reichman & Samuelson,supra note 62, at 102-10; Samuelson,supra note 109, at 422-
23.
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adopt the draft database treaty. 7 Similar resistance confronts legisla-
tion proposed in Congress. Although there have been a large number
of legislative proposals on database protection, "35 8 commentators have
widely criticized these proposals, 359 and Congress has yet to adopt any
of them. As commentators have pointed out, sui generis database
protection would confer far broader and stronger exclusive rights on
database contents than is necessary to provide the needed incentives for
database producers.36 ° Such protection also would raise serious
constitutional questions under the Commerce Clause, the Copyright
Clause, and the First Amendment.36 1 Moreover, sui generis protection
may be unnecessary in light of the significant protection currently
enjoyed by database producers under state contract and misappropria-
tion laws and nonlegal, technological protective devices. 362  In fact,
many database producers, who are also database users, would unlikely
357. See Samuelson, supra note 109, at 419-27 (discussing the events surrounding the draft database
treaty in the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference in Geneva).
358. These proposals include, to name a few, Collections of Information Antipiracy Act of 1999, H.R.
354, 106th Cong. (1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998);
Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999); and Database
Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).
359. See sources cited supra note 347 for criticism of the U.S. database legislative proposals. See also
Marci Hamilton, Should U.S. Intellectual Property Rits Chaige to Fit World Norms?, FINDLAw's WRIT: LEGAL
COMMENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20010524.html (May 24, 2001) (arguing that
the United States should not yield easily to global pressure without considering the strengths of its intellectual
property system).
360. By granting database producers a monopoly over their collected data, the proposals would allow
private entities to lock up information that is essential ,to basic scientific research and future creative
endeavors. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 62, at 113-24 (discussing the adverse impact ofsui generis
database protection on scientific research and education); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 347, at 796-821
(discussing the adverse impact of database protection laws on scientific, technical, and educational users of
factual data and information). The proposals also would create an anti-competitive environment that makes
it difficult for valued-added products and services to enter the market, thus making information products
more expensive. Benkler, supra note 347, at 562-65 (discussing the anti-competitive nature of database
protection laws); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 62, at 124-30 (discussing how sui generis database
protection would frustrate competition in the market for value-added products and services).
361. See Benlder, supra note 347 (discussing the constitutional limits of Congress's power to create
exclusive private rights in information); Hamilton, A Response to Phofessor Benkler, supra note 347, at 619-28
(discussing the constitutional deficiencies of U.S. database legislation); Pollack, supra note 347, at 50-89
(discussing the constitutional constraints on database protection). See also Paul J. Heald, The
Evtraction/Duplication Dichotomy: Constitutional LIne-drawing in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. LJ. 933, 935
(2001) (arguing that Congress "could rely on the Commerce Clause to grant thin protection to unoriginal
collections of information, but is constitutionally constrained from prohibiting the extraction and use of facts
contained in a compilation, regardless of whether the compilation is original").
362. SeeJonathan Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate in the 106th Congress, 62 OHIO
ST. LJ. 869, 869-70 (200 1); Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, supra note 347, at 176; see also eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (recognizing claims of "trespass to
chattels" over the unauthorized extraction of information from an Interet website); NBA v. Motorola, Inc.,
105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997) (prohibiting copying of "hot news" or time-sensitive materials for
competition purposes).
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support any legislation unless they were certain that the legislation
strikes the right balance between the production of databases and the
use of collected information.363
Given the significant resistance confronting U.S. legislative proposals
on database protection, the United States will not likely offer sui generis
database protection in the near future. The differing protection between
the European Union and the United States, therefore, will create
tension, and possibly conflicts, between the two trading partners. 64 In
fact, database protection is only one of the many issues that are troubl-
ing trans-Atlantic intellectual property relations. Other issues include
the protection of moral rights,365 fair use,366 the first sale doctrine,367 the
363. Yu, Eolving Legal Protection for Databases, supra note 347. So far, the database industry has failed
to provide substantial factual information as to how it would be harmed had the legislative proposal not been
adopted. It only succeeded in making generalized claims of potential foreign competition and piracy in the
European markets. Benkler, supra note 347, at 591-92; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 62, at 70; see also
Pollack, supra note 347, at 92-93 (noting that the American database industry is booming). These claims ring
hollow when only one of the three major database .industry stakeholders, McGraw-Hill, is an American
company. Benlder, supra note 347, at 592. Reed-Elsevier is a European company and Thompson is a
Canadian company. Id.
364. The more favorable environment of producing database in the European Union also would
attract businesses to set up offices in, or even relocate to, the European Union, thus chipping away the
United States's competitive edge in the information revolution. Yu, Evoving Legal Protectionfor Databases, supra
note 347.
365. For discussions of the tension between U.S. copyright and moral rights in Europe, see, for
example, PAULGOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTrENBERGTOTHECELSTIALJUKEBOX
165-96 (1994); Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economis, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. I (1997); Jane
C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copynghts: Literag Property in Revoutionay France and Amenta, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991
(1990); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Righ" Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L.
REV. I (1985); GeriJ. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 79, 86-101 (1996). Cf Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (providing limited moral
rights to visual art); CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West 1998) (California Art Preservation Act); N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.51-14.59 (McKinney 1984) (New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act).
366. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 87
(2000) (arguing that "an international fair use doctrine does not currently exist in the international law of
copyright and that such a doctrine is vital for effectuating traditional copyright policy in a global market for
copyrighted works as well as for capitalizing on the benefits of protecting intellectual property under the free
trade system"); Tyler G. Newby, Note, Wh'7at's Fair Here Is Not Fair Eveywhere: Does the American Fair Use
Doctrine lrolate International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (1999) (discussing the distinctiveness of the
fair use doctrine under U.S. copyright law). Compare Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that reverse engineering for the purpose of gaining an understanding of the unprotected
functional elements of a computer program qualifies as fair use), with EC Computer Program Directive, supra
note 108, art. 6(l) (permitting reverse engineering only for the purpose of "obtainfing] the information
necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other
programs").
367. See Vincent Chiappetta, The Deasrability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WVTO, TRIPs, International 1PR
Ehaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333 (2000) (discussing the disagreement over the
exhaustion issue during the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement).
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work-made-for-hire arrangement,"61 and protection against private
copying in the digital environment.
3 69
To examine how the United States could resolve its intellectual
property disputes with the European Union, one may draw insights
from the recent development concerning the EU-U.S. dispute over the
protection of personal data. In 1995, the European Union enacted the
European Parliament and Council Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data (EU Privacy Directive).37 This directive
requires all member states to implement legislation to protect the right
to privacy with respect to the collection, processing, storage, and
transmission of personal data."' By harmonizing privacy laws among
the fifteen member states,372 the EU Privacy Directive seeks to promote
368. Reichman, Duration of Copyiht, supra note 345, at 631 (noting that "[a] more substantial
discrepancy between American copyright law and that of other Berne Union countries stems from the
greater reliance of the former on the work-made-for-hire doctrine in general and on the principle of
corporate authorship in particular"); see id. at 631-33 (discussing the United States's distinctive reliance on
the work-made-for-hire doctrine and corporate authorship).
369. Joseph S. Papovich, .AFA's Provisions Regarding Intellectual Property: Are They W4orking as
lntended?-A U.S. Perspective, 23 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 253, 259 (1997) ("Blank tape levies have been a matter of
dispute for several years between the United States and some European countries .... "); see also Gary S.
Lutzker, Dat's All Fo&s: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home RecordingAct of 1991-Menie Melodies or Looney Ties?,
II CARDozo ARTS & ENT. Lj. 145, 182-83 (1992) (discussing how foreign countries protect against
unauthorized private copying). Compare Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1009
(2000), uith EU Digital Copyright Directive, supra note 108.
370. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 1995 Oj. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter EU Privacy Directive]. For an overview of the Directive, see Peter
K. Yu, An Introduction to the EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data, GIGALAW.CoM, at
http://www.gigalaw.com/aricles/200 I /yu-2001-07a.html (July 200 1) [hereinafter Yu,An Introduction to the
EU Directive]. See generally Symposium, Data Protection Law and the European Union's Directive: The Chalknge for
the United States, 80 IOwA L. REV. 431 (1995), for an excellent symposium on the EU Privacy Directive.
371. EU Privacy Directive, supra note 370, art. I(I). The Directive broadly defines "personal data"
as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person." Id. art. 2(a). It further defines
"processing of personal data" as "any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination; blocking, erasure or destruction." Id. art. 2(b). The Directive,
however, makes an exception for processing operations that fall outside.the scope of EU law, such as those
concerning public security, defense, state security, and law enforcement, and processing operations that are
performed "by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity." Id. art. 3(2).
372. The fifteen member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Before
the EU Privacy Directive entered into force, several member states had broad statutes protecting privacy
rights. These states included Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. Fred H. Cate, The EUProtection Directive, Information Priyacy, and the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV.
431, 431 (1995); see also Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polls: The EU Directive an the Protection of Personal
Data, 80 IOwA L. REV. 445, 451 (1995) (discussing the differences among data protection laws enacted by
the various EU member states).
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a high level of data privacy and the free flow ofpersonal data within the
European Union.373
To prevent circumvention of the Directive and creation of "data
havens" outside the European Union, the Directive further prohibits the
transfer of personal data to non-EU countries that do not meet the
European "adequacy" standard for data protection.374 Such a prohibi-
tion is particularly alarming, for it could cut off all personal data flows
from the European Union.375 This disruption would affect a large
373. EU Privacy Directive, supra note 370, art. 1(2) ("Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit
the free flow of personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection afforded
[under the Directive]."). But, ser Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolvig Confl cuing Inrmatmal Data Prwacy Ruks in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1351 (2000) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Intkemational Data Privacy Rules]
(noting the elusiveness of full harmonization of European data privacy laws).
374. EU Privacy Directive, supra note 370, art. 25(l). Article 25(l) of the EU Privacy Directive
provides:
The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data which
are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take place only
if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the
other provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures an adequate level of
protection." Id. Whether a country meets the European "adequacy" level will depend on
"all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer
operations." Id. art. 25(2). Particular consideration will be given to "the nature of the data,
the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country
of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force
in the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures which are
complied with in that country.
Id.
Notwithstanding the strict prohibition under article 25(l), the Directive allows member states to
transfer data to a third country that does not meet the European "adequacy" standard under the following
conditions:
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer; or
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and
the controller or the implementation of precontractual measures taken in response to
the data subject's request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in
the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds, or for
the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or
(1) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is intended
to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the
public in general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the
extent that the conditions laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular
case.
Id. art. 26(l). In addition, the Directive allows data transfer to a non-EU country that does not meet the
European "adequacy" standard "where the controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the
protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the exercise of
the corresponding rights." Id. art. 26(2).
375. See general/y Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictiown on International Data Flow,
80 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995) (noting that the EU Piracy Directive creates anew kind of coercive international
legal action known as "the data embargo order"). As defined by Professor Schwartz, "a data embargo order
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variety of trans-Atlantic business activities, including personal banking
and brokerage transactions, airline and hotel reservations, Internet sales,
credit checks, credit card purchases, and inter-office communication
between EU and non-EU branches of a multinational corporation.376
To protect its businesses, the United States has three options. The
United States could adopt a coercive approach. Such an approach is
sometimes used to deter and punish countries that discriminate against
U.S. products. For example, Congress could pass a section 301 -type law
mandating sanctions on any countries that deny U.S. companies fair or
equitable access to information needed for business operations. 377 U.S.
companies also could decide not to trade with any European companies
that deny them necessary personal data.
Nonetheless, such an approach would hurt both U.S. and EU
companies. For U.S. companies, the European Union is a very
important market. 378  Having personal data cut off from European
sources would therefore mean a significant reduction of business.
Furthermore, with the advent of the Internet and new communications
technologies, such an approach would be almost impossible. Commerce
has developed to a stage where personal data can no longer be classified
under territorial boundaries. Even a small company in an obscure town
can have customers from countries all over the world.
For the European Union, insisting on a legislative approach that is
unique to its legal tradition and business practice is unwise and
counterproductive. The United States provides a very lucrative market
for European Internet and e-commerce businesses. If the European
is a command forbidding a planned international data export or limiting the conditions of the export." Id.
at 488; see also id. at 488-92 (discussing the data embargo order).
376. Stephen R. Bergerson, E-Commerce Macy and the Black Hal of Cyberspace, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1527, 1550 (2001). As Professor Cate pointed out:
U.S. businesses have good reason to be worried. The first prohibition on transnational data
transfer by the British Data Protection Registrar under national law forbade a proposed sale
of a British mailing list to a United States direct mail organization. France, acting under
French domestic law, has prohibited the French subsidiary of an Italian parent company
from transferring data to Italy because Italy did not have an omnibus data protection law.
The French Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes has required that
identifying information be removed from patient records before they could be transferred to
Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States.
Cate, supra note 372, at 438-39.
377. It is questionable whether such a law would survive challenge before the Dispute Settlement Body
of the WTO. For discussions of how the Dispute Settlement Body would rule on the EU Privacy Directive,
see discussion infra text accompanying notes 379-85.
378. "The European Union is the U.S.'s largest trading partner and the site of most U.S. foreign
investment. In 1997, the United States exported $253.6 billion of goods and services to the European Union
and imported $270.3 billion ofgoods and services from the European Union." Gregory Shaffer, Globalization
and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privay Standar4 25 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1, 39 (2000).
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Union imposed sanctions on U.S. companies, it would jeopardize its
own economy and e-commerce development. Indeed, such sanctions
would hurt the European Union as much as it would hurt the United
States.
Alternatively, the United States could adopt an adversary ap-
proach-for example, by taking the dispute to the Dispute Settlement
Body of the WTOY9 So far, commentators disagree as to whether the
United States would prevail in the dispute."' 0 Although the General
Agreement on Trade in Services38' prohibits restrictions on transborder
data flows,"' it makes exceptions for privacy-related restrictions."'
Thus, unless the EU Privacy Directive is "applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where like conditions prevail[] or a disguised
restriction on trade in services," '384 the United States could not prevail.38 5
379. PETER P. SW1RE & ROBERT E. LTAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIREcTIVE 189 (1998) (quoting an official from
the Clinton administration saying that the United States would go to the WTO ifit had to); see also id. (noting
that the WTO may be "a useful forum for resolving disagreements about data protection rules"); id. at 194
(noting that the WTO could "provide an international forum for harmonizing the legal treatment of privacy
protection"); Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directte, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 46l, 483
(2000) ("Only if a wide array of nations, possibly acting through a body such as the WTO or the United
Nations, arrives at an agreement on the appropriate level of data protection will a truly global solution be
possible."); Reidenberg, International Data lIavacy Rules, supra note 373, at 1354 (discussing the increasing
importance of WTO as a forum for the protection of personal data); id. at 1359-62 (discussing the need for
a General Agreement on Information Privacy). But see SWIRE & LITAN, supra, at 195 (cautioning that
negotiations in the WTO are sometimes hard to predict and may result in a more law-centered approach,
as compared to the sectoral and self-regulatory approach which the United States preferred); id. at 196
(noting the difficulties in expanding the scope of WTO to "complex issues such as privacy protection that
are only modestly related to free trade and protectionism").
380. See SWIRE&LITAN,supra note 379, at 189 ("Data protection laws at the national or EU level may
violate the free trade rules administered by the World Trade Organization."); id at 191-92 (relating
skepticism of trade experts about whether the European position on data protection would survive WTO
scrutiny); Fromholz, supra note 379, at 474 (arguing that the EU Privacy Directive would survive WTO
review); Shaffer, supra note 378, at 46-49 (discussing claims that the EU Privacy Directive would violate the
rules of the WTO); id. at 49-52 (explaining why the EU Piracy Directive would survive WTO review).
381. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex I B, LEGALINSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OFTHE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994).
382. Id. art. XVII, 33 I.L.M. at 1180 (requiring countries to give national treatment to other
signatories).
383. See id. art. XIV(c)(ii), 33 I.L.M. at 1177.
384. Id. art. XIV, 33 I.L.M. at 177.
385. Professor Shaffer listed three reasons why a WTO challenge to the EU Privacy Directive would
fail. First, although there are arguably some protectionist motives behind the EU Piracy Directive, the
Directive, on its face, applies equally to transfers to all countries, including member states of the European
Union. Shaffer, supra note 378, at 49-50. Second, the Directive seeks to promote a legitimate public policy
objective, ie., to protect the privacy of EU residents. Such an objective is explicitly included in Article XIV
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Id. at 50. Third, "[u]nder media scrutiny, WTO dispute
settlement panels would prefer to refrain from engaging in a close balancing of competing trade and privacy
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In the end, the United States adopted a nonzero-sum approach,
which resulted in a win-win solution for both itself and the European
Union. Shortly after the EU Privacy Directive entered into force in
1998,386 the United States negotiated with the European Commission,
the governing body of the European Union, to develop a "safe harbor"
privacy framework.387 Under the framework, companies decide for
themselves whether they want to participate in the safe harbor.388 To
qualify for the safe harbor, a business must notify the Department of
Commerce in writing annually and declare publicly in its published
privacy statements that it adheres to the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles. 38 9 The Department of Commerce will maintain and make
publicly available a list of all organizations that have self-certified.39 ° If
a business that has self-certified persistently fails to comply with the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles, the Department of Commerce will indicate
on the list the business's noncompliance and thus its ineligibility for safe
harbor benefits.39' InJuly 2000, the European Commission approved
of the safe harbor framework 392 and issued a decision that the frame-
work satisfies the European "adequacy" standard for data protection. 93
Before one can learn why the safe harbor framework is a win-win
solution, one must understand the significant differences between the
European Union and the United States in their approaches to data
interests, and rather review the process by which the European Union takes account of foreign privacy
protections." Id. at 51.
386. The EU Privacy Directive entered into force on January I, 1998. EU Privacy Directive, supra
note 370, art. 16(1).
387. For documents detailing the safe harbor privacy framework, see U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe
HarborDocuments, availableathttp://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh-documents.html. Seealso U.S. Dep't
ofCommerce, Safe Harbor Overview, avai/abeat http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/shoverview.html; Yu,
An Introduction to the EUDirective, supra note 370, for an overview ofthe safe harbor framework.
388. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 387.
389. The Safe Harbor Privacy Principles include the following seven principles: notice, choice,
onward transfer, security, data integrity, access, and enforcement. Id. There are two ways to adhere to these
principles. A business can develop its own self-regulatory privacy program that conforms to the principles.
Alternatively, it can participate in a self-regulatory privacy program that adheres to the principles. For a
detailed description of the safe harbor principles, see U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles, available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm.
390. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 387.
391. Id. Such noncompliance also may lead to sanctions under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
392. Article 25(6) of the EU Privacy Directive confers upon the European Commission the power to
find that a third country satisfies the European "adequacy" standard for data protection by reason of its
domestic law or of the international commitments into which it has entered. EU Privacy Directive, supra
note 370, art. 25(6).
393. Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy
Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Commerce, 2000 Oj.
(L 215) 7 (Commission Decision C(2000) 2441).
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protection. First, the term "privacy" has different meanings in the
United States and the European Union. In the United States, privacy
"serves as a catch-all term, protecting a variety of interests ranging from
government intrusion into the bedroom to the inviolability of telephone
communications." '94 Despite the importance of these privacy interests,
many Americans believe in the free market and are constantly suspicious
of government intrusions. Thus, prevailing U.S. opinion prefers "a
sectoral approach that relies on a mix of legislation, regulation and self-
regulation.",
9 3
Second, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes limits
on the government's ability to regulate the flow of information,
including personal data.3" Comprehensive legislation like the EU
Privacy Directive would undermine significant interests protected by the
First Amendment. 97 In fact, U.S. privacy laws tend to be carefully
drafted so that they are narrowly tailored to the type of information,
victims, and businesses the laws are designed to regulate.398
394. Joel R. Reidenberg,& ttingStandardsforFairlnformation Practicein the U.S. PrvaeSector, 80 IOWA L.
REX'. 497,498 (1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Setting Standards].
395. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 387; see also Fromholz, supra note
379, at 471 (noting that the United States holds "a very different view [from the European Union] of both
privacy and the role of government"); Robert M. Gelman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure
ofFederal Priacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SOFTWARE LJ. 199 (1993) (explaining why the United
States failed to enact comprehensive privacy legislation); Arthur R. Miller, Personallrivacy in the Camputer Age:
The Chalenge ofa.AV'w Technologv in an Information-OrintedSociey, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089 (1969) (examining the
challenges facing the developmeni of privacy laws in the United States); Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra
note 394, at 507-1 (arguing that the American society has a desire to disperse standards setting); see also id.
at 498 (noting the differences in the meaning of "privacy" between the European Union and the United
States).
396. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
397. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 55 (1997) ("Just as the First Amendment
protects the privacy of every person to think and to express thoughts freely, it also fundamentally blocks the
power of the government to restrict expression, even in order to protect the privacy of other individuals.");
Fromholz, supra note 379, at 471 ("The First Amendment's free-speech guarantee imposes limits on the
ability of the government to regulate the flow of inf6rmation, including personal data."); Reidenberg, Setting
Standards, supra note 394,at 501-07 (arguing that American society has a desire to minimize restrictions on
information flows).
398. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,47 U.S.C. §§ 551-
554 (2000) (protecting privacy of cable subscribers); Children's On-line Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501-6506 (2000) (regulating the collection and use of data from children aged thirteen and under);
Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000) (regulating the disclosure of driver's license
records); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000) (providing for privacy
in electronic communications); Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693(r) (2000) (requiring
financial institutions to notify customers before disclosing the customers' records to third parties); Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, I5 U.S.C. § 1681-1681i (2000) (regulating credit reporting); Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.) (regulating data practices of financial institutions); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000)
(regulating government data processing); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000)
(protecting piracy of video rental customers). See also SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 379, at 43 (noting the
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Third, the United States does not have a specific government data
protection agency. 99 Instead, data privacy is supervised by a large and
diverse array of government agencies, including the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Transportation, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Trade Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Consumer Affairs, the Office
of Management and Budget, and the Social Security Administration."0
By contrast, in the European Union, the term "privacy" refers to a
narrower and more distinct interest, that of "maintaining the integrity
of personal information and fairness to the individuals about whom the
data relates."" Because the European Union treats this distinct interest
as a fundamental human right," 2 it considers comprehensive legislation
as the most appropriate means to protectpersonal information."3 Such
an approach therefore requires the creation of government data
protection agencies, registration of databases with those agencies, and
approval before the processing of personal data. 4
"complex web of privacy laws").
399. Despite the lack of such an agency, pressure from the EU Privacy Directive has induced the
United States to establish a new position of Chief Counselor for Privacy within the Office of Management
and Budget. Shaffer, supra note. 378, at 62. The primary responsibilities of this new position are "to
coordinate U.S. domestic policy on 'public and private sector' data processing practices and to 'serve as a
point of contact on international privacy issues,' such as the negotiations with EU authorities." Id. The first
Chief Counselor for Privacy is Professor Peter Swire of Ohio State University.
400. &e id at 26; Letter from Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, toJohn Mogg,
Director, DG XV, European Commission (July 14, 2000), available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/FI'CLETTERFINAL.htm; Letter fror Samuel Podberesky, Assistant
General Counsel for Aviation Enforcement and Proceeding, Department of Commerce, to John Mogg,
Director, DG XV, European Commission (July 14', 2000), available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/DOTLETrERFINAL.htm; Memorandum from the Department of
Commerce on Damages for Breaches of Privacy, Legal Authorizations and Mergers and Takeovers in U.S.
Law (July 14, 2000), availabk at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/PRIVACYDAMAGESFINAL.htm;
see also Reidenberg, IntemationalData Privacy Rules, supra note 373, at 1334 (noting that different countries have
adopted different data protection supervisory agencies); id. at 1335 ("Mhe United States has repeatedly
rejected an agency enforcement model for privacy oversight, favoring industry self-regulation.").
401. Reidenberg, &ttuzg Standards, supra note 394, at 498.
402. See EU Privacy Directive, supra note 370, art. 1(1) (declaring that the EU Privacy Directive
"protect[s] the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons"); see also Cate, supra note 372, at 439
("W]hen we speak of data protection within the European Union, we speak of the necessity to respect the
fundamental rights of the citizens. Therefore, data protection may be a subject on which you can have
different answers to the various problems, but it is not a subject you can bargain about.") (quoting Spiros
Simitis, a former data protection commissioner in the German state of Hesse and chair of the Data
Protection Experts Committee of the Council of Europe).
403. See Reidenberg, Intematinad Data Privacy Rules, supra note 373, at 1347 ("[Flor Europe, the choice
is clear: privacy protection is an exclusive issue of law.") (quoting Louise Cadoux, former Vice President of
the French National Commission on Data Processing and Liberties).
404. See EU Privacy Directive, supra note 370, arts. 18-19 (stipulating the data processor's obligation
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Given the above differences, the safe harbor framework is particularly
helpful, for it allows both the EU and U.S. regulatory approaches to
coexist. By doing so, it enables the European Union and the United
States to promote data flow and privacy protection through coordina-
tion and cooperation. °5 It also paves the way for further cooperation
between the two trading partners in other protection that sits uneasily
with either country's cultural or constitutional tradition.
40 6
Furthermore, the framework is particularly well-equipped to address
privacy issues in the online environment." Without committing to the
EU legislative approach or the U.S. sectoral approach, the safe harbor
framework creates an environment that is conducive to the development
of technical rules and default settings. As Professors Lawrence Lessig
andJoel Reidenberg maintain, technical standards and default settings
will be particularly helpful in protecting fundamental values in
cyberspace. 8 These standards and settings even may establish new
to notify the supervisory authority); id. art. 20 (requiring the supervisory authority to investigate data
processing operations that are "likely to present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects");
id. art. 21(2) (requiring the supervisory authority to maintain and make publicly available a register of notified
processing operations); id. art. 28(l) (requiring the establishment of a supervisory authority).
405. Cf. Reidenberg, Intematnal Data Pivacy Rules, supra note 373, at 1370 (articulating the need for
a theory for coregulation that allows for strategies and methods for data protection authorities to promote
international data flows through multinational coordination and cooperation).
406. The safe harbor framework provides several benefits to U.S. businesses. It provides predictability
and continuity for companies that transmit personal information from Europe. It also eliminates the need
for prior approval of data transfers from the European Union. In addition, it benefits small and medium
enterprises by offering a simpler and cheaper means ofcomplying with the EU Privacy Directive. U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 387.
407. This is especially important, considering the fact that the EU Privacy Directive was drafted more
than ten years ago. The Directive was drafted initially in 1990. See Proposal for a Council Directive
Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C 277)
3. To some extent, it was outdated even before it entered into force. Using terms-such as "controller" and
"data subject," the Directive assumes a top-down architecture that is more applicable to big corporations
and mainframe computers than to individuals, small and medium enterprises, and a network of personal
computers and laptops. SWIRE & UTAN, supra note 379, at 50-53; see also Fromholz, supra note 379, at 475;
Julia Gladstone, The U.S. Privacy Balance and the European Privacy Directive: Relections on the United States Privacy
Policy, 7 WILLAMETTEJ. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RESOL 10, 20 (2000). Thus, it will be interesting to see how
the Directive evolves in light of the Internet, the e-commerce explosion, and the proliferation of automated
data-transfer devices such as cookies and web "boss." Yu, An Introduction to the EUDirective, supra note 370.
408. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) ("Codle isaw ....
We can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are fundamental, or we can
build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear."); Lawrence Lessig, Reading the
Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LJ. 869, 898 (1996) (discussing the use of technology as a tool to regu-late
behavior and facilitate compliance with legal norms); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governtg.Netuwoks and Rule-making
in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 929 (1996) ("State governments can and should be involved in the
establishment of norms for network activities, yet state governments cannot and should not attempt to
expropriate all regulatory power from network communities."); Reidenberg, InternationalData Privacy Rules,
supra note 373, at 1331 ("Technical rules and default settings establish data privacy norms."); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Lea lnfonmatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553,
555 (1998) (arguing that policymakers must "understand, consciously recognize, and encourage" the set of
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privacy norms that accommodate the divergent interests of the various
members of the international community. 9
One might wonder whether the nonzero-sum approach would be
more appropriate and attainable for abstract issues like privacy and civil
liberties than for economic issues like intellectual property and
international trade. Such an argument, however, overlooks the
intertwined relationships between intellectual property and democratic
society4 ' and between intellectual property and cultural policy.4 '
Indeed, the nonzero-sum approach not only is appropriate in the
intellectual property arena, but might provide promising solutions to
resolving difficult disputes concerning the protection of folklore and
traditional knowledge 12 and the access to AIDS drugs in less developed
countries.
4 13
B. Disputes Between Developed and Less Developed Countries
Historically, developed and less developed countries have deep
disagreements over the availability, scope, and use of intellectual
property rights. Developed countries consider intellectual property
rules for information flows imposed by technology and communication networks known as "Lex
Informatica"); Joel R. ReidenbergRules of the Roadfor Global Electronic ,hwarys: Merging the Trade and Technical
Paradigm, 6 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 287, 296-301 (1993) (discussing the use of technology to protect the
integrity and interoperability of information networks).
409. See Reidenberg, IntematinalData Pivag Rules, supra note 373, at 133 1; id. at 1344 ("The absence
of law .. .encourages the rise of information policy rules through technical code. These technical rules
embed information privacy decisions, or more often privacy violations, in network architecture.").
410. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyights DTemocratic Pinciples in the Global Arena, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 217, 278 (1998) (arguing that the fundamental purpose of copyright law is to promote democratic
society); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright anda Democratic Sociry, 106 YALE Lj. 283, 288 (1996) (proposing
a democratic paradigm for copyright law).
411. See Reichman, Duration of Copyrgh supra note 345 (noting the close ties between copyright and
cultural policy); Thomas Bishop, France and the Needfor Cultural Evception, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 187,
187 (1997) (exploring the importance of the cultural exception and arguing that each country "has a
right-even a duty-to protect and develop its own culture" despite the need to protect intellectual
property).
412. For discussions of the interplay of intellectual property and traditional knowledge, see generally
RosemaryJ. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community Traditional Knowledge in International
Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275 (200 1); David R. Downes, How Intellectual Proprty Could Be a Tool to Protect
Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 253 (2000); Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of
Indikenous Peopks: Is Intellectual Property theAnswer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. I (1997); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore
Under Modem Intellectual Proper!y Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in
Africa and the United States, 48 Am. U. L. REV. 769 (1999); Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products,
81 B.U. L. REV. 793 (2001).
413. For discussions of the tension between intellectual property protection and the access to AIDS
drugs, see generally james Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy Consistently
with Facilitating Access to Affordable Aids Drugs to Low-End Consumers 53 U. FLA. L. REV. 727 (200 1).
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rights important to economic development. 4  According to these
countries, intellectual property rights will attract foreign investment,"' 5
416W41increase taxes, create newjobs, 7 and facilitate technology transfer.4 8
By contrast, less developed countries regard intellectual property rights
as exploitative devices that drain scarce resources4 19 and slow down their
414. See Robert M. Sherwood, Wh7y'a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the Vorld
[hereinafter Sherwood, IWhy a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense], in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68,83 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] ("Strong intellectual
property safeguards seem likely to speed rather than retard progress toward world-class achievement."); Yu,
From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 220 (noting the importance ofintellectual property rights to a country's
strategy of economic development); Yu, P/racy, Preidice, and Perspectives, supra note 2, at 62 (arguing that
China overlooked the importance of intellectual property rights to its economic development).
415. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1994); Antonio Medina Mora Icaza, The Mexican Sojiware
Industy, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 414, at 232, 236
("Intellectual property rights protection in a country is a way to seek the trust of foreign investors in the
country that will allow its economy to grow."); Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual
Property Rifts in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 7, 8 (Mary L. Riley
ed., 1997) (listing the loss of foreign investment and know-how as a cost of counterfeiting); Josh Martin,
Copyrght Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COM., Mar. 7, 1996, at IC (reporting on a World Bank
survey that demonstrates the correlation between intellectual property rights and foreign investment);
A.R.C. Westwood, Preface to GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 414,
at v, vi ("Clearly, a company will not be enthusiastic about doing business in a country unwilling to provide
protection for the intellectual content of its products--a concern now facing U.S. businesses as they evaluate
opportunities in the former Soviet Union."); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 192 (noting that
effective intellectual property protection can attract foreign investment); Yu,Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives,
supra note 2, at 63 (same); see ao Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Propery Systems and Investment Stimulation.
The Rating of Systems in Eteen Deveopig Coumtries, 37 IDEA 261 (1997) (using foreign investment as one of
the variables in measuring intellectual property protection in a less developed country); Micky Mouse Back
in China, N.Y. TIMESJune 3,. 1993, at D4 (reportingthat Disney brought Mickey Mouse back to China after
a self-imposed four-year absence due to copyright infringements). But see A. Samuel Oddi, The International
Patent System and Third World Development, Reality or MytA, 1987 DUKE LJ. 831, 849 ("In the complex
decisionmaking process of whether to invest in a foreign country, the availability of patent protection seems
unlikely to be a determinative factor."); McManis, supra note 107, at 1289 (noting the lack of "empirical
support for the proposition that increased levels of intellectual property protection in the developing world
will necessarily lead to increased levels of foreign investment in developing countries").
416. See Lagerqvist& Riley, supra note 415, at 9; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONTRIBUTION OF
THE SOFrWARE INDUSTRY TO THECHINEE ECONOMY 4 (1998) (estimating that a sixty-percent decrease
in piracy would translate into more than $466 million in tax receipts).
417. See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 415, at 9; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 192 (noting
that effective intellectual property protection can createjobs); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note
2, at 63 (same); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 416, at 4 (1998) (estimating that a sixty-
percent decrease in piracy would translate into more than 79,000jobs).
418. See MANSFIELD, supra note 415, at 20 ("Mhe strength or weakness of a country's system of
intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect, particularly in high-technology industries,
on the kinds of technology transferred by many U.S. firms to that country."); SELL, supra note 67, at 214
(arguing that an operational intellectual property regime will promote technology transfer); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Patent Policy ofDeveloping Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 166, 175-76 (1994) (same); Yu, From
Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 192 (noting that effective intellectual property protection can facilitate
technology transfer); Yu, Pisacy, Prjdic, and Perspectives, supra note 2, at 63 (same).
419. Giunta & Shang, supra note 3, at 331 ("As with the importation of capital, developing countries
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catchup processes.42 ° Under this perspective, intellectual property rights
"will lead to or embed a stratification and concentration of [intellectual
property rights] ownership" in enterprises based in industrialized
countries.42' They may even facilitate the transfer of valuable cultural
resources out of the country.422
With the creation of the TRIPs Agreement, developed and less
developed countries finally came to a compromise. Although the
compromise is interesting and instructive in understanding international
trade negotiations, this section does not discuss how the two groups of
countries reached such a compromise.423 Instead, it focuses on the
various provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. By doing so, it hopes to
demonstrate how one can divine the conflict resolution approach used
to resolve a complex intellectual property dispute.
From the standpoint of the less developed countries, those provisions
of the TRIPs Agreement that delineate the minimum standards of
intellectual property protection are apparently coercive. As Professor
Marci Hamilton pointed out, the TRIPs Agreement was not designed
only to correct the international balance of trade or to lower customs
often view the importation of intellectual property as a means of dominating and exploiting the economic
potential of the importing country. Paying for imports or royalties is thus seen as an economic burden
fostering a negative balance of trade.").
420. But see Robert P. Merges, Battle ofthe Lateralisms: Intellectual Propery and Trade, 8 B.U. INT'L LJ. 239,
246 (1990) (noting the growth of the Hong Kong recording industry and the Indian software industry after
improved copyright protection); Sherwood, "y a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense, supra note
414, at 72 (noting a large increase of patent applications filed by Mexican nationals after Mexico reformed
its patent law in 1991); id. (noting that since Colombia started providing copyright protection to software
in 1989, "[m]ore than 100 Colombian nationals have since produced application software packages that
have been registered with the copyright office, with hundreds more written but not registered"); Yu, From
I'rates to Partners, supra note 2, at 192 (noting that effective intellectual property protection will promote the
development of indigenous industries and technologies); Yu, INacy, Prudice, and Perspecties, supra note 2, at
63 (same).
421. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement, supra note 107, at 46.
422. See Bellagio Declaration, reprinted inJAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION SOCIETY 192-95 (1996) (declaring that contemporary intellectual
property laws deny protection to people who do not fit the author-centered model, such as "custodians of
tribal culture and medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional artistic and musical forms, or peasant
cultivators ofvaluable seed varieties"); see also BOYLE, supra, at 2 (arguing that Western intellectual property
systems tend to disproportionately favor industrialized countries while ignoring the interests of less developed
countries which supplied the indigenous cultural materials); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 241
(emphasizing the importance of granting protection to rare and irreplaceable raw materials like folkloric
works, works ofcultural heritage, and biological and ecological know-how of traditional peoples); Yu,Piray,
Preudice, and Perspectives, supra note 2, at 86 (same). But see Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment
on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Properfy Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 271 (1998)
(contending that "copyright laws can form the first line of defense in protecting indigenous culture and still
comply with TRIPS standards").
423. For discussions of how the developed and less developed countries came to a compromise, see
generally sources cited supra note 72.
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trade barriers.4 24  Rather, the Agreement sought to "remake
international copyright law in the image of Western copyright law.
4 23
Due to its coercive nature, the Agreement is illusory and largely
ineffective.426 So far, the primary reasons for the lack of intellectual
property protection in less developed countries are the lack of
understanding in and public awareness of intellectual property rights,
427
the belief that intellectual property rights would not benefit the
economic development of the country,428 and the lack of belief in
individualism, reward, and commodification.429 Without increasing the
public awareness of intellectual property rights and effectively nurturing
the political values needed to sustain an operational intellectual property
system, the TRIPs Agreement was doomed to fail from the very
beginning.
To understand why the creation of political values is needed for the
success of the new intellectual property system, one can compare the
development of the system with that of antitrust laws in less developed
countries. In the early 1980s, the economic crisis in less developed
countries led to the emergence of politically powerful domestic
constituencies favoring new anticompetition policies.4 0  These
constituencies not only encouraged their governments to actively seek
out information and assistance in pursuing the new policies, they also
helped foster a change of mindset among the local people favoring this
new direction. 411 As a result, a different politico-social environment
developed, and a new and sustained antitrust regime became possible.
Although the TRIPs Agreement is coercive by nature, it contains
provisions reflecting other approaches. Article 64 of the Agreement
embraced the adversary approach by mandating that disputes arising
under the Agreement be settled by the dispute settlement procedure of
the WTO.4 2 Thus, countries can resort to a rule-based mechanism for
424. Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 70, at 614; see a/so SurendraJ. Patel, Can the Intellectual
Proper y Rights System Senv the Interests of Indigenous Knowledge?, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 305, 316 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds.,
1996) (arguing that TRIPs "universalize[s] the U.S. system of intellectual property rights").
425. Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra note 70, at 614.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
427. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 213.
428. See id; Yu, Nza, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 2, at 24-28 (discussing the skepticism of the
Chinese people about intellectual property rights).
429. See Hamilton, TRIPSAgrement, supra note 70, at 617; see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note
2, at 211 ("To believe in intellectual property rights, one must accept, at least, some version of individualism,
reward, and commodification.").
430. See SELL, supra note 67, at 177-78.
431. Id. at 178.
432. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, art. 64, 33 I.L.M. at 1221.
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resolving intellectual property disputes covered by the TRIPs
Agreement. Such a mechanism will provide predictability and stability
to the international intellectual property system and will deter signatory
countries from cheating on the other member states.
433
For example, in a recent dispute between the European Union and
the United States,434 the Dispute Settlement Panel of the WTO
adjudicated whether the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998413
(FIMLA) violated the United States's obligations under the TRIPs
Agreement.43 6 Enacted as a compromise between copyright holders and
small business enterprises,4  the FIMLA amended section 110(5) of the
United States Copyright Act by exempting restaurants, bars, and retail
stores from royalties for using "homestyle" audio and video equipment
to play broadcast music.
41
8
In 1999, the European Union challenged the FIMLA and the
homestyle exemption of the United States Copyright Act s9 under the
dispute settlement procedures'of the WTO. ' ° In a sixty-nine-page
report, the dispute settlement panel found that the FIMLA, but not the
homestyle exemption," violated articles 11 bis(l)(iii) and 11 (1)(ii) of the
433. See discussion supra Part I.B.
434. For excellent discussions of the disputi, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodic, 77w Development and
Incorporation ofintemationalNAorms in the Fomaion ofC oight Law, 62 OHIO ST. Li. 733 (2001); Laurence R.
Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Bene/7RIPS and &onomie Analysis ofthe Fairness in Music Licensing Ac 80
B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
435. Pub. L. 105.298, § 202, 112 Stat. 2830.31 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 110(5)(B), 504,
513 (2000))
436. United States-Section I l0(5)ofthe U.S. Copyright Act: Report of the Panel, WT/DS/ 160/R
(June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Decision], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/dispue/
1234da.pdf (finding that the FIMLA violated the TRIPs Agreement).
437. Helfer, supra note 434, at 102 (noting that the FIMLA "split the difference between business
interests who wanted a total exemption for secondary uses of broadcast music and [performing rights
organizations] and copyright owners who opposed any relaxation of the homestyle exemption").
438. 17 U.S.C. § I 10(5)(B) (2000)7
439. 17 U.S.C. § I l0(5)(A).
440. As Professor Heifer recounted:
Within days of the law's entry into force in January 1999, the fifteen-member European
Community ("EC") challenged both the FIMLA and the homestyle exemption under the
dispute settlement procedures ofthe World Trade Organization ("WTO"). The EC is acting
on a complaint by the Irish Music Rights Organization that the HMLA is causing its
members to lose $1.36 million annually in licensing royalties. Canada, Australia and
Switzerland soon joined the EC in seeking formal consultations with the United States,
alleging that their songwriters and music publishers will also be denied foregone performance
royalties.
Heifer, supra note 434, at 99 (footnote omitted).
441. Panel Decision, supra note 436, 7.1(a):
Subparagraph (A) of Section 110(3) of the US Copyright Act meets the requirements of
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and is thus consistent with Articles Ilbis(l)(iii) and
I I(i)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by
Article 9.1 of that Agreement.
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Berne Convention as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.442 In
view of this violation, the panel recommended that "the Dispute
Settlement Body request the United States to bring [the FIMLA] into
conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. '443
Ironically, despite a negative finding in the WTO panel decision, the
United States refused to amend its copyright law and, instead, entered
into an agreement with the European Union to submit to binding
arbitration as permitted under article 25 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. 444 In November 2001, the arbitration panel awarded
EU copyright holders about $1.4 million per year for lost revenues
caused by the FIMLA.445 Although questions remain as to how the U.S.
government will fund the settlement and distribute the penalty money,'
the manner in which this dispute was resolved will undeniably have
longlasting implications for the development of the dispute resolution
mechanism under the WTO.
Finally, the TRIPs Agreement includes provisions that reflect the
cooperative approach. However, not all of these "cooperative"
provisions result in a win-win solution. Instead, some result in mere
compromises in which losses are allocated between the various parties.
For example, Article 65 of the Agreement provides less developed and
transitional countries with a five-year transitional period.447 Likewise,
Article 66 provides least developed countries with an eleven-year
transitional period.' To help create "a sound and viable technological
base" in these countries, Article 66 further requires developed countries
442. Id. 7.1(b):
Subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act does not meet the requirements
of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and is thus inconsistent with Articles I lbis(l)(iii) and
I I(l)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by
Article 9.1 of that Agreement.
443. Id. 7.2.
444. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 86, art. 25 (permitting arbitration as a means to
dispute settlement); see also Phil Hardy, WTO Arbitrators Rule That US Should Pay $1.4m a rear to EU Copyright
Owners, MUSIC & COPYRIGHT, Nov. 71, 2001, available at Lexis, News Library, ALLNWS File (providing
background for the WTO arbitration decision).
445. United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Recourse to Arbitration Under Article
25 of the DSU 5.1, WT/DSI60/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/ 160arb.25_ I _e.pdf (determining the award atf 1,219,900 per year); see also Hardy, supra
note 444 (discussing the abitration decision).
446. See Hardy, supra note 444. For discussion of events occurring after the arbitration decision, see
International Development, ENT. L. REP., Mar. 2002, available at Lexis, News Library, ALLNWS File; Settlement
Between European Union and United States of WTO Fainess in Music Licensing Case Appears to Have Fallen Apar4 ENT.
L. REP., Feb. 2002, available at Lexis, News Library, ALLNWS File.
447. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, art. 65(l)-(3), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
448. Id. art. 66(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
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to provide incentives for their businesses and institutions to promote and
encourage technology transfer to least developed countries.449
Despite these provisions, there is no guarantee that less developed
countries will develop a more effective intellectual property system or
the political values needed to sustain the system during the transitional
period. There is also no guarantee that the benefits deriving from the
transitional arrangement would compensate for the economic and
cultural losses caused by the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement.
Even worse, as many less developed countries are concerned, the
transitional provisions do not prevent their more powerful trading
partners, such as the European Union,Japan, and the United States,
from imposing unilateral sanctions on them.
5
Fortunately, the TRIPs Agreement includes several provisions that
allow countries to enable the more preferable nonzero-sum approach.
Article 67 of the Agreement requires developed countries to provide
technical and financial cooperation to less and least developed countries
"on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions."45' Such
cooperation includes "assistance in the preparation of laws and
regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights as well as on the prevention of their abuse, and ... support
regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and
agencies relevant to these matters, including the training of
personnel."4 2
In addition, all the signatory countries agree to cooperate with each
other to eliminate international trade in intellectual property-infringing
goods by establishing and notifying contact points in their governments,
exchanging information on trade in infringing goods, and promoting
cooperation between their customs authorities. 53 To allow for further
cooperation and coordinated decisionmaking, the Agreement requires
the Council for TRIPS to review the implementation of the Agreement
at two-year intervals after the expiration of the transitional period and
in light of any relevant new developments that might warrant
modification or amendment of the agreement. 54 Because "[r]egimes
449. Id. art. 66(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
450. GA T/BillBings Major Reforms, supra note 64, at 1966-67; see also Hartridge & Subramanian, supra
note 64, at 909 (querying the need for less and least developed countries to accept the TRIPs Agreement "if
they remain vulnerable to unilateral actions").
451. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 13, art. 67, 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
452. Id., 33 I.L.M. at 1222-23.
453. Id. art. 69, 33 I.L.M. at 1223.
454. Id. art. 71(l), 33 I.L.M. at 1224.
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are maintained so long as the patterns of interest that gave rise to them
remain,"45 5 such review is particularly important.
C. Disputes Between China and the United States
Since the reopening of China in the late 1970s, U.S. companies have
experienced significant problems caused by the lack of intellectual
property protection in China.456 To protect their economic interests,
they have heavily lobbied the U.S. government to adopt a coercive
approach. In the past two decades, the United States has repeatedly
threatened China with a series of economic sanctions, trade wars, non-
renewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to entry into the
WTO.4 5 Such threats eventually led to compromises by the Chinese
government and the signing of intellectual property agreements in
1992,458 1995, 45 9 and 1996. 46
455. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration, supra note 12, at 137.
456. For discussions of U.S.-China intellectual property disputes, see ALFORD, supra note 67; Alford,
Making the World Safe for hPat?, supra note 76; Berkman, supra note 76; Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons
and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China. Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1081
(1996); Patrick H. Hu, "Mickey Mouse" in China. Legal and Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copynghts 14
B.U. INT'L LJ. 81 (1996); Tiefenbrun, supra note 33; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2; Yu, Piracy,
Proudice, and Perspectives, supra note 2.
457. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 137-38 (describing the United States's use of section
301 sanctions and various trade threats to induce China to protect intellectual property rights). On
November 10, 2001, the WTO member states approved the proposal to admit China to the international
trading body in the Doha Ministerial Conference. See Paul Blustein & Clay Chandler, 14rOAppoves China's
Ent, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at A47;Joseph Kahn, World Trade Organization Admits China, Amid Doubts,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. II, 2001, at IA. After fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations, China formally became
the 143rd member ofthe WTO on December 11, 2001. Fordiscussions ofthe ramifications of China's entry
into the WTO, see generally SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO:
CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); Peter K. Yu, The Ramifications of China's Enty into
the WHTO: Will the Global Community Benefit?, FINDLAW's WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, Dec. 4, 2001, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011204-yu.html.
458. Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United States on the Protection
of Intellectual Property,Jan. 17 1992, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 677 (1995); see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners,
supra note 2, at 142-44 (discussing the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding). Pursuant to the 1992
Memorandum of Understanding, China amended the 1984 Patent Law, Patent Law of the People's
Republic of China, translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA: THE LAW 66-79 (1996),
promulgated new patent regulations, Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People's Republic
of China, translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA: THE LAW, supra, at 83-116, and
acceded to the Patent Cooperation Treaty,June 19, 1970,28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. China also
acceded to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 81, and
ratified the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309. In addition, China amended the
Copyright Law, Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, translated in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN CHINA: THE LAw, supra, at 128-42, updated its trademark law, and adopted a new unfair
competition law that affords protection to trade secrets.
459. 1995 Agreement, supra note 112; see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 145-46
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Despite these agreements and the reforms they induced, the U.S.
intellectual property policy toward China has been largely
unsuccessful,"' partly due to its failure to take into account China's
different political, social, economic, cultural, and ideological
conditions. 2 In fact, this ill-advised policy had cost the United States
credibility463 and helped China improve its ability to resist American
(discussing the 1995 Agreement). The 1995 Agreement summarized the enforcement measures China had
undertaken in the past and those it would undertake in the near future. It included a pledge to improve
market access for American products and to promote transparency by publishing all laws, rules, and
regulations concerning limitation on imports,joint ventures, and other economic activities. The Agreement
also delineated the mutual responsibilities that would be undertaken by both countries, such as training
customs officers and bureaucrats, exchanging information and statistics, -and undertaking future
consultations. In addition, the 1995 Agreement provided a series of short-term and long-term remedial
measures, including the establishment of the State Council Working Conference on intellectual Property
Rights; the creation of Enforcement Task Forces; the adoption of a copyright verification system that
protects compact discs, laser discs, and CD-ROMs; the requirement for title registration of foreign
audiovisual products and computer software in CD-ROM format; and the intensification of border control
by customs officers. Finally, the Agreement provided for a six-month "special enforcement period," during
which intensive efforts would be undertaken to crack down on major infringers of intellectual property rights
and to target regions in which infringing activity was particularly rampant at the time of the Agreement.
460. People's Republic of China Implementation ofthe 1995 Intellectual Property Rights Agreement,
June 17,1996, P.R.C.-U.S.,availab/e at http://www.mac.doc.gov/TCC/DATA/index.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2001); see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 149 (discussing the 1996 Accord). The terms of
the 1996 Accord include the closing of pirate plants, criminal prosecution for those who violate intellectual
property regulations, a special enforcement period where police assume responsibility for the investigation
of piracy, improved border'surveillance by customs officers, and a registration system for compact disc
manufacturers.
461. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2 (criticizing the ineffectiveness of the American coercive
intellectual property policy toward China). The failure of the coercive policy is evident from the cycle of
futility the policy had created. The cycle goes as follows: The United States begins by threatening China
with trade sanctions. In response, China retaliates with countersanctions of~a similar amount. After several
months of bickering and posturing, both countries come to an eleventh-hour compromise by signing a new
intellectual property agreement. While intellectual property protection improves during the first few months
immediately after the signing of the agreement, the piracy problem revives once international attention is
diverted and the foreign push dissipates. Within a short period of time, American businesses again complain
to the U.S. government, and the cycle repeats itself. See id. at 154 for a discussion of this cycle.
462. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 2, at 16 (arguing that China's political, social,
economic, cultural, and ideological differences with the West militate against intellectual property law
reforms in China); see also id. at 16-37 (discussing China's differences with the West).
463. See Greg Mastel, Piracy in China- No Mickey Mouse Issue, WASH. POST, Feb.'15, 1996, at A27 ("The
United States has threatened China with trade sanctions for its many trade sins a half-dozen times in recent
years without making good on its threats. In the eyes ofthe Chinese, continued empty U.S. threats have little
credibility."); see alsojAMES MANN, ABOUT FACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP
WITH CHINA, FROM NIXON TO'CLINTON 311 (2000) ("Clinton's retreat on human rights made matters
worse than ifhe had never imposed his MFN conditions .... [l]t had shown that America would back down
from the threats it made about human rights and democracy in cases where its commercial and -strategic
interests were jeopardized."); James Lilley, Trade and the Waking Giar--Csia, Asia, and American Engagement,
in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS 36, 53 (James R. Lilley & Wendell L.
Willkie II eds., 1994) ("President Clinton does not seem entirely credible to foreign leaders because he has
made threats without following up on them."); James D. Morrow, The Strateic Setting ofChoices: Signalin
Commitment, and Aegotiation in International Politics, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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demands.464 The continuous threats and bullying also created hostility
among the Chinese people, making the government more reluctant to
adopt Western intellectual property law reforms."65 Even worse, the
bilateral policy backfired on the United States's foreign trade and
human rights policies.
4 66
Today, intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting remain
rampant throughout China, in particular at the grassroots level467 and
in rural areas. 8 In the past few years, the United States has continually
77 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999) (emphasizing the importance of credibility in international
relations).
464. See RICHARD BERNSTEIN & Ross H. MUNRO, THE COMING CONFLICT WITH CHINA 83
(Vintage Books 1998) (noting China's success in inverting the United States's coercive approach); Yu, From
Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 133-34.
465. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 174.
466. See id. at 169 (describing how the U.S. intellectual property policy toward China threatened the
integrity of the global trading system); id. at 174 (describing how U.S. intellectual property policy toward
China has backfired on its longstanding interests in promoting the protection of human rights and civil
liberties in China); Alford, Making the World Safe for fWat?, supra note 76, at 144-45 (noting that the U.S.
coercive trade policy provides China with "a convenient legitimization" for its repressive measures while
constraining the United States's capacity to complain about such actiofis).
467. OMCEOF USTR, 2000 NATIONALTRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADEBARRIERS
50 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NTE REPORT] (reporting that significant problems exist with the enforcement
of intellectual property laws at the grassroots level in China); see also Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the
People's Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 11 (2000) ("Although the level of copyright piracy seems to
have decreased recently in China due to aggressive campaigning by copyright owners, trademark
counterfeiting continues to increase.").
468. Corruption and loeal protectionism are particularly problematic in the rural areas. See 2000 NTE
REPORT, supra note 467, at 50 (considering corruption and local protectionism as some of the biggest
problems of enforcing intellectual property rights in China); see also CHINA DECONSTRUCTS: POLITICS,
TRADE, AND REGIONALISM (David S.G. Goodman &!Gerald Segal eds., 1994) (examining the regional
disparities in China); DONG SHIZHONG ETAL, TRADEAND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES INCHINA: THE
CURRENT COMMERCIAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 196 (1992) ("In China, local governments are highly
protective of their own interests. A well-known expression in China sums up the protectionist attitudes of
local governments: 'The central government has policies but the local governments have policy-proof
devices."'); PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL
SYSTEM 240 (1997) ("Government bureaux are still linked to production facilities and foreign trading
corporations. When licenses or permits are needed.... the administraiiye organ with jurisdiction to handle
the matter will only grant the license or permit to the extent that it does not threaten a domestic interest.
..."); Berkman, supra note 76, at 17 (i'While Beijing's directives generally are implemented without question,
protection of intellectual property rights may be one area where Beijing's support is not alone sufficient.");
Yiqiang U, Evaluation of the Sino-American Intellectual Property Agreements: A judticial Apploach to Solving the Local
Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM.J. ASIAN L. 391, 401 (1996) ("Today it is often hard to implement a national
plan without local governments' consent and cooperation."); Gerald Segal, China's Changing Shape: The
Muddle fingdom., FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1994, at 43, 58 ("[F]oreigners who want to trade with China are
best advised to think in terms of provinces or localities. It is [the local authorities] who can guarantee the
transparency of global trading regulations or resolve disputes over intellectual property."); Gregory S.
Kolton, Comment, Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the People's Republic of China: A Review and Critique of
China's Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 415, 448 (1996) (noting that piracy problems
"arise from flaws in the Chinese legal system, which allows for local protectionism both in the adjudication
process and the enforcement process"); id. at 448-49 ("[Plarticipation by local Chinese authorities generally
is needed to enforce People's Court orders, which they might be unwilling to offer if doing so would be
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lost more than $2 billion in revenue annually due to intellectual
property piracy in China. 9 As the Chinese economy and the demand
for intellectual property-based products grow, these losses will be
unlikely to decrease despite the government's increasing effort to crack
down on piracy and counterfeiting and the general public's increased
awareness of intellectual property rights.47
The repeated failure of the United States's approach to solve the
Chinese piracy and counterfeiting problem has led scholars,
policymakers, the mass media, and the American public to debate
whether the United States should reformulate its intellectual property
policy toward China. In fact, many U.S. companies have switched from
a coercive approach to an adversary approach by litigating in courts.471
However, given the lack of the rule of law in China, courts are of limited
effectiveness4 72 and are marred by various structural problems, such as
"the limited independence of the judicial branch, the intertwining
relationship between the court and the Chinese Communist Party, the
court's vulnerability to outside influence, the judges' susceptibility to
bribery and corruption, underfunding, abuse of government officials,
and local protectionism. 4 73 There is also an acute shortage of lawyers,
in particular intellectual property lawyers, in China.4 74 Because of this
detrimental to their authority, especially if the judgment comes from ajurisdiction outside the scope of such
officials' authority.").
469. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2001), available at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/200l/200SPEC30ICHINA.pdf; see
also Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at DI (estimating the
United States's trade losses due to piracy in China at more than $2 billion).
470. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2.
471. Susan Finder, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through the Courts, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 255 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999). See id. for a
discussion of those issues potential litigants in the Chinese courts have to be aware of when considering
whether to seek enforcement of their intellectual property rights through the Chinese courts.
472. See Berkman, supra note 76, at 24-25 ("The court system as an institution generally lacks the
political muscle to stare down powerful, local officials who may wish to impede law enforcement.");
Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 415, at 28 ("In China, administrative enforcement is occasionally seen as more
cost effective than either civil or criminal proceedings against counterfeiters."). But see id. at 32 ("Due to the
more public nature of a court action, there is somewhat less likelihood that a judge will give in to local
pressure."); Li, supra note 468, at 414-15 (noting that courts are more powerful than administrative agencies
and may institute preliminary measures against the infringer no matter where it is located).
473. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 217-18.
474. ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OFTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 37 (1998); William P. Alford, Tasseled Loafersfoi Barefoot Latwyers: Transfonnation and Tension in the
World of Chinese Legal Workers [hereinafter Alford, Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lauyers], in CHINA'S LEGAL
REFORMS 22, 30 (Stanley Lubman ed., 1996); Berkman, supra note 76, at 29; Yu, From Pirates to Partners,
supra note 2; Jianyang Yu, Protection of Intelkcual Property in the P.R.C.: Progress, Problems, and Proposals, 13
UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 140, 149 (1994); Yu, Piray, Prfjudie, and Perspectives, supra note 2, at 71. This shortage
may alleviate once China lifts the geographic ban on overseas lawyers and'opens up the legal profession to
foreign law firms, as itjoins the WTO. "So far, branches of overseas law firms have been set up in only eight
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shortage, businesses and individuals cannot obtain competent legal
advice and services to protect and enforce their intellectual property
rights in lawsuits and administrative proceedings. Furthermore, given
the adversarial nature of a lawsuit and the hostilities it will breed, "it
may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to continue doing business
in China to sue because doing so may wreck their 'guanxi'-personal
contacts or favors-that are integral for doing business in [China]."7
To alleviate these problems, U.S. companies should consider taking
the nonzero-sum approach. To illustrate this approach, this section
focuses on the various difficulties confronting U.S. companies in their
attempts to protect intellectual property rights in China.
First, the Chinese leaders are reluctant to promote intellectual
property rights because these rights tend to benefit foreigners at the
expense of the local people.476 For example, in 1992, foreigners
obtained two-thirds of all invention patents granted in China, even
though the Chinese people filed eleven times more applications.477
However, Chinese leaders may change their minds if they are convinced
that intellectual property protection benefits the domestic population
and contributes to the economic growth of the country. Thus, U.S.
companies should adopt a cooperative strategy that assists the Chinese,
in particular their independent sector,478 to develop a local intellectual
property industry.479 They also should consider cooperating with
cities including Beijing and Shanghai among all the 15 Chinese cities which have government permission
to hold overseas law firms." China: Geographic Restrictiuns on Lawyers to Be biflerdAj IITO, CHINA Bus. INFO.
NETWORK, May 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17728683.
.475. Kolton, supra note 468, at 451.
476. This discussion is also valid in other less developed countries, whose leaders are equally concerned
about the fact that intellectual property rights tend to benefit foreigners at the expense of the local people.
477. See ALFORD, supra note 67, at 84. As one commentator explained:
Because developed countries create a majority of the patentable inventions and technology,
most of the patents granted in developing countries are issued to foreigners. The largest
proportion of inventions covered by patents are thus induced, not by the availability of patent
protection in the developing countries, but rather by the domestic patent system of the holder
or in conjunction with patent systems in other developed countries. As a result, a developing
country cannot expect that implementation of a patent regime will induce foreign innovators
to focus their development efforts on new products and technologies that meet the special
needs of the developing nations.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA 20-21 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997).
478. In China, the public and private sectors are not always distinguishable. See William Alford,
Underestimating a Complex China, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 1994, at 23 ("The businesses that American media
celebrate as private or at least non-state-owned, including in particular the much-touted township/village
enterprises, in many instances actually are owned in significant measure by the government or the
Communist Party."); MARGARET M. PEARSON, CHINA'S NEW BUSINESS ELITE: THE POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC REFORM 40 (1997) (noting the difficulty in distinguishing in post-Mao
China between what is within the Party-state and what falls outside of it).
479. See Warren H. Maruyama, U.S. -China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Proper!y, and the Rule of Law
in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWAND PRACTICE, supra note 47 1, at 165, 167
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Chinese companies to facilitate legitimate intellectual property
exchange.48 Furthermore, they could help local Chinese intellectual
property holders develop a lobby that aims to protect their own
interests.48' After all, "the strongest voices in China are always Chinese,
and the most convincing arguments for development and enforcement
of strict [intellectual property] protocols in China have come from those
Chinese organizations which are starting to discover that they have11,481
intellectual property worth protecting. It is therefore a good strategy
to seek out or help create Chinese organizations that share similar
interests.4 3
Second, many Chinese leaders, in particular those in the rural areas,
are concerned about the unemployment problem created by the closure
of pirate factories.8 Such concerns are further heightened by the Asian
("China's [intellectual property rights] regime will become self-sustaining only when it sees that protecting
technology, films, music, and software advances its own core economic interests."); id. at 208 (arguing that
intellectual property agreements became self-sustaining in Korea and Taiwan "when both countries began
developing indigenous innovative technologies, and thus a stake in effectively wielding [intellectual property]
laws to protect domestic economic'interests"); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 221 (noting that
it is important for the United States to encourage and assist China to develop its local intellectual property
industry); Michael Schrage, In China, Start with Human ROIS to Stop the Sojkcmre Pixates, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
1995, at D3 ("Today, all the economic incentives in China dictate that piracy is a business model that makes
sense. The best way to change that is to help China and its entrepreneurs develop their own intellectual
property industries, protected by intellectual property laws that make sense."); see also SELL, supra note 67,
at 216 ("The sustainability of the new direction in developing countries will depend on both the emergence
of politically powerful domestic constituencies committed to the new direction, and the ability of interested
private parties to mobilize these constituencies to uphold and enforce these policies."); Butterton,supra note
456, at 1118 (explaining the economics behind the need to develop a local intellectual property industry);
Gary M. Hoffman & George T. Marcou, Combating the PraesofAmerica's Ideas, 7 COMPut-ER L. 8, 12 (1990)
("The local recording industry in Indonesia, for example, helped significantly in convincing the Indonesian
government to pass an effective copyright law.").
480. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 220; see also Kolton, supra note 468, at 458-59
(describing a joint intellectual property exchange between China and the United States held in Xian in
August 1995).
481. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 220; see also Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra
note 2, at 72 ("Without a well-organized intellectual property lobby, China lacks the essential domestic
constituencies that are needed to push for and to sustain continuous intellectual property law reforms and.
enforcement efforts.").
482. John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Suwahbckling the Pirates: A Communications-Based Approach to
IPR Protection in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 471, at 409,
417.
483. Id.; see MILNER, supra note 283, at 239 (arguing that the legislature will be more likely to adopt
a proposal that it does not fully understand when it can depend on one or more informed domestic groups
to signal it about the proposal); see also Giunta & Shang, supra note 3, at 331 ("[U]nlike Western countries,
developing countries have few strong lobbies of inventors, authors or companies that would benefit from
strict intellectual property laws or the enforcement thereof."); Eric I. Griffin, Note, Stop Re ig on Uncle
Samn-A Proactive Approach to Copyrght Protection in the Peopl's Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 169,
191 (1998) ("Intellectual property is simply too new a concept within China to have any strong lobbies of
inventors, authors, or companies.").
484. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 22 1.
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financial crisis and increased unemployment resulting from the
downsizing of state-operated enterprises." 5 Once again, a cooperative
strategy will help. For example, American businesses could establish
joint ventures with local companies,4 6 thus creating immediate
economic incentives for the Chinese to enforce intellectual property
rights.487 They also could consider manufacturing products in China,
thus making use of the local labor force, raw materials, and distribution
channels." Indeed, some commentators have suggested cooption of
pirate factories as a solution to the piracy problem.489 Nonetheless, real-
485. See Frank Long,joint Ventures: Different Kif d of Union Protection, ARIz. BUS. GAZETTE, Mar. 27,
1997, at I I [hereinafter Long,Joint Ventures]; see also Simon P. Cheetham, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
in Luxury Goods, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND; PRACTICE, supra note 471, at 385, 385
(stating that the local economies are concerned about "the employment, foreign exchange, and increased
industrial development provided by counterfeiting factories").
486. For discussions ofjoint ventures in China, see generally Walter Sterling Surry et al.Joint Ventures
in China: The First Water Stop, 21 TEX. INT'L LJ. 221 (1986). See also Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment Law
in the Pople's Republic of China: Dilemmas ofState Control, in CHINA'S LEGALREFORMS 155 (Stanley Lubman ed.,
1996) (reviewing the structure and performance of foreign investment law and policy in China).
487. Cheng, supo note 64, at 2010 ("The business structure ofjoint ventures may even move potential
Chinese pirates to the opposite side of the infringement equation."). Establishingjoint ventures with Chinese
companies creates other benefits to U.S. companies. For example,- it, facilitates market access for
international trade partners, id., and helps protect businesses against losses due to intellectual property piracy.
See Keshia B. Haskins, Special 301 in China and Metico: A Policy Which Fails to Consider How Politics, E onomics,
and Culture Affect Legal Change Under Civil Law Systems ofDeteloping Countries, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. LJ. 1125, 1169 (1999) ("In joint ventures, United States investors work with local partners in foreign
countries who gain 'economic interest[s] in keeping the intellectual property safe from loss."') (quoting Long,
Joini Ventures, supra note 485) (explaining how American exporters use joint ventures to protect their
intellectual property). Joint ventures also assist foreign businesses in overcoming local protectionism. As one
commentator explained:
The Chinese partner is more likely to have a better understanding of the nuances of political
life in China, be more aware of impending upheavals, and maintain the proper government
contacts to safeguard joint venture's investments. Also, a local government is more willing
to take action when a foreign investor has a government-linked partner and the government's
own interest is at stake.
Cheng, supra note 64, at 2010; see also Haskins, suptra, at 1169 ("[Joint ventures] can protect foreign investors
against loss '[in countries where political risk[s are] high."' (quoting Longoint Ventures, supra note 485)).
Finally, joint ventures allow American investors to bridge their cultural differences, obtain access to the
distribution network of their local partners, and take advantage of the personal connections, orguan-'i, that
are essential to commercial success in China. Cheng, supra note 64, at 2010 (quoting Long,Joint Ventures,
supra note 485, at I1).
488. See RYAN, supra note 2, at 81; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2.
489. See CliffordJ. Shultz II & Bill Saporito, Proting Intellectual Property: Strategies and Recommendations
to Deter Couterfeiting and Brand Piracy in Global Markets, 31 COLUM.J. WORLD Bus. 18,22-23 (1996); Griffin,
supra note 483, at 188. Cooption serves two purposes:
First, it effectively "shuts down" the bogus operation while keeping manufacturing capacity
"employed." The production of legitimate, quality goods is achieved and a counterfeit
operation has been eliminated with little incentive to start others. Second, a strategy that
employs the local work force is good public relations, politically expedient and well received
by local governments and can be leveraged for future interests.
Shultz & Saporito, supra, at 23.
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life experiences suggest that cooption has limited success in eradicating
the piracy problem, except in cases where very costly equipment is
involved. 90
To help win the acceptance and goodwill of local leaders and the
Chinese people, American businesses also should invest some of their
profits back into the local community in the form of cultural or
educational benefits.4"' Such investment not only would demonstrate to
local officials the benefits of adequate intellectual property protection,
but also would allow local officials to benefit from the success of foreign
intellectual property businesses.492 The mutual benefits resulting from
such investment would further alleviate the xenophobic sentiments
among the Chinese people and their widespread skepticism toward
Western institutions.
Third, U.S. companies have constantly complained about the
reluctance of Chinese courts to impose heavy fines on local pirates or
counterfeiters, thus reducing their deterrent effect.49 However, these
companies tend to ignore the fact that the Chinese authorities impose
heavier fines when intellectual property infringement implicates the
health and well-being of the general public.494 Thus, a cooperative
approach would be helpful to promote understanding of the two
countries and their different sense of values and to facilitate exchange
between academics, policymakers, government officials, and business
490. See Mark A. Groombridge, The Political Economy of Inelectual Proper Rhts Protection in the People's
Republic of Chma, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS 11, 36 (Clarisa Long ed.,
2000) ("All too often it is the authorized manufacturer who is involved in the infringing activities.").
491. "For example, under the auspices of Project Hope, Motorola has contributed funds to assist in
the construction of local primary schools throughout China." Doris Estelle Long, China's 1P Reforms Show
Little Success: IPEnforcement Remains Problematic, but Clever Owners Can Beat the Odds, IP WORLDWIDE, Nov.-Dec.
1998, at 1, 6 [hereinafter Long, China's IPReforms]; see also R. Michael Gadbaw & TimothyJ. Richards,
Introduction to INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 1, 27 (R.
Michael Gadbaw & TimothyJ. Richards eds., 1988) (arguing for the investment of a portion of the benefits
the United States would gain from the elimination of piracy).
492. Long, China's IPReforms, supra note 491.
493. See OFFICE OF USTR, 2001 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERS 57 (2001) (noting that "criminal and civil penalties for most kinds of counterfeiting remain too
low to deter counterfeiting"); Butterton, supra note 456, at 1104 ("[F]ines did not appear to be applied
broadly enough to act as an effective deterrent; nor were they substantial enough in every case to deter
repeat offenses by those pirates whose ill-gotten gains may have made them comparatively affluent.");
Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 415, at 16 ("Another type of problem is the low level of damage awards so far
meted out in cases that have been reported. Low damage awards do not have a deterrent effect.").
494. For example, to protect consumers, China has enacted laws and regulations containing statutory
warranties of the quality of goods manufactured or sold. If the infringing product is of inferior quality,
"selling it under trade mark is an offense, as is advertising it or selling it directly to a consumer." Mary L.
Riley, Strategies for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rghts in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 415, at 70. Thus, U.S. companies should consider not only intellectual
property laws, but also other legal theories that may result in a stronger likelihood of success and possibly
a larger fine.
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executives. 95 In addition, as demonstrated by the example concerning
investment of profits back into the local community, the court may be
less reluctant to impose fines if those fines are reinvested into the local
community in the form of education and training programs. Such
programs are badly needed to promote public awareness of intellectual
property rights. Yet, despite their paramount importance, foreign
governments and intellectual property industries are reluctant to commit
their resources to these programs.4 96
Finally, many Chinese companies are reluctant to protect intellectual
property rights of their foreign joint venture partners. Having limited
understanding of intellectual property rights, the Chinese partners are
understandably suspicious of the intentions behind what their foreign
partners are attempting to do. However, they may change their
perception and position once they learn more about intellectual
property rights. For example, in one joint venture, the Chinese
manufacturer was unwilling to allocate a portion of the joint venture
profits to the foreign partner for design charges.497 Although the foreign
495. See Ding Xinghao, Basis for a Conshuctive Strategi Partners/up Between China and the United States, in
OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 58, at 157, 167 (arguing that both China and the United
States should encourage more exchanges at every level of government and society, especially educational
and cultural exchanges, to help better understand the other); Gregory P. Fairbrother & Gerard A.
Postiglione, Teaching About China in America. Shaping the Perspectives of a New Generation, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-
CHINA RELATIONS, supra note 58, at 267, 281-82 (arguing for the incorporation of China-related content
in the U.S. social-studies curriculum); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2 (arguing that China and the
United States need to foster exchanges (in particular educational and cultural ones) between academics,
professionals, and government officials to promote better understanding between the two countries); Yu,
Piracy, Prudice, and Perspectives, supra note 2, at 82-83 (same); see also China: Sino-US Seminar on Intellectual
Property Rights Closes, CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWORK, Sept. 21, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13494566 (reporting
the joint seminar between Chinese and U.S. experts in Chongqing exploring the relations between the
protection of intellectual property rights and economic development); China Fair ofInventions, New Technologies
Opens in US, CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWORK, Sept. 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17730900 (reporting on the
China Fair of Inventions and New Technologies, an event co-sponsored by the State Intellectual Property
Office of China and the US-China Council for International Exchange, Inc. to promote better
understanding and cooperation between the United States and China in the intellectual property area).
496. Alford, Making the World Safe for Ithat?, supra note 76, at 142 ("For all its much ballyhooed
expressions of concern, neither the U.S.. government nor many of the companies driving [the American
foreign intellectual property] policy ... have made any substantial attempt ... to communicate to the
Chinese why better intellectual property protection would be in their interest .... ); Chow, supra note 467,
at 46 (noting that "brand owners are reluctant to commit the amount of resources necessary to achieve these
goals or to risk seriously offending the Chinese government"); see also Hu, supra note 456, at I I I ("[A]ctive
involvement by U.S. companies and lawyers, for example through special seminars, exchange programs,
mock proceedings, and other assistance to the Chinese media, will expedite the training process.").
The lack of resources committed to education and awareness programs is attributable to two reasons.
First, the American political system tends to reward short-term results, rather than long-term results. Yu,
From Pirates to Partners, supra note 2, at 223. Thus, policymakers are reluctant to focus on long-term policies
such as providing education at the grassroots level. Second, education is a public good. Most companies
tend to free ride on each other's efforts without incurring any substantial investment. Id.
497. See Donaldson & Weiner, supra note 482, 420.
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partner insisted on those charges, it helped the manufacturer determine
the cost of its own design processes. After the manufacturer learned that
it could charge separately for its design work, it began actively lobbying
the local regulators for the right to design fees.498
CONCLUSION
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the theory of natural
selection provided the major intellectual impetus for fierce competition,
aggressive expansion, and overseas colonization. As we begin the New
Millennium, however, nonzero-sum approaches seem to have received
widespread acceptance as the more preferable approach. In a recent
provocative, yet insightful, bestseller,499 Robert Wright argues that
natural evolution is a goal-seeking process that follows the logic of a
nonzero-sum game.5"0 Although one may disagree or have reservations
about his theory and conclusion, one can hardly deny that nonzero-sum
cooperation has captured the hearts of many policymakers, scholars,
and members of the public.
Today, the world has become increasingly globalized and
interdependent. A confrontational approach not only would limit our
synergistic potential, but also would result in unnecessary waste of
resources. Borrowing from the experiences of mediators, business
strategists, and international relations theorists, this Article seeks to
explain why policymakers should aim at playing a nonzero-sum game
when they try to resolve intellectual property disputes. Only by doing
so can they promote the development of science and technology, create
mutual benefits for all the parties involved, and preserve delicate trading
relationships.
With the advent of the Internet and the proliferation of new com-
munications technologies, the world has become increasing borderless.
A dispute resolution approach that seeks to identify gains and losses with
territorial boundaries no longer makes sense. In fact, as nobody can
predict the future of cyberspace, one solution would arguably be as good
as another.50 ' Unless policymakers can devise a win-win solution
whereby all parties benefit, insisting on one's own values without
considering another's interests will lead one down a very dangerous
path.
498. Id.
499. ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY (Vintage Books 2001).
500. Id. at 323.
501. Lawrence Lessig, Foreeoid, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987,999 (2000) ("But this is cyberspace, where no
one has the right to declare truth is on their side; and where no one should claim the right to condemn.").
[Vol. 70
